Although this blog is intended to be about the amazing stuff happening in Dutch society and politics, it's now time to publish a feature for our friends in the United States of America.
The Trump turn of events is not unique
In the last year, you Americans have seen something happen that you wouldn't think possible. A strange guy, with strange hairdo and outspoken, politically incorrect behaviour, is appealing to the masses and making a run for Presidency. While at first you all thought this was extremely unlikely to ever lead to that guy being the Republican nominee, this did happen after all.
And while you think this is a unique turn of events, you may rest assured that it is not. What you are witnessing now is something we've seen happening here in the Netherlands already for quite some time now.
Even today we still have a blond loudmouth claiming to bring back the true Netherlands and true Freedom. And the guy ranks dangerously high in our polls. He even made it to become part of a condoning coalition but then ran away from this position of power, being afraid to be criticised by his followers.
Will you end up there as well in the US?
Well, it's up to you, and in order for you to get your bearings, let me provide some further background
The mechanics of narcist-populist leader
A Dutch scholar by the name of L D'Anjou has written a very solid piece of work about narcistic leaders and politicians. You can read it here and the summary is
In modern societies narcissists regularly enter the political arena to make their dreams of success and power come true. The dynamics of narcissism tend to propel these politicians into extreme behavior and radicalism - a process that is further intensified by the way the media operate. Moreover, a kind of ‘natural’ affinity exists between political narcissism and populism.
Narcissistic politicians, therefore, try to organise electoral support with a populist platform and seek support in populist movements. As the latter are invariably radical, this strengthens those politicians’ radicalism even further. The article analyzes the dynamics of political narcissism, its relation to populism and the conditions that determine the success or failure of narcissistic politicians.
As the article is in Dutch I would recommend you to learn Dutch and read it. Or else, you''ll have to do with this brief summary and reflection by yours truly.
Trump walks a clear narcist-populist walk
In essence the article outlines that the modern society -with all media around- provides a great stage for narcistic personalities and politicians to florish. In general, the media will reinforce the performance of narcist leaders, but first they must gain political ground.
D'Anjou states that this may be easier in open societies as the Dutch (with low barriers for new parties to be founded). For that reason our two main political narcists, Fortuyn and Wilders, have understandably come from a background where they founded their own party, rather than affiliated with an existing one.
While D'Anjou thought it unlikely for a narcist to pass through the hurdles of political parties, the interesting thing is that in the US, our blond loudmouth property-developing and loss-making cowboy did do so. This can be the result of the fact that rather than achieve media-exposure via the political party, the candidate had drummed up his own media-exposure.
Next up on the list of conditions is that other players in the political market provide the opportunity for the narcist to gain grounds. In general this can be easier in times of fast change and turmoil, as the narcist can play an opportunistic game against current politicians. So the narcist will combine his outlier position with a populist approach and plays on emotions like ('things were better in the past'). The use of the 'make America great again' slogan is therefore in line with this theory.
Most important success factor for these politicians is formed by the functioning of media. The media, with their great need for news, deviations, rows, incidents will jump on the narcists behaviour to provide him with a forum for his views. And quite interestingly, we can now also see US media, recognising this dynamic and reversing course. This would be a nice lesson for the Dutch media (who tend to still amplify the vision of our local loudmouth with little fact-checking to debunk his untruths).
Whereto next?
The author D'Anjou states, at the end of the article, that our societies effectively have to learn to live with these narcist-populist players in the political game. So that means we best learn and adapt from the experiences all over the world.
Here in the Netherlands we now have some more than 10 years experience with that and all along Europe other countries are also experiencing this fact. We can see a populist bang a simplistic drum and attract a lot of followers. Putting their words to consistent political action will however not be as easy, as our local history showed.
But even so, for us in the Netherlands the jury is still out. Next years elections may even see - despite all our experience in dealing with narcist politicians) our local loudmouth become the biggest party (which of course has only one member, chief, secretary and treasurer: the loudmouth himself).
What appears to be happening in the US now, is that the essential traits of the narcist (inability to lose, to be left alone) lead to an increase of his erratic behaviour. In combination with the media that take their responsibility to not just amplify the voice, but also check it, this may finally lead to a choice for capabilities rather than pomposity.
Still, it will be very interesting to see how, in the US, as an example of a democracy with a lot of checks and balances, the elections play out. So in determining your vote, I wish you all the wisdom you need.
Showing posts with label democracy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label democracy. Show all posts
04/06/2012
Eurozone troubles.... all originate in a wish to get back to normal?
In the recent days I've read a book by J. Beyen called: 'het spel en de knikkers'. It's a Dutch autobiography describing the life and career of a banker, central banker, former President of the BIS, Executive Director at the IMF, Minister of Foreign Affairs and so on. Beyen was for example one of the important Dutch delegates at the Bretton Woods conference. And his book - in particular the episode on the golden standard - is fascinating.
Golden Standard as the solution or the problem?
Until the First World War, the golden standard had become the de facto monetary norm for governments/countries. It consisted of a set of fixed exchange rates, which meant that local economies sometimes had to suffer, as devaluation was impossible. On the other hand, it allowed for a lot of international trade and stability and was thus praised and adopted. Until the First World War changed a lot and the golden standard was abandoned.
In his book, Beyen describes the major sentiment of policy makers after the First World War. And he calls it the desire to go 'back to normal'. A central theme in this desire was the re-establishment of the Golden Standard. Beyen also describes that monetary thinking at that time wasn't as advanced as in 1968 (when he wrote the book) He sketches that the system of fixed exchange rates in itself burdened the European economies, but policy makers weren't able to see this at the time: obsessed with getting back to normal.
Current flaws in Euroland thinking: still seeking a back to normal?
The musings and discussions all around Europe these days, in particular the new plans on a banking union, fascinate me enormously. The singlemindedness with which politicians now move forward into more Europe, more joint policy, more deposit guarantee may be variations on a similar desire: back to normal. Back to the Europe from before the crisis, using the same policy tools and concepts that we used before the financial and sovereign crisis broke out.
As a result, we are now witnessing policy makers, fully caught up in their goal to save Europe by designing futher institutions and policies. But, essentially, our politicians and civil servants fail to recognize that the European car doesn't respond any more to twists of the steering wheel. The only thing that has helped (only temporarily) is throwing money at the problem.
Are we missing something here?
While our monetary thinking may evolved quite a bit since the 1930s, our knowledge of policy and strategy making is not as widely and heavily discussed and modeled. In theory we could all be aware of mechanisms such as groupthink, tunnel vision, decision complexity, resource complexity etcetera. But in practice we fail to properly recognize and address the fundamental errors in policy making.
Having read the autobiography of Beyen, I tend to believe that we are now learning new lessons in the Eurozone. And the lessons are not so much related to monetary theories but to international policy making under stress. I therefore hereby propose the concept of policy illusion to be better recognized in the future. It is the understandable tendency of policy makers to continue doing what you were doing all the time, even when the world fundamentally required a different way of looking.
And so we can now see our policy makers making policy by looking so intensely at the rear-view mirror that they will miss the fork in the road ahead.
Golden Standard as the solution or the problem?
Until the First World War, the golden standard had become the de facto monetary norm for governments/countries. It consisted of a set of fixed exchange rates, which meant that local economies sometimes had to suffer, as devaluation was impossible. On the other hand, it allowed for a lot of international trade and stability and was thus praised and adopted. Until the First World War changed a lot and the golden standard was abandoned.
In his book, Beyen describes the major sentiment of policy makers after the First World War. And he calls it the desire to go 'back to normal'. A central theme in this desire was the re-establishment of the Golden Standard. Beyen also describes that monetary thinking at that time wasn't as advanced as in 1968 (when he wrote the book) He sketches that the system of fixed exchange rates in itself burdened the European economies, but policy makers weren't able to see this at the time: obsessed with getting back to normal.
Current flaws in Euroland thinking: still seeking a back to normal?
The musings and discussions all around Europe these days, in particular the new plans on a banking union, fascinate me enormously. The singlemindedness with which politicians now move forward into more Europe, more joint policy, more deposit guarantee may be variations on a similar desire: back to normal. Back to the Europe from before the crisis, using the same policy tools and concepts that we used before the financial and sovereign crisis broke out.
As a result, we are now witnessing policy makers, fully caught up in their goal to save Europe by designing futher institutions and policies. But, essentially, our politicians and civil servants fail to recognize that the European car doesn't respond any more to twists of the steering wheel. The only thing that has helped (only temporarily) is throwing money at the problem.
Are we missing something here?
While our monetary thinking may evolved quite a bit since the 1930s, our knowledge of policy and strategy making is not as widely and heavily discussed and modeled. In theory we could all be aware of mechanisms such as groupthink, tunnel vision, decision complexity, resource complexity etcetera. But in practice we fail to properly recognize and address the fundamental errors in policy making.
Having read the autobiography of Beyen, I tend to believe that we are now learning new lessons in the Eurozone. And the lessons are not so much related to monetary theories but to international policy making under stress. I therefore hereby propose the concept of policy illusion to be better recognized in the future. It is the understandable tendency of policy makers to continue doing what you were doing all the time, even when the world fundamentally required a different way of looking.
And so we can now see our policy makers making policy by looking so intensely at the rear-view mirror that they will miss the fork in the road ahead.
21/04/2012
Wilders stops his support for minority-government of the Netherlands...
The breaking news here in the Netherlands is that Geert Wilders has left the building. And 'the building' is the so-called Catshuis, the seat of our prime-Minister. It is here that, during the past 7 weeks, the VVD (liberals) and CDA (christian-democrats) have negotiated with the PVV (Freedom Party) to agree on further austerity measures. And our prime-Minister Mark Rutte has just explained to the public that the Freedom Party has stopped the negotiations and was no longer willing to take its responsibility for the measures. CDA-delegate Verhagen has mirrored this remark so we can see that the blame-game has now started.
It is interesting to note that this step of Wilders occured only 12 hours after the group was provided with the data of the Dutch Planning Agency that had calculated the impact of the jointly agreed draft austerity-measures. And our foreign readers should also note that Wilders is increasingly losing momentum. Hero Brinkman has left the PVV, a couple of weeks ago. And the quite unelegant bashing of the Queen as well as Turkish official Gül last week, didn't win him a lot of supporters either (he immediately lost 2 seats in the polls).
So now we find ourselves in a tricky situation in the Netherlands: we need austerity measures and we need our government to act. But the support-construction with the Freedom Party have turned the past 2 years into a standstill with no serious economic reforms and lots of symbolic regulatory measures to please the public (and the PVV-voter). So while everyone in the Netherlands understands the need to reform, it is also clear that it is now time for new elections. The experiment with PVV has failed to work.
Our Prime Minister has of course phoned the Queen but has not resigned yet. He stated that the situation is so serious that he wants to discuss further steps with Parliament. And he leaves open the possibility that there will first be an agreement on government finances and afterwards elections. While some parties will want to follow this pragmatic route, it remains to be seen if the big opposition parties such as the left wing Socialistische Partij and the Partij van de Arbeid are willing to cooperate.
Geert Wilders has also given a press conference, just now, and he specifically blames Europe. He had outlined that he has stepped away, that he no longer supports the minority-government. And he stated that especially the cuts for elderly pensioners formed a serious issue for him.In the press-talk afterwards he repeatedly outlined that he did not wish to comply with the 3% rule of Brussel. So he started blaming Brussels and he started the election game.
It is clear to me that for Wilders, the duration of his cooperation with the minority-government was long enough to gain creditibility as a true states-man. And as he is losing support among the public, as his party starts to crumble, he must have decided that if ever, now is the time to capitalize on his popularity and to try his jump to become the biggest party in the Netherlands. In doing so he demonstrates once more that his major quality does not pertain to leading a party or a state, but is one of walking away from the debate and challenges that are really relevant to the nation.
It is interesting to note that this step of Wilders occured only 12 hours after the group was provided with the data of the Dutch Planning Agency that had calculated the impact of the jointly agreed draft austerity-measures. And our foreign readers should also note that Wilders is increasingly losing momentum. Hero Brinkman has left the PVV, a couple of weeks ago. And the quite unelegant bashing of the Queen as well as Turkish official Gül last week, didn't win him a lot of supporters either (he immediately lost 2 seats in the polls).
So now we find ourselves in a tricky situation in the Netherlands: we need austerity measures and we need our government to act. But the support-construction with the Freedom Party have turned the past 2 years into a standstill with no serious economic reforms and lots of symbolic regulatory measures to please the public (and the PVV-voter). So while everyone in the Netherlands understands the need to reform, it is also clear that it is now time for new elections. The experiment with PVV has failed to work.
Our Prime Minister has of course phoned the Queen but has not resigned yet. He stated that the situation is so serious that he wants to discuss further steps with Parliament. And he leaves open the possibility that there will first be an agreement on government finances and afterwards elections. While some parties will want to follow this pragmatic route, it remains to be seen if the big opposition parties such as the left wing Socialistische Partij and the Partij van de Arbeid are willing to cooperate.
Geert Wilders has also given a press conference, just now, and he specifically blames Europe. He had outlined that he has stepped away, that he no longer supports the minority-government. And he stated that especially the cuts for elderly pensioners formed a serious issue for him.In the press-talk afterwards he repeatedly outlined that he did not wish to comply with the 3% rule of Brussel. So he started blaming Brussels and he started the election game.
It is clear to me that for Wilders, the duration of his cooperation with the minority-government was long enough to gain creditibility as a true states-man. And as he is losing support among the public, as his party starts to crumble, he must have decided that if ever, now is the time to capitalize on his popularity and to try his jump to become the biggest party in the Netherlands. In doing so he demonstrates once more that his major quality does not pertain to leading a party or a state, but is one of walking away from the debate and challenges that are really relevant to the nation.
14/02/2012
Silly Geert Wilders seeks attention with anti-eastern European website
This blog is to update and inform the foreign readers about the current status of things here in the Netherlands. And in particular with respect to our narcistic party leader Wilders of the PVV. He has set up a website where complaints can be filed about neighbours from Eastern Europe, when they make too much noise. According to the Freedom Party PVV, the site is a great succes, with 14000 complaints filed on the first day and 40.000 after a week.
It is interesting to note the subsequent debate in the Netherlands (and rest of Europe). First of all, it appears that no one recalculates the data of the PVV. So the silly claim of 14000 in one day (meaning 10 complaints per minute, during 24 hours) goes unchallenged. And the same goes for the claim of 40.000 in one week (4 complaints a minute, during 7 days of non stop operation). Even if the PVV would themselves be filling in the forms on their website (which they did in a previous incident, about traffic incidents in The Hague), they would have a hard time typing it all.
Second, we had this bureau of discrimination, stating quickly that the site of Wilders would not constitute discrimination. Well, it seems to me clear that the site is discriminatory. But foreign readers should note that here in the Netherlands we lost our ability to value and protect human rights. We have had judges here that outlined that Wilders was not doing hatespeech (only to be corrected one month later when Breivik demonstrated that the effect even crossed our borders). And some maintain the fiction that this site is not discriminatory. In doing so, we completely forget our historic heritage (liberty of religion, as stated in the Union of Utrecht in the 16th century) as well as the relevant international guidances on human rights. So our Prime Minister turns a blind eye to the issue.
The reasons for doing so are not illogical by the way. Our Prime-Minister essentially chooses to ignore most of the stupid actions of the Freedom Party and its narcist leader. And in psychological terms that is indeed a correct approach which clearly works. The Freedom party is losing a lot of traction in voting polls with the Socialist Party (SP) gaining a lot. And the effect is so strong that Wilders himself starts showing up in interviews and tv programs. And that is new: he would normally just tweet and never give interviews. So he feels the heat and now seeks to regain influence.
But then again, when the subject involves discrimination, one may think twice when turning the blind eye. Fortunatety we have a lot of creative Dutch people that quickly set up all kinds of websites to hug the Polish, to report all scary PVV-MP's and so on. So foreigner shouldn't take this stuff to seriously; it's certainly isn't the common opinion. See also how our Dutch Commissioner Kroes aptly responded: why not create a website to complain about blonded hair? So the thing that our Prime-Minister should do is to inform and advise all foreign nations to use a similar approach: just ignore Wilders on this one.
And while I'm tempted to do the same, I figured it might be good to explain this to the foreign readers. So do note that this whole charade is the proverbial 'cornered cat that jumps strangely' (as we say here in the Netherlands).
It is interesting to note the subsequent debate in the Netherlands (and rest of Europe). First of all, it appears that no one recalculates the data of the PVV. So the silly claim of 14000 in one day (meaning 10 complaints per minute, during 24 hours) goes unchallenged. And the same goes for the claim of 40.000 in one week (4 complaints a minute, during 7 days of non stop operation). Even if the PVV would themselves be filling in the forms on their website (which they did in a previous incident, about traffic incidents in The Hague), they would have a hard time typing it all.
Second, we had this bureau of discrimination, stating quickly that the site of Wilders would not constitute discrimination. Well, it seems to me clear that the site is discriminatory. But foreign readers should note that here in the Netherlands we lost our ability to value and protect human rights. We have had judges here that outlined that Wilders was not doing hatespeech (only to be corrected one month later when Breivik demonstrated that the effect even crossed our borders). And some maintain the fiction that this site is not discriminatory. In doing so, we completely forget our historic heritage (liberty of religion, as stated in the Union of Utrecht in the 16th century) as well as the relevant international guidances on human rights. So our Prime Minister turns a blind eye to the issue.
The reasons for doing so are not illogical by the way. Our Prime-Minister essentially chooses to ignore most of the stupid actions of the Freedom Party and its narcist leader. And in psychological terms that is indeed a correct approach which clearly works. The Freedom party is losing a lot of traction in voting polls with the Socialist Party (SP) gaining a lot. And the effect is so strong that Wilders himself starts showing up in interviews and tv programs. And that is new: he would normally just tweet and never give interviews. So he feels the heat and now seeks to regain influence.
But then again, when the subject involves discrimination, one may think twice when turning the blind eye. Fortunatety we have a lot of creative Dutch people that quickly set up all kinds of websites to hug the Polish, to report all scary PVV-MP's and so on. So foreigner shouldn't take this stuff to seriously; it's certainly isn't the common opinion. See also how our Dutch Commissioner Kroes aptly responded: why not create a website to complain about blonded hair? So the thing that our Prime-Minister should do is to inform and advise all foreign nations to use a similar approach: just ignore Wilders on this one.
And while I'm tempted to do the same, I figured it might be good to explain this to the foreign readers. So do note that this whole charade is the proverbial 'cornered cat that jumps strangely' (as we say here in the Netherlands).
11/10/2011
Waiting for the trojka report and the finale... will the euro go out with a bang...?
The times they are changing amazing.
One year ago in Deauville, we saw Merkel and Sarkozy decide on how to save Europe: getting the banks involved was the answer. Then this week we saw them saving Europe once again: a huge fund and effort was necessary. Everyone was hopeful; it really appeared as if they were going to get it right this time. Stock exchanges felt happy but the stakes are up. Because if Merkozy fail to get it right, the finale will certainly become a blast.
What I find amazing is that we could see a sovereign crisis turn into a full blown bank crisis in Europe, due to the political desire to take revenge on banks. If banks need to pay up as well, this hurts their income, their revenue and future divivends. So down with share prices and trust. Then, add a couple of local bank tax plans on top and those are all the ingredients you need for a full blown contagion in the financial market. Yet only a number of people, among which former Director Hoogduin of the Dutch Central Bank, dare to outline to Merkozy that they themselves have been the major factor that contributed to the feared 'contagion' in the financial markets.
So now we need an ever bigger final bazooka solution. And what concerns me now, is the tone with which both leaders of state keep referring to the trojka report and the decision afterwards. It's a tone that defers the topic to a technicality with subsequent political decision. It's not the tone that you would expect of leaders. Two real political leaders might refer to the report, but not give the trojka this much attention.
Because imagine yourself to be a member of the trojka. If all the eyes of the world are upon you, what are you going to say? You need to keep an optimistic tone, but then again, you can see that the Greek are evidently failing the standards. What to report then? Outlining that Greece missed the norm will mean oil on the fire of populist hardliners in the EU. And stressing that Greece is well underway means that the flak might be directed at the trojka itself. There's no way of doing it right.
So what may happen is that there will be a highly diplomatic press conference and report, so ambigous that it will do the least public harm. Still, the politicans are responsible for putting the trojka in this awkward position. They deflected a primary political issue to a group of experts while they should effectively solve it themselves. Because as things stands now, the trojka has too much politicial expectations deflected upon itself, to do its work properly. And in my opinion, this doesn't bode well at all.
So we could be up for a grand finale. Either because of the trojka report or because of the fact that the French and German are not going to agree on the details that they need to agree upon to shoot the final bazooka.
More and more I feel that this political (and sovereign) crisis has some similarities with these animated Disney films. Cat is chasing mouse. Running hard. Running off the cliff and keeps running in a straight line. Until the cat discovers there's no more ground underneath. Which is when the fall begins. Cat falls down and should be dead of course, but in this miracle world of Disney just irons out the bumps and starts chasing the mouse again....
Updated 1540: If you wish the end result, the joint statement, read the text below: a nice example of diplomacy beyond diplomacy. Greece gets the money while it doesn't fullfill earlier criteria. Where did we hear this before..?
PRESS RELEASE
11 October 2011 - Statement by the European Commission, the ECB and IMF on the Fifth Review Mission to Greece
Staff teams from the European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have concluded their fifth review mission to Greece to discuss recent economic developments. The mission has reached staff-level agreement with the authorities on the economic and financial policies needed to bring the government’s economic program back on track.
Regarding the outlook, the recession will be deeper than was anticipated in June and a recovery is now expected only from 2013 onwards. There is no evidence yet of improvement in investor sentiment and the related increase in investments, in part because the reform momentum has not gained the critical mass necessary to begin transforming the investment climate. However, exports are rebounding—albeit from a low base—and a shift towards a more dynamic export sector, supported by a moderation of unit labor costs, should lead to more balanced and sustainable growth over the medium term. Inflation has come down over the last year and is expected to remain below the euro area average in the period ahead.
In the fiscal area, the government has achieved a major reduction in the deficit since the start of the program despite a deep recession. However, the achievement of the fiscal target for 2011 is no longer within reach, partly because of a further drop in GDP, but also because of slippages in the implementation of some of the agreed measures.
As for 2012, the mission believes that the additional measures announced by the government, in combination with a determined implementation of the adjusted Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, should be sufficient to bring the fiscal program back on track and ensure that the deficit target of EUR 14.9 billion will be met.
Looking to 2013-14, additional measures are likely to be needed to meet program targets. Such measures should be adopted in the context of an update of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy by mid-2012. To ensure that the program is growth-friendly, and in view of the ambitious assumptions regarding improvement in revenue administration already embedded in the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, it is essential that such measures focus on the expenditure side.
In the area of privatisation, progress has been achieved with the creation of a professionally managed privatisation fund. However, delays in the preparation of the assets for privatisation, and to some extent worse market conditions, mean that revenues in 2011 will be significantly lower than expected. The government remains, however, committed to the revenue target of EUR 35 billion by the end of 2014. Ensuring that the privatisation fund remains independent from political pressures remains key for success in this area.
Banks have improved their capital base through market-based means. As evident from this weekend’s resolution of Proton Bank, the recent amendment of the banking law ensures that non-viable banks can be wound down while protecting depositors' interest and preserving the stability of the financial system.
As to structural reforms, areas of progress include the transport sector, licensing procedures, and regulated professions. As overall progress has been uneven, a reinvigoration of reforms remains the overarching challenge facing the authorities. In this regard, the decision to suspend the mandatory extension of sector-level collective agreements to the firm level is a major step forward, as it will help ensure the flexibility in the labour market needed to boost growth and prevent high unemployment from getting entrenched.
Overall, the authorities continue to make important progress, notably with regard to fiscal consolidation. To ensure a further reduction in the deficit in a socially acceptable manner and to set the stage for a recovery to take hold, it is essential that the authorities put more emphasis on structural reforms in the public sector and the economy more broadly.
The success of the program continues to depend on mobilizing adequate financing from private sector involvement (PSI) and the official sector. Ongoing discussions on PSI together with assurances provided by European leaders at their July 21 summit suggest that the program remains fully financed.
Once the Eurogroup and the IMF’s Executive Board have approved the conclusions of the fifth review, the next tranche of EUR 8 billion (EUR 5.8 billion by the euro area Member States, and EUR 2.2 billion by the IMF) will become available, most likely, in early November.
One year ago in Deauville, we saw Merkel and Sarkozy decide on how to save Europe: getting the banks involved was the answer. Then this week we saw them saving Europe once again: a huge fund and effort was necessary. Everyone was hopeful; it really appeared as if they were going to get it right this time. Stock exchanges felt happy but the stakes are up. Because if Merkozy fail to get it right, the finale will certainly become a blast.
What I find amazing is that we could see a sovereign crisis turn into a full blown bank crisis in Europe, due to the political desire to take revenge on banks. If banks need to pay up as well, this hurts their income, their revenue and future divivends. So down with share prices and trust. Then, add a couple of local bank tax plans on top and those are all the ingredients you need for a full blown contagion in the financial market. Yet only a number of people, among which former Director Hoogduin of the Dutch Central Bank, dare to outline to Merkozy that they themselves have been the major factor that contributed to the feared 'contagion' in the financial markets.
So now we need an ever bigger final bazooka solution. And what concerns me now, is the tone with which both leaders of state keep referring to the trojka report and the decision afterwards. It's a tone that defers the topic to a technicality with subsequent political decision. It's not the tone that you would expect of leaders. Two real political leaders might refer to the report, but not give the trojka this much attention.
Because imagine yourself to be a member of the trojka. If all the eyes of the world are upon you, what are you going to say? You need to keep an optimistic tone, but then again, you can see that the Greek are evidently failing the standards. What to report then? Outlining that Greece missed the norm will mean oil on the fire of populist hardliners in the EU. And stressing that Greece is well underway means that the flak might be directed at the trojka itself. There's no way of doing it right.
So what may happen is that there will be a highly diplomatic press conference and report, so ambigous that it will do the least public harm. Still, the politicans are responsible for putting the trojka in this awkward position. They deflected a primary political issue to a group of experts while they should effectively solve it themselves. Because as things stands now, the trojka has too much politicial expectations deflected upon itself, to do its work properly. And in my opinion, this doesn't bode well at all.
So we could be up for a grand finale. Either because of the trojka report or because of the fact that the French and German are not going to agree on the details that they need to agree upon to shoot the final bazooka.
More and more I feel that this political (and sovereign) crisis has some similarities with these animated Disney films. Cat is chasing mouse. Running hard. Running off the cliff and keeps running in a straight line. Until the cat discovers there's no more ground underneath. Which is when the fall begins. Cat falls down and should be dead of course, but in this miracle world of Disney just irons out the bumps and starts chasing the mouse again....
Updated 1540: If you wish the end result, the joint statement, read the text below: a nice example of diplomacy beyond diplomacy. Greece gets the money while it doesn't fullfill earlier criteria. Where did we hear this before..?
PRESS RELEASE
11 October 2011 - Statement by the European Commission, the ECB and IMF on the Fifth Review Mission to Greece
Staff teams from the European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have concluded their fifth review mission to Greece to discuss recent economic developments. The mission has reached staff-level agreement with the authorities on the economic and financial policies needed to bring the government’s economic program back on track.
Regarding the outlook, the recession will be deeper than was anticipated in June and a recovery is now expected only from 2013 onwards. There is no evidence yet of improvement in investor sentiment and the related increase in investments, in part because the reform momentum has not gained the critical mass necessary to begin transforming the investment climate. However, exports are rebounding—albeit from a low base—and a shift towards a more dynamic export sector, supported by a moderation of unit labor costs, should lead to more balanced and sustainable growth over the medium term. Inflation has come down over the last year and is expected to remain below the euro area average in the period ahead.
In the fiscal area, the government has achieved a major reduction in the deficit since the start of the program despite a deep recession. However, the achievement of the fiscal target for 2011 is no longer within reach, partly because of a further drop in GDP, but also because of slippages in the implementation of some of the agreed measures.
As for 2012, the mission believes that the additional measures announced by the government, in combination with a determined implementation of the adjusted Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, should be sufficient to bring the fiscal program back on track and ensure that the deficit target of EUR 14.9 billion will be met.
Looking to 2013-14, additional measures are likely to be needed to meet program targets. Such measures should be adopted in the context of an update of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy by mid-2012. To ensure that the program is growth-friendly, and in view of the ambitious assumptions regarding improvement in revenue administration already embedded in the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, it is essential that such measures focus on the expenditure side.
In the area of privatisation, progress has been achieved with the creation of a professionally managed privatisation fund. However, delays in the preparation of the assets for privatisation, and to some extent worse market conditions, mean that revenues in 2011 will be significantly lower than expected. The government remains, however, committed to the revenue target of EUR 35 billion by the end of 2014. Ensuring that the privatisation fund remains independent from political pressures remains key for success in this area.
Banks have improved their capital base through market-based means. As evident from this weekend’s resolution of Proton Bank, the recent amendment of the banking law ensures that non-viable banks can be wound down while protecting depositors' interest and preserving the stability of the financial system.
As to structural reforms, areas of progress include the transport sector, licensing procedures, and regulated professions. As overall progress has been uneven, a reinvigoration of reforms remains the overarching challenge facing the authorities. In this regard, the decision to suspend the mandatory extension of sector-level collective agreements to the firm level is a major step forward, as it will help ensure the flexibility in the labour market needed to boost growth and prevent high unemployment from getting entrenched.
Overall, the authorities continue to make important progress, notably with regard to fiscal consolidation. To ensure a further reduction in the deficit in a socially acceptable manner and to set the stage for a recovery to take hold, it is essential that the authorities put more emphasis on structural reforms in the public sector and the economy more broadly.
The success of the program continues to depend on mobilizing adequate financing from private sector involvement (PSI) and the official sector. Ongoing discussions on PSI together with assurances provided by European leaders at their July 21 summit suggest that the program remains fully financed.
Once the Eurogroup and the IMF’s Executive Board have approved the conclusions of the fifth review, the next tranche of EUR 8 billion (EUR 5.8 billion by the euro area Member States, and EUR 2.2 billion by the IMF) will become available, most likely, in early November.
09/10/2011
Exceptional, depressing and amazing interview by Peter van Ingen on Buitenhof (Dutch tv) this morning
This morning. Both the terms Peter van Ingen and Buitenhof became trending on Twitter Netherlands. And the reason is that we could all be amazed at the style of interview by Mr. van Ingen. I dedicated a Dutch blog on the implications of such an interview style, but the foreign readers may want a bit of background information.
So what happened here in the Netherlands in the media?
Our labour party, PvdA is strongly in decline. While they reached 30 seats in parliament during elections, they have considerable less seats in polls now (see here) which creates an uncomfortable position. The Socialist Party eats up a lot of votes and there is a lot of discussion in public on the style of Job Cohen, the chair of the 30 members of Parliament. He remains the gentlemen rather than choosing for the quote-style of politics that we can see a lot these days. In doing so he is the exception.
This week, the chair of the Labour Party, Ploumen, left the party. But she also gave an exit-interview in the Volkskrant (a bit left-oriented newspaper in the Netherlands). And as a result, the pressure on Job Cohen mounts. See also this article. Cohen has outlined that he will take the criticism to heart and therefore all eyes in the Netherlands were turning to Buitenhof, this Sunday morning. Buitenhof is the main political debate program, which often serves as a platform for political discussion.
The interview in Buitenhof
This mornings edition of Buitenhof had a particularly agressive interviewer, Peter van Ingen, who fist wanted to discuss in detail what exactly had happened this week, with the exit interview of Ploumen. Then Cohen explained this but also stated: I prefer not to further engage on this issue in public, but within the party. Van Ingen kept pushing, but Cohen outlined his stance.
In a lof of the rest of the interview van Ingen effectively sort of played the devils advocate and repeated some of the criticism of Ploumen on Cohen. Which was all about style and conduct. Cohen made it clear that he was choosing his own style, his own tone of voice and that insulting nicknames said more about the insultor than himself. Yet van Ingen pushed on, not willing to listen to the content of Cohen's message.
Essentially, the interviewer kept on moaning and complaining about how Cohen conducted himself in the political arena while Cohen tried to outline his partys vision for the future. And although the tv-interview was advertised on the web as: 'Cohen's reply', (suggesting that Cohen would get the floor for his vision on developments) the interviewer didn't allow for much space and often interrupted. So we ended up with very little content in the discussion and an awful lot of tit-for-tat talk on process.
The most striking element was that the last question was: 'Did you arrange already for your succession?'. Many comments on twitter described this as impertinent, given also the previous line of questioning by the interviewer. It's not nice to wrap up the interview and throw this prepared granate to the guest. But Cohen handled it competently. And this ended the interview.
Annoyed
The style of interview -and the last question as the cherry on the cake- got many people annoyed. This was more about the opinion of the interviewer than giving the floor to Cohen.It got me to immediately write an analysis and comment on my Dutch blog that:
1. the choice by a tv show to not focus on content but only short time actuality/gossip is in itself also a political choice; it's not a neutral choice but a choice that also shapes the political climate,
2. the choice by an interviewer to go for an offensive style can be made, but the talk should in the end be about the guest and the opinion of the guest, rather than the opinion of the interviewer. And this interview contained quite a lot of display of morality and opinion of the interviewer, blocking the message of the guest. And underneath, the interviewer did not appear to be interested at all in the opinion of the guest. Which showed.
3. the last question about succession planning, was an impertinent one; comparable to kicking a man when he is own on the ground. And I noted that this tough-style interviewing is becoming more and more popular in the Netherlands. And thus, the Dutch media themselves play a role in creating a more rude and inpolite political climate: a serious trend that they might want to reflect on.
Action
To vent out my amazement I wrote this Dutch blog. And in it I placed two links so that readers who would agree, could easily send out e-mails to the journalist team at Buitenhof. So that the team may reflect on what happened today in the interview with Cohen.
I hope they will succeed in getting their interview standards to a higher level, because a good functioning political system also requires solid journalists keeping up their standards.
So what happened here in the Netherlands in the media?
Our labour party, PvdA is strongly in decline. While they reached 30 seats in parliament during elections, they have considerable less seats in polls now (see here) which creates an uncomfortable position. The Socialist Party eats up a lot of votes and there is a lot of discussion in public on the style of Job Cohen, the chair of the 30 members of Parliament. He remains the gentlemen rather than choosing for the quote-style of politics that we can see a lot these days. In doing so he is the exception.
This week, the chair of the Labour Party, Ploumen, left the party. But she also gave an exit-interview in the Volkskrant (a bit left-oriented newspaper in the Netherlands). And as a result, the pressure on Job Cohen mounts. See also this article. Cohen has outlined that he will take the criticism to heart and therefore all eyes in the Netherlands were turning to Buitenhof, this Sunday morning. Buitenhof is the main political debate program, which often serves as a platform for political discussion.
The interview in Buitenhof
This mornings edition of Buitenhof had a particularly agressive interviewer, Peter van Ingen, who fist wanted to discuss in detail what exactly had happened this week, with the exit interview of Ploumen. Then Cohen explained this but also stated: I prefer not to further engage on this issue in public, but within the party. Van Ingen kept pushing, but Cohen outlined his stance.
In a lof of the rest of the interview van Ingen effectively sort of played the devils advocate and repeated some of the criticism of Ploumen on Cohen. Which was all about style and conduct. Cohen made it clear that he was choosing his own style, his own tone of voice and that insulting nicknames said more about the insultor than himself. Yet van Ingen pushed on, not willing to listen to the content of Cohen's message.
Essentially, the interviewer kept on moaning and complaining about how Cohen conducted himself in the political arena while Cohen tried to outline his partys vision for the future. And although the tv-interview was advertised on the web as: 'Cohen's reply', (suggesting that Cohen would get the floor for his vision on developments) the interviewer didn't allow for much space and often interrupted. So we ended up with very little content in the discussion and an awful lot of tit-for-tat talk on process.
The most striking element was that the last question was: 'Did you arrange already for your succession?'. Many comments on twitter described this as impertinent, given also the previous line of questioning by the interviewer. It's not nice to wrap up the interview and throw this prepared granate to the guest. But Cohen handled it competently. And this ended the interview.
Annoyed
The style of interview -and the last question as the cherry on the cake- got many people annoyed. This was more about the opinion of the interviewer than giving the floor to Cohen.It got me to immediately write an analysis and comment on my Dutch blog that:
1. the choice by a tv show to not focus on content but only short time actuality/gossip is in itself also a political choice; it's not a neutral choice but a choice that also shapes the political climate,
2. the choice by an interviewer to go for an offensive style can be made, but the talk should in the end be about the guest and the opinion of the guest, rather than the opinion of the interviewer. And this interview contained quite a lot of display of morality and opinion of the interviewer, blocking the message of the guest. And underneath, the interviewer did not appear to be interested at all in the opinion of the guest. Which showed.
3. the last question about succession planning, was an impertinent one; comparable to kicking a man when he is own on the ground. And I noted that this tough-style interviewing is becoming more and more popular in the Netherlands. And thus, the Dutch media themselves play a role in creating a more rude and inpolite political climate: a serious trend that they might want to reflect on.
Action
To vent out my amazement I wrote this Dutch blog. And in it I placed two links so that readers who would agree, could easily send out e-mails to the journalist team at Buitenhof. So that the team may reflect on what happened today in the interview with Cohen.
I hope they will succeed in getting their interview standards to a higher level, because a good functioning political system also requires solid journalists keeping up their standards.
22/09/2011
Dutch budget talks and generic policy discussions in parliament taken hostage by 'freedom of speech' of Wilders
This is a blog for the foreign readers, interested in finding out what's happening in the Netherlands political debate since Wilders was acquitted from hate speech.
Well the short update is the following:
1- many politicians were awkwardly silent when the Norwegian shooting occured; although it was quite clear that this shooting better proved the existence and cross-border impact of Wilders hate speech than the local Dutch court dared to conclude.
2- Wilders keeps on banging the drum that Greece should be kicked out of the euro; as a result the PvdA (Labour) challenges Wilders to stop supporting this minority cabinet or otherwise be silent,
3- Wilders now helps out a cabinet with a set of cutbacks that are contrary to his election promises, and seeks to divert attention,
4- the strategy of Wilders to divert attention was a full-out indecent and improper behaviour during yesterdays and todays Parliamentary discussions on budget and future strategy of the Dutch government (read the dutch report here).
My personal impression was that, as is often the case with narcist people, the words of Wilders said more of himself than of the subject or person at hand. And the fact that Wilders had to resort to so many unsubtleties shows two things:
- psychologically he has concluded - in his head - that with the acquittal of the penal court, he has firmly gained and established the right to freedom of speech and the right to express himself any way he likes; there is no stopping Geert now as he thinks the judge has now not only acquitted him, but also issued him a license to insult,
- politically, he is playing his old record/song (personal attacks, indecent inferrals and wording) louder and louder in order to gain attention from media and electorate; yet, now that he supports the government, the opposition is smart enough to point out to the people that Wilders is all talk, no action.
Effectively Wilders is eager to exercise his rights but never present when it comes to honouring obligations that come with the rights. So below I have listed some of his words, translated, to illustrate how Wilders uses his right to freedom of speech in Dutch parliament and ignores his obligation to show conduct an MP becoming. And do note that many other subtle hints in body language, tone and frasing, are untranslatable.
To Cohen, leader of the PvdA
-Well you can bleat all you want but at the end of the day you are the company poodle of this cabinet.
-I'll say it once again and it hurts, but you are the company poodle
-You are the toy dog, the poodle of the Cabinet.
To the chair of Parliament:
-Wilders (when meaning to talk to Cohen): ..you are the co-muddler of this government.
-Chair of Parliament: Mr Wilders you were going to try to talk via the chair of Parliament. I am not a co-muddler.
-Wilders: Not yet, so much is true.
About MP Peters (when characterizing Green Left as a 'beach-party' this summer:
.. and Mrs Peters was somewhere mixing up her interests (inuendo to an affair that became part of a public and political discussion).
To Mr Pechtold
I am not sure if there was a question, but let me try to answer this dhiarrea of Mr Pechtold..
About Secretary of state Albayrak
While Albayrak still recieved criminal strangers open armed, giving a general pardon away - I don't know if she did it in cooperation with her niece - we now really deal with criminal strangers.
To Green Left:
Objection noted. The Beach Party apparently does not agree.
About A director of a hospital
We have a concern with care-directors at the top (using the word bobo's which is a denigrating term for rich, ignorant directors).
About himself, when adressed about courtesey in parliament
We at the PVV enjoy a strong debate. One time it is courteous, the other time sharp and sometimes both. It's all part of the game and we will never change our ways.
Latest update: Wilders provoking the Minister President and parliament ignoring him
Yesterdays improper behaviour of Wilders resulted in 120 letters being sent to parliament. And some MPs, notable Roemer (Socialist Party) yesterday desired a written declaration of the Minister President Rutte on how he qualified the wording of Wilders. Prime Minister Rutte chose to do that at the end of todays session. And that was a solid choice, because a good discussion followed during todays session in parliament.
Until somewhere this afternoon Rutte denounced the wording of Wilders the day before and Wilders started rebutting, throwing in the remark (in sort of cockney style): 'Hey man, act normal.' So Wilders had chosen to increase the stakes by now provoking the Prime Minister. What then happened was quite interesting.
The chair of Parliament asked both Wilders and Rutte to behave and a discussion occured between members of parliament and Rutte on whether this verbal behaviour of Wilders was suitable. Rutte distanced himself completely from the wording of Wilders (yesterdays wording in particular) and explained: 'Well, we always knew this was a package deal. With Wilders we will get some support and because of the support we carry on as a government. But we also know his style to be provocative and at some times its best to not react and clearly state that this is unsuitable.'
Although Cohen outlined that this was too distanced a response by Rutte, the members of Parliament chose to discuss norms and behaviour at another time and to go on with the discussion. Also, the Minister President Rutte acknowlegded that as politicians we are struggling with how to deal with these provocations by Wilders. He literally said: "we know that the style of Wilders is to throw in some red meat in the arena sometimes". And having discussed the topic, VVD-leader Blok (who previously had outlined that he was not joining the debate because he had no intention to be provoked) simply suggested to move on. Which happened and was a new thing for this parliament.
Essentially Wilders provocation was ignored. With Wilders then stating that what he said was almost the same wording as used in previous years by other politicians. But that was a feeble attempt to communicate to his followers that once again Wilders was being discriminated against by the regular politicians.
The 'magic' of Wilders is fading quickly now
All in all, this is some interesting development here in the Netherlands. The content-less provocations of Wilders are no longer discussed as true suggestions but viewed and treated for what they are. Simple provocations that aim to make himself look as the reasonable guy that dares to say what the public thinks. And that dares to challenge everyone.
But it does have the looks of it as if the magic fades. Everyone in public gradually starts to realize that for Wilders there are no promises that he keeps, just the promise to himself that only he is allowed to do and say as he pleases and anyone critisizing him will become his object of hatespeech and indecent wording.
Well the short update is the following:
1- many politicians were awkwardly silent when the Norwegian shooting occured; although it was quite clear that this shooting better proved the existence and cross-border impact of Wilders hate speech than the local Dutch court dared to conclude.
2- Wilders keeps on banging the drum that Greece should be kicked out of the euro; as a result the PvdA (Labour) challenges Wilders to stop supporting this minority cabinet or otherwise be silent,
3- Wilders now helps out a cabinet with a set of cutbacks that are contrary to his election promises, and seeks to divert attention,
4- the strategy of Wilders to divert attention was a full-out indecent and improper behaviour during yesterdays and todays Parliamentary discussions on budget and future strategy of the Dutch government (read the dutch report here).
My personal impression was that, as is often the case with narcist people, the words of Wilders said more of himself than of the subject or person at hand. And the fact that Wilders had to resort to so many unsubtleties shows two things:
- psychologically he has concluded - in his head - that with the acquittal of the penal court, he has firmly gained and established the right to freedom of speech and the right to express himself any way he likes; there is no stopping Geert now as he thinks the judge has now not only acquitted him, but also issued him a license to insult,
- politically, he is playing his old record/song (personal attacks, indecent inferrals and wording) louder and louder in order to gain attention from media and electorate; yet, now that he supports the government, the opposition is smart enough to point out to the people that Wilders is all talk, no action.
Effectively Wilders is eager to exercise his rights but never present when it comes to honouring obligations that come with the rights. So below I have listed some of his words, translated, to illustrate how Wilders uses his right to freedom of speech in Dutch parliament and ignores his obligation to show conduct an MP becoming. And do note that many other subtle hints in body language, tone and frasing, are untranslatable.
To Cohen, leader of the PvdA
-Well you can bleat all you want but at the end of the day you are the company poodle of this cabinet.
-I'll say it once again and it hurts, but you are the company poodle
-You are the toy dog, the poodle of the Cabinet.
To the chair of Parliament:
-Wilders (when meaning to talk to Cohen): ..you are the co-muddler of this government.
-Chair of Parliament: Mr Wilders you were going to try to talk via the chair of Parliament. I am not a co-muddler.
-Wilders: Not yet, so much is true.
About MP Peters (when characterizing Green Left as a 'beach-party' this summer:
.. and Mrs Peters was somewhere mixing up her interests (inuendo to an affair that became part of a public and political discussion).
To Mr Pechtold
I am not sure if there was a question, but let me try to answer this dhiarrea of Mr Pechtold..
About Secretary of state Albayrak
While Albayrak still recieved criminal strangers open armed, giving a general pardon away - I don't know if she did it in cooperation with her niece - we now really deal with criminal strangers.
To Green Left:
Objection noted. The Beach Party apparently does not agree.
About A director of a hospital
We have a concern with care-directors at the top (using the word bobo's which is a denigrating term for rich, ignorant directors).
About himself, when adressed about courtesey in parliament
We at the PVV enjoy a strong debate. One time it is courteous, the other time sharp and sometimes both. It's all part of the game and we will never change our ways.
Latest update: Wilders provoking the Minister President and parliament ignoring him
Yesterdays improper behaviour of Wilders resulted in 120 letters being sent to parliament. And some MPs, notable Roemer (Socialist Party) yesterday desired a written declaration of the Minister President Rutte on how he qualified the wording of Wilders. Prime Minister Rutte chose to do that at the end of todays session. And that was a solid choice, because a good discussion followed during todays session in parliament.
Until somewhere this afternoon Rutte denounced the wording of Wilders the day before and Wilders started rebutting, throwing in the remark (in sort of cockney style): 'Hey man, act normal.' So Wilders had chosen to increase the stakes by now provoking the Prime Minister. What then happened was quite interesting.
The chair of Parliament asked both Wilders and Rutte to behave and a discussion occured between members of parliament and Rutte on whether this verbal behaviour of Wilders was suitable. Rutte distanced himself completely from the wording of Wilders (yesterdays wording in particular) and explained: 'Well, we always knew this was a package deal. With Wilders we will get some support and because of the support we carry on as a government. But we also know his style to be provocative and at some times its best to not react and clearly state that this is unsuitable.'
Although Cohen outlined that this was too distanced a response by Rutte, the members of Parliament chose to discuss norms and behaviour at another time and to go on with the discussion. Also, the Minister President Rutte acknowlegded that as politicians we are struggling with how to deal with these provocations by Wilders. He literally said: "we know that the style of Wilders is to throw in some red meat in the arena sometimes". And having discussed the topic, VVD-leader Blok (who previously had outlined that he was not joining the debate because he had no intention to be provoked) simply suggested to move on. Which happened and was a new thing for this parliament.
Essentially Wilders provocation was ignored. With Wilders then stating that what he said was almost the same wording as used in previous years by other politicians. But that was a feeble attempt to communicate to his followers that once again Wilders was being discriminated against by the regular politicians.
The 'magic' of Wilders is fading quickly now
All in all, this is some interesting development here in the Netherlands. The content-less provocations of Wilders are no longer discussed as true suggestions but viewed and treated for what they are. Simple provocations that aim to make himself look as the reasonable guy that dares to say what the public thinks. And that dares to challenge everyone.
But it does have the looks of it as if the magic fades. Everyone in public gradually starts to realize that for Wilders there are no promises that he keeps, just the promise to himself that only he is allowed to do and say as he pleases and anyone critisizing him will become his object of hatespeech and indecent wording.
05/09/2011
Eurocrisis: a clash of old (long term) and new (opportunistic) political thinking
These days I'm trying to get my head around the current developments in international and European markets and politics. There's a real flood of former politicians emphasizing that Europe is the solution, rather than the problem (see for example the statement by the Council for the Future of Europe). And here in the Netherlands we had former Prime Minister Wim Kok as well as former Minster of Finance Gerrit Zalm explaining to us on television that we need to remember the benefits of Europe and use it as a road to the solution. And I fully agree. As a whole, the eurozone is not doing so bad, but we do have a serious internal management and discipline problem.
Leadership today may be far more difficult than when the euro was formed..
Many commentators outline that now is the time to show leadership, based on a long term vision. And that is most certainly an important element of any solution. But I sense there may be more to it. There are some tectonic plates moving beneath todays politics. And the theory that I'm forming right now, is that most commentators are overlooking the movements of those plates as they are standing on those plates themselves (and incorrectly assume that they're not moving).
My theory is that, due to these slowly moving tectonic plates in the political environment, it might be much harder for todays leaders to exhibit the same leadership as their predecessors. So the solution to the eurocrisis is not just about leadership, but requires an appreciation of those fundamental trends as well.
What are the fundamental trends that now constrain our leaders?
The slowly moving 'tectonic plates' that constrain our leaders are:
1- a long period without war and a fading memory of bad economic circumstances,
2- a growing mastering of technology, leading to a shift in risk-sensitivity and a new control-perspective on the ability to control developments,
3- less religious attitudes, loss of self-discipline and focus on individual welfare,
4- electoral behaviour that is no longer focused on full political vision or ideology but can be seen as short-term shopping behaviour; the contract term of citizen and politicians decreased considerably,
5- the rise of the internet and social media, leading to increased scrutiny by the public, less margin for politicians to implement long term solutions and to oversimplification of complex problems in the public debate.
So what am I saying is:
1- In Europe, we have forgotten how rich we really are and where we came from. So the financial and geopolitical benefits of Europe (income, peace and peace of mind) are taken for granted. And as we grow older, this individual and collective memory fades more and more.
2- The advancing technology incites a sense of control into the modern human being and people are less inclined to accept the limitations of life; we are used to demand more, get more, expect more, demand more and so on. The succes of technology also provides us with a sense that we can control more than we really can. And it shifts our risk-sensitivity. Risks that in former times were acceptable or considered an act of God, are now subject to preventive and containment measures, with the people seeking a culprit if insufficient measures were taken. Essentially technology makes us become spoilt brats that don't want to bite the sour apple for our health if there is a sweeter alternative around the corner.
3- The increased welfare and growing economy allow for the realization of many wishes. And the traditional religions slowly lose ground to an economic religion in which there is little place for self restraint or group thinking and solidarity.
4- In the political domain, the economization also occurs and voting becomes more an act like shopping than an act like determining which church/religion you wish to belong to. The lifelong committment to ideologies fades away and needs to make place for opportunistic electoral behaviour. In turn, the political parties need to focus more on short term issues and popularity to survive and represent the interest of their electorate.
5- Whereas in former times some leeway in government and politics could be created by controlling and restraining the flow of information, the rise of Internet and social media make it almost impossible to create time/intellectual room for debate/solutions. These media also allow for collective intelligence and feedback which is very much quicker than before. So politicians can no longer design political solutions which do not work in practice or contain design-errors. Similarly they cannot decide or choose open-ended solutions, hoping that some underlying fundamental problem will be solved by time rather than politics.
Thus, in order to solve the Eurocrisis, we don't just need leadership, but also:
- increased awareness about the benefits peace, peace of mind and economic growth that Europe has brought us and brings us,
- the ability to bite through a sour apple rather than postpone solutions,
- the awareness that we're in it together, even if it doesn't feel like that,
- politicians with the leadership to appeal to the publics desire for stability and growth and the fact that only with their prolonged loyalty can the public expect a better long term outcome,
- consistent solutions to the technical, financial and political issues at stake; any backdoor or design error will get back at us within a years time-frame.
See also the Dutch version of this post here.
Leadership today may be far more difficult than when the euro was formed..
Many commentators outline that now is the time to show leadership, based on a long term vision. And that is most certainly an important element of any solution. But I sense there may be more to it. There are some tectonic plates moving beneath todays politics. And the theory that I'm forming right now, is that most commentators are overlooking the movements of those plates as they are standing on those plates themselves (and incorrectly assume that they're not moving).
My theory is that, due to these slowly moving tectonic plates in the political environment, it might be much harder for todays leaders to exhibit the same leadership as their predecessors. So the solution to the eurocrisis is not just about leadership, but requires an appreciation of those fundamental trends as well.
What are the fundamental trends that now constrain our leaders?
The slowly moving 'tectonic plates' that constrain our leaders are:
1- a long period without war and a fading memory of bad economic circumstances,
2- a growing mastering of technology, leading to a shift in risk-sensitivity and a new control-perspective on the ability to control developments,
3- less religious attitudes, loss of self-discipline and focus on individual welfare,
4- electoral behaviour that is no longer focused on full political vision or ideology but can be seen as short-term shopping behaviour; the contract term of citizen and politicians decreased considerably,
5- the rise of the internet and social media, leading to increased scrutiny by the public, less margin for politicians to implement long term solutions and to oversimplification of complex problems in the public debate.
So what am I saying is:
1- In Europe, we have forgotten how rich we really are and where we came from. So the financial and geopolitical benefits of Europe (income, peace and peace of mind) are taken for granted. And as we grow older, this individual and collective memory fades more and more.
2- The advancing technology incites a sense of control into the modern human being and people are less inclined to accept the limitations of life; we are used to demand more, get more, expect more, demand more and so on. The succes of technology also provides us with a sense that we can control more than we really can. And it shifts our risk-sensitivity. Risks that in former times were acceptable or considered an act of God, are now subject to preventive and containment measures, with the people seeking a culprit if insufficient measures were taken. Essentially technology makes us become spoilt brats that don't want to bite the sour apple for our health if there is a sweeter alternative around the corner.
3- The increased welfare and growing economy allow for the realization of many wishes. And the traditional religions slowly lose ground to an economic religion in which there is little place for self restraint or group thinking and solidarity.
4- In the political domain, the economization also occurs and voting becomes more an act like shopping than an act like determining which church/religion you wish to belong to. The lifelong committment to ideologies fades away and needs to make place for opportunistic electoral behaviour. In turn, the political parties need to focus more on short term issues and popularity to survive and represent the interest of their electorate.
5- Whereas in former times some leeway in government and politics could be created by controlling and restraining the flow of information, the rise of Internet and social media make it almost impossible to create time/intellectual room for debate/solutions. These media also allow for collective intelligence and feedback which is very much quicker than before. So politicians can no longer design political solutions which do not work in practice or contain design-errors. Similarly they cannot decide or choose open-ended solutions, hoping that some underlying fundamental problem will be solved by time rather than politics.
Thus, in order to solve the Eurocrisis, we don't just need leadership, but also:
- increased awareness about the benefits peace, peace of mind and economic growth that Europe has brought us and brings us,
- the ability to bite through a sour apple rather than postpone solutions,
- the awareness that we're in it together, even if it doesn't feel like that,
- politicians with the leadership to appeal to the publics desire for stability and growth and the fact that only with their prolonged loyalty can the public expect a better long term outcome,
- consistent solutions to the technical, financial and political issues at stake; any backdoor or design error will get back at us within a years time-frame.
See also the Dutch version of this post here.
29/06/2011
Greece: let's help the Greek people in solving the democratic errors that caused the financial trouble!
In an earlier post, I outlined that both the EU-countries and Greece were sort of stuck with politicians that may have not done their job well. Populist politicians in the EU have widened the gap with Greece by portraying all the Greek as bandits. Meanwhile, within Greece there is a huge difference between have's and have-nots and between politicians and the people. So while the world may treat Greece as one people, we overlook the distinctions within the Greek people.
ZeroHedge featured an article that made this distinction more specific. The article outlines that Greece may essentially be a kleptocracy. In such a system, a financial and political Elite skims and concentrates the wealth of the nation via corruption and embezzlement while being protected by the winking complicity of their fellow plunderers who hold civil and financial authority.
At present all eyes are focused on Greece and the votes in parliament. While most eyes will focus on the financial part of the vote, I am thinking now about the ramifications for Greece as a democracy and its citizenry. Imagine yourself to be a Greek voter that has over time learnt to live with corruption and the fact that an elite holds the jobs and priviliges. In this role you are essentially illegally taxed by the elite, in order to get services from the state that it should provide you for free or at much lower costs. And now this elite has also frauded the European system so much, that it is obliged to introduce a formal tax upon you as well. This double-taxing appears to be quite unfair and incorrect. And what can you do about it?
The current workings of the Greek democracy will thus inevitably lead to further social unrest than we see already. The people will want to rise up against their political elite in a similar way that in the Middle-East countries we see the people rise against its dictators and their family-clans. And that's what we see in the streets now. It's the same process, but the Greek elite is less pronounced, leass easy to catch and less easy to portray as a single entity.
I am afraid that the EU people and politicians will be so much clouded by their economic mindset and reasoning, that they will misstake and portray the Greek people's resistance as inappropriate given the amount of fraud that has occurred so far in Greek government (the elite). This may lead EU leaders and politicians to explicitly or implicitly favour a violent suppression of completely justified Greek protests.
In my opinion, our attention in the EU should not just be focused on the financial issue. We should take a broader perspective and try to determine how we can help the Greek public get a government with less corruption and less implicit taxes, allowing them to pay the formal taxes that Greece needs to come out of the crisis.
The stakes are high. And not just financially. If we overlook this issue, then essentially we are supporting the dictatorship of the Greek political elite.
And is that something we want the European Union to be based on?
Click here for a Dutch translation of this blogposting.
ZeroHedge featured an article that made this distinction more specific. The article outlines that Greece may essentially be a kleptocracy. In such a system, a financial and political Elite skims and concentrates the wealth of the nation via corruption and embezzlement while being protected by the winking complicity of their fellow plunderers who hold civil and financial authority.
At present all eyes are focused on Greece and the votes in parliament. While most eyes will focus on the financial part of the vote, I am thinking now about the ramifications for Greece as a democracy and its citizenry. Imagine yourself to be a Greek voter that has over time learnt to live with corruption and the fact that an elite holds the jobs and priviliges. In this role you are essentially illegally taxed by the elite, in order to get services from the state that it should provide you for free or at much lower costs. And now this elite has also frauded the European system so much, that it is obliged to introduce a formal tax upon you as well. This double-taxing appears to be quite unfair and incorrect. And what can you do about it?
The current workings of the Greek democracy will thus inevitably lead to further social unrest than we see already. The people will want to rise up against their political elite in a similar way that in the Middle-East countries we see the people rise against its dictators and their family-clans. And that's what we see in the streets now. It's the same process, but the Greek elite is less pronounced, leass easy to catch and less easy to portray as a single entity.
I am afraid that the EU people and politicians will be so much clouded by their economic mindset and reasoning, that they will misstake and portray the Greek people's resistance as inappropriate given the amount of fraud that has occurred so far in Greek government (the elite). This may lead EU leaders and politicians to explicitly or implicitly favour a violent suppression of completely justified Greek protests.
In my opinion, our attention in the EU should not just be focused on the financial issue. We should take a broader perspective and try to determine how we can help the Greek public get a government with less corruption and less implicit taxes, allowing them to pay the formal taxes that Greece needs to come out of the crisis.
The stakes are high. And not just financially. If we overlook this issue, then essentially we are supporting the dictatorship of the Greek political elite.
And is that something we want the European Union to be based on?
Click here for a Dutch translation of this blogposting.
30/05/2011
May 30, 2011: some background on the Wilders trial and the developments here in the Netherlands
In this blog post I will try to summarize what happens here in the Netherlands with the criminal case against Geert Wilders. Some very good descriptions in English of the days in the trial can be found at the Klein Verzet Blog. And I contributed a number of reviews and observations myself (in Dutch here) on the more recent trial days.
Wilders in footsteps of Fortuijn: populist and anti-Islam
Starting with Wilders, as a successor to Fortuyn. Wilders is active in politics since the 1990s, then for the liberal party, VVD. He witnessed how Pim Fortuyn succeeded in rallying and mobilizing the disgruntled parts of our people that found that there was too much political attention and care for newcomers/immigrants and that the original Dutch people were being forgotten. As a result, Pim Fortuijn got a significant number of votes but he was not going to live his success as he was killed by a left wing activist. And truth be told, before that happened, some of our politicians were quite keen (and too quick on their feet) to compare Fortuijn and his movement to the developments in the depression times (1930s, running up to the war). This is when the word 'demonizing' came into existence and the impression occurred that the death of Fortuijn was due to the consequent demonizing of Fortuijn by left wing politicians.
Wilders observed Fortuijn and decided to step in his footsteps. And the Al-Qaida attacks since 2001 (as well as the killing of Theo van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker by a radical Muslim) helped him to play a fear card about Muslims and the Islam. Wilders philosophy is that the Islam is an inherent violent and suppressive ideology and that not only the Muslims are bound to conform to the inhuman/uncivilized rules of the Islam, but all people. Thus, the Islam is the vehicle with which a political war is being fought and we should all recognize this invasion and stop it. He wants the end to the 'cuddling of minority groups' that in his view has gone over the top here in the Netherlands. He wishes that all incoming foreigners should adapt and integrate with the Netherlands and he wants the politics to return to the public again and thus plays the anti-elitist card.
Setting up his own party: he is his own king
Wilders soon found out that his own party, VVD, did not agree with his populist views, so he founded a Group Wilders, and went for political success alone. He founded a party, but chose to circumvent the official rules in a 'smart' way. He founded a party movement where he himself is the only member (chairman, treasurer, secretary, member) of the PVV-association as our election law prescribes that all participating parties in elections should be an association. Thus, Wilders avoided all kinds of trouble with members of his party association wishing to steer his politics. He is himself the king and the party at the same time. And he uses a foundation to gather funds for his political movement. And indeed, this has all the looks of a narcissist
One of the key trademarks of Wilders is that he never wishes to engage in a real discussion. He is very verbal, very able to make cunning and smart remarks in parliament and thus win the hearts of people who think that politics is about saying openly how much you dislike others (other than trying to engage in constructive choices for the country). And he is keen to jump from the one environment (parliament, press, science, court of law) to the other while ignoring the implicit game rules of those environments. So he mistakes the court (where the question is not what is the truth, but does one abide by the rules) for science. He mistakes and uses science (where there is never certainty and always doubt) as the tool to declare that his Islam-vision is the one and only correct one. He uses the media to send out and reinforce his political messages to the public (and to throw in denigrating statements about the Islam and those who follow it). And in parliament he chooses at times to walk out (rather than try and debate about differences of opinion) so that his followers will applaud him, while MPs are annoyed.
Wilders is very verbal and very able to maneuver about. Dutch politicians find it very hard to position themselves against him. So where his idea is that Muslim people should leave the Netherlands, he chose to use the word/abstraction: islamisation to discuss the desired emigration. All people in the Netherlands instinctively understand what he means, but he seldom says it straightforward. The consequence is that it is very hard to pin him down on where his statements are discriminating, racist or hate speech. While he does undoubtedly bring such a message across, as you can see by watching his film Fitna.
As far as his personal life and personality is concerned. Wilders lives under permanent security rules, given possible attacks by radical political adversaries. And we have seen an analysis in a Dutch opinion paper that his trauma is essentially of a postcolonial revanchist nature. Wilders is part of minority himself: the minority of Indonesian immigrants who came to the Netherlands after the second world war. And as this group was forced to assimilate (and assimilated itself due to their cultural background) it may have been the case that this has struck Wilders deeply in his youth. And witnessing that later immigrants were being cuddled more than he/his family was, it is argued that Wilders wishes to impose on them what was 'done to himself'. So the young man that used to be bullied now becomes the bully.
The criminal case against Wilders
Whereas Wilders is a hard act to catch, his public speech at times is discriminating and implying that Muslims are non-humans ('they reproduce like rabbits'). And he creates an atmosphere in which discrimination and rudeness (even in our parliament) becomes the norm rather than the exception. Quite a number of people in the public, as well as organizations that represent Muslims or other minorities have thus complained about some of his public remarks, stating that is was inciting to discrimination and hate speech.
Yet, the prosecutors here in the Netherlands at first did not want to take up these complaints. So the complainants appealed, which lead the legal court in Amsterdam to order the Public Prosecutor to start a criminal case against Wilders. Wilders at first wanted the best criminal lawyers, Anker&Anker. In response to Wilders request to make a public carnival out of the trial, they informed Wilders that hiring them would mean: 'no publicity during the trial', Wilders left them and chose to hire Mosckowicz, a lawyer that is often in the media (perhaps even more than in court). This is of course in line with his strategy to always play his political game simultaneously in public, parliament, media and court.
The trial started last year, with Wilders often remarking that it was a political trial. Exploiting the publicity. And there were some legal and procedural mishaps, with made it possible for his lawyer to send the first Judges back home (it turned out that one judge of the Amsterdam court had been present and possibly influenced a witness of the Wilders-trial during a dinner, a couple of days before the trial-date). So all the proceedings had to wait and a new court with new judges was assembled and assigned. But at that point, we already witnessed something very particular. The Prosecutor effectively did not want to prosecute and demanded acquittal on all counts of the criminal case. In doing so, the Prosecutor messes up the due process that we need in the court.
An interesting thing that also occurred during the trial is that civilians and complainants may join in the criminal proceedings so that they can be granted a compensation for damage. And most of them ask a sum of 1 euro. But the group of complainants is quite diverse. There are some solid legal arguments put forward by some lawyers, while the rest of the complainants acts in a personal manner. Which may feel good for them, but is not legally relevant. Yet, this varied bunch does create an image in which the trial doesn't seem to be important/true/real. So it helps Wilders to frame the trial as a 'fake trial' in which judges protect each other.
What I find interesting during all the proceedings is that Wilders is using very much the freedom of speech argument to be able to say what he wants. And he says that 'the lights will go out in Europe' if he is convicted. Thus stating that freedom of speech is more important than any other human right. The argument is used in an opportunistic way however, because since then, we have witnessed Wilders and his party limiting the freedom of speech of all those that were against them. So the image of Wilders as the proclaimer of freedom of speech has bleached considerably.
What is remarkable as well, is that the trial is essentially a clash of the two fundamental human rights that nation states should seek to protect/enact. One is the freedom of speech but the other is a prohibition of discrimination/hate speech. Both of course have an effect on the quality of democracy. And the essence of the trial is that these two human rights need to be protected/enacted in a balanced way. And the trial demonstrates, in my view, that Wilders is only executing his fundamental rights and does not wish to abide with the obligation (not to discriminate). And with the people in the Netherlands in flux about the statements of Wilders, I think the court of Amsterdam has chosen wisely to order the Prosecution of Wilders. Only such a prosecution and court case will make it clear if Wilders has crossed a line, or not. And the facts and material at hand, is sufficiently substantial to do so. Again I would encourage the readers to have a look at the film Fitna.
Current state of things in the trial (May 30, 2011): rushing it too much
As promised, the lawyer of Wilders has made it a carnival. Rebutting/challenging also the second set of judges. Declaring that the case should not start ('niet-ontvankelijk) and so on. But all that was brushed aside and the court was considered independent to continue. Also, the court listened to some extra witnesses to discover that whatever happened at the dinner (before the first trial) was not legally relevant to the case (although the court considered it very unwise of the judge to be present at the dinner). So last week, we finally started.
On Monday, the court summarized the case, presented the facts, and also outlined some international relevant law, including considerations on the European legal framework. At last, we were now dealing with the facts. And to me it became clear that the choice to prosecute is very fundamental and important. This is an important court case that will determine the extent to which freedom of speech can be exercised, until it turns into discrimination or inciting hate.
On Wednesday we could witness the Prosecutor, not prosecuting but effectively defending Wilders. The Prosecutor used an intermediary test to determine if what Wilders said or published wash criminal or not. The test was whether the statement was intrinsically divisive and conflictual in nature. Yet, all statements and context discussed lead the Prosecutor to conclude that acquittal was the only conclusion. In doing so, the Prosecutor rebelled against the court that had ordered the law suit. And they now made it more difficult for the court itself as well as for the civilians that wish to file compensation claims in this criminal case. Any soccer game requires two teams. And by siding with Wilders, the flow of justice (and exchange of arguments and counter arguments) is not guaranteed.
On Friday the civilians that complained could substantiate their compensation claims. But, they weren't allowed to comment on the case itself. This led to a strange situation where one lawyer, Prakken, outlined that the basis for the claim constituted a different reasoning than that of the Prosecutor. The judges were, after being incited by Mosckowicz, keen to alert her to stay within bounds, but she held her ground properly. And stated that the prohibition against incitement does not build on discrimination but is a separate human value that deserves protection by and through its essential nature. In my view a very convincing argument, and better at times than the flawed vision of the Prosecutor.
The overall impression that I was left with, on Friday, was one of a rush. Having watched the proceedings via Internet, it became clear to me that the judges want the case to be done with. And that is a bit unsatisfactory, as it is an essential case and theme. And with a prosecutor that does not prosecute, the court judges are burdened with the obligation to determine themselves if or not they agree with the prosecution arguments.
And today we're back on Monday (30th of May). Wilders lawyer, Moszkowicz, of course compliments the Prosecutor for a solid piece of work. Thus creating a setting in which Prosecutor and defendant agree, and making it hard for the Court to disagree and condemn Wilders. The first bits of the argument by Moszkowicz were a recollection of the strange proceedings until so far. And as we speak, he is still throwing all kinds of arguments. And what struck me in his arguments, is that he is effectively responding to all kinds of arguments, but never developing his own line of thought. And least of all is his recognition of the fact that two fundamental democratic values are at stake here. Which is perhaps what one can expect from a defending lawyer, but it still creates an uncanny setting.
Last words by Wilders
As is the custom, Wilders has had the last word in his first instance of the trial. He immediately used it to make political statements. And in doing so, he provided evidence to the court that he will use any instance to voice his vision (which is exactly one of the elements of hate speech: the repetitive and consequent manner in which a suspect incites to hatred and unjustified discrimination). And I am confident that we will see some of this in a few moments, when again he will be offered the opportunity to make a statement.
Whereto from here?
In my view, the prosecutor has not done sufficient effort to make the criminal case against Wilders. There is a lot of material in which there are clear signs of Wilders' hate speech and demonizing of the Islam (and implicitly all followers/believers). Yet we haven't come round to properly discussing it in this case. And in this very important case for our democracy we are now faced with a court that wishes to speed things up. I am not confident that this is the best way forward.
If I look at the replies/reactions on Twitter during the case, I can see a lot of harsh and rude comments, some of those outright violent. While it would not be fair to argue that Wilders is the cause of all these arguments, he has indeed been creating (and thus legitimizing) a climate for such comments and visions. Also he is providing a bad example by continuing his denigrating talk with respect to Muslim people (calling them 'cattle that votes' in Parliament). And while it is up to the MP's to correct him in Parliament, it is also up to the Dutch courts to determine if he's gone too far in inciting hate.
So, it is only too bad that we may be rushing this trial forward where it might be better - both for us and for our democracy here - to take our time to properly consider pros and cons.
[Update... June 2, 2011: I returned home yesterday to discover that Geert Wilders mentioned Johan de Witt in court on June 1, during his trial. He mentioned de Witt in his plea for freedom and tried to model himself after my example. That inspired me to write him a letter in which I lecture him on fundamental rights, democracy and so on. That letter is too Dutch to translate, but my response essentially was that Wilders poses as a member of parliament but he does not act responsibly like one. Leading to the conclusion that: an ape 's an ape, a varlet 's a varlet, tho' they be clad in silk or scarlet.]
Wilders in footsteps of Fortuijn: populist and anti-Islam
Starting with Wilders, as a successor to Fortuyn. Wilders is active in politics since the 1990s, then for the liberal party, VVD. He witnessed how Pim Fortuyn succeeded in rallying and mobilizing the disgruntled parts of our people that found that there was too much political attention and care for newcomers/immigrants and that the original Dutch people were being forgotten. As a result, Pim Fortuijn got a significant number of votes but he was not going to live his success as he was killed by a left wing activist. And truth be told, before that happened, some of our politicians were quite keen (and too quick on their feet) to compare Fortuijn and his movement to the developments in the depression times (1930s, running up to the war). This is when the word 'demonizing' came into existence and the impression occurred that the death of Fortuijn was due to the consequent demonizing of Fortuijn by left wing politicians.
Wilders observed Fortuijn and decided to step in his footsteps. And the Al-Qaida attacks since 2001 (as well as the killing of Theo van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker by a radical Muslim) helped him to play a fear card about Muslims and the Islam. Wilders philosophy is that the Islam is an inherent violent and suppressive ideology and that not only the Muslims are bound to conform to the inhuman/uncivilized rules of the Islam, but all people. Thus, the Islam is the vehicle with which a political war is being fought and we should all recognize this invasion and stop it. He wants the end to the 'cuddling of minority groups' that in his view has gone over the top here in the Netherlands. He wishes that all incoming foreigners should adapt and integrate with the Netherlands and he wants the politics to return to the public again and thus plays the anti-elitist card.
Setting up his own party: he is his own king
Wilders soon found out that his own party, VVD, did not agree with his populist views, so he founded a Group Wilders, and went for political success alone. He founded a party, but chose to circumvent the official rules in a 'smart' way. He founded a party movement where he himself is the only member (chairman, treasurer, secretary, member) of the PVV-association as our election law prescribes that all participating parties in elections should be an association. Thus, Wilders avoided all kinds of trouble with members of his party association wishing to steer his politics. He is himself the king and the party at the same time. And he uses a foundation to gather funds for his political movement. And indeed, this has all the looks of a narcissist
One of the key trademarks of Wilders is that he never wishes to engage in a real discussion. He is very verbal, very able to make cunning and smart remarks in parliament and thus win the hearts of people who think that politics is about saying openly how much you dislike others (other than trying to engage in constructive choices for the country). And he is keen to jump from the one environment (parliament, press, science, court of law) to the other while ignoring the implicit game rules of those environments. So he mistakes the court (where the question is not what is the truth, but does one abide by the rules) for science. He mistakes and uses science (where there is never certainty and always doubt) as the tool to declare that his Islam-vision is the one and only correct one. He uses the media to send out and reinforce his political messages to the public (and to throw in denigrating statements about the Islam and those who follow it). And in parliament he chooses at times to walk out (rather than try and debate about differences of opinion) so that his followers will applaud him, while MPs are annoyed.
Wilders is very verbal and very able to maneuver about. Dutch politicians find it very hard to position themselves against him. So where his idea is that Muslim people should leave the Netherlands, he chose to use the word/abstraction: islamisation to discuss the desired emigration. All people in the Netherlands instinctively understand what he means, but he seldom says it straightforward. The consequence is that it is very hard to pin him down on where his statements are discriminating, racist or hate speech. While he does undoubtedly bring such a message across, as you can see by watching his film Fitna.
As far as his personal life and personality is concerned. Wilders lives under permanent security rules, given possible attacks by radical political adversaries. And we have seen an analysis in a Dutch opinion paper that his trauma is essentially of a postcolonial revanchist nature. Wilders is part of minority himself: the minority of Indonesian immigrants who came to the Netherlands after the second world war. And as this group was forced to assimilate (and assimilated itself due to their cultural background) it may have been the case that this has struck Wilders deeply in his youth. And witnessing that later immigrants were being cuddled more than he/his family was, it is argued that Wilders wishes to impose on them what was 'done to himself'. So the young man that used to be bullied now becomes the bully.
The criminal case against Wilders
Whereas Wilders is a hard act to catch, his public speech at times is discriminating and implying that Muslims are non-humans ('they reproduce like rabbits'). And he creates an atmosphere in which discrimination and rudeness (even in our parliament) becomes the norm rather than the exception. Quite a number of people in the public, as well as organizations that represent Muslims or other minorities have thus complained about some of his public remarks, stating that is was inciting to discrimination and hate speech.
Yet, the prosecutors here in the Netherlands at first did not want to take up these complaints. So the complainants appealed, which lead the legal court in Amsterdam to order the Public Prosecutor to start a criminal case against Wilders. Wilders at first wanted the best criminal lawyers, Anker&Anker. In response to Wilders request to make a public carnival out of the trial, they informed Wilders that hiring them would mean: 'no publicity during the trial', Wilders left them and chose to hire Mosckowicz, a lawyer that is often in the media (perhaps even more than in court). This is of course in line with his strategy to always play his political game simultaneously in public, parliament, media and court.
The trial started last year, with Wilders often remarking that it was a political trial. Exploiting the publicity. And there were some legal and procedural mishaps, with made it possible for his lawyer to send the first Judges back home (it turned out that one judge of the Amsterdam court had been present and possibly influenced a witness of the Wilders-trial during a dinner, a couple of days before the trial-date). So all the proceedings had to wait and a new court with new judges was assembled and assigned. But at that point, we already witnessed something very particular. The Prosecutor effectively did not want to prosecute and demanded acquittal on all counts of the criminal case. In doing so, the Prosecutor messes up the due process that we need in the court.
An interesting thing that also occurred during the trial is that civilians and complainants may join in the criminal proceedings so that they can be granted a compensation for damage. And most of them ask a sum of 1 euro. But the group of complainants is quite diverse. There are some solid legal arguments put forward by some lawyers, while the rest of the complainants acts in a personal manner. Which may feel good for them, but is not legally relevant. Yet, this varied bunch does create an image in which the trial doesn't seem to be important/true/real. So it helps Wilders to frame the trial as a 'fake trial' in which judges protect each other.
What I find interesting during all the proceedings is that Wilders is using very much the freedom of speech argument to be able to say what he wants. And he says that 'the lights will go out in Europe' if he is convicted. Thus stating that freedom of speech is more important than any other human right. The argument is used in an opportunistic way however, because since then, we have witnessed Wilders and his party limiting the freedom of speech of all those that were against them. So the image of Wilders as the proclaimer of freedom of speech has bleached considerably.
What is remarkable as well, is that the trial is essentially a clash of the two fundamental human rights that nation states should seek to protect/enact. One is the freedom of speech but the other is a prohibition of discrimination/hate speech. Both of course have an effect on the quality of democracy. And the essence of the trial is that these two human rights need to be protected/enacted in a balanced way. And the trial demonstrates, in my view, that Wilders is only executing his fundamental rights and does not wish to abide with the obligation (not to discriminate). And with the people in the Netherlands in flux about the statements of Wilders, I think the court of Amsterdam has chosen wisely to order the Prosecution of Wilders. Only such a prosecution and court case will make it clear if Wilders has crossed a line, or not. And the facts and material at hand, is sufficiently substantial to do so. Again I would encourage the readers to have a look at the film Fitna.
Current state of things in the trial (May 30, 2011): rushing it too much
As promised, the lawyer of Wilders has made it a carnival. Rebutting/challenging also the second set of judges. Declaring that the case should not start ('niet-ontvankelijk) and so on. But all that was brushed aside and the court was considered independent to continue. Also, the court listened to some extra witnesses to discover that whatever happened at the dinner (before the first trial) was not legally relevant to the case (although the court considered it very unwise of the judge to be present at the dinner). So last week, we finally started.
On Monday, the court summarized the case, presented the facts, and also outlined some international relevant law, including considerations on the European legal framework. At last, we were now dealing with the facts. And to me it became clear that the choice to prosecute is very fundamental and important. This is an important court case that will determine the extent to which freedom of speech can be exercised, until it turns into discrimination or inciting hate.
On Wednesday we could witness the Prosecutor, not prosecuting but effectively defending Wilders. The Prosecutor used an intermediary test to determine if what Wilders said or published wash criminal or not. The test was whether the statement was intrinsically divisive and conflictual in nature. Yet, all statements and context discussed lead the Prosecutor to conclude that acquittal was the only conclusion. In doing so, the Prosecutor rebelled against the court that had ordered the law suit. And they now made it more difficult for the court itself as well as for the civilians that wish to file compensation claims in this criminal case. Any soccer game requires two teams. And by siding with Wilders, the flow of justice (and exchange of arguments and counter arguments) is not guaranteed.
On Friday the civilians that complained could substantiate their compensation claims. But, they weren't allowed to comment on the case itself. This led to a strange situation where one lawyer, Prakken, outlined that the basis for the claim constituted a different reasoning than that of the Prosecutor. The judges were, after being incited by Mosckowicz, keen to alert her to stay within bounds, but she held her ground properly. And stated that the prohibition against incitement does not build on discrimination but is a separate human value that deserves protection by and through its essential nature. In my view a very convincing argument, and better at times than the flawed vision of the Prosecutor.
The overall impression that I was left with, on Friday, was one of a rush. Having watched the proceedings via Internet, it became clear to me that the judges want the case to be done with. And that is a bit unsatisfactory, as it is an essential case and theme. And with a prosecutor that does not prosecute, the court judges are burdened with the obligation to determine themselves if or not they agree with the prosecution arguments.
And today we're back on Monday (30th of May). Wilders lawyer, Moszkowicz, of course compliments the Prosecutor for a solid piece of work. Thus creating a setting in which Prosecutor and defendant agree, and making it hard for the Court to disagree and condemn Wilders. The first bits of the argument by Moszkowicz were a recollection of the strange proceedings until so far. And as we speak, he is still throwing all kinds of arguments. And what struck me in his arguments, is that he is effectively responding to all kinds of arguments, but never developing his own line of thought. And least of all is his recognition of the fact that two fundamental democratic values are at stake here. Which is perhaps what one can expect from a defending lawyer, but it still creates an uncanny setting.
Last words by Wilders
As is the custom, Wilders has had the last word in his first instance of the trial. He immediately used it to make political statements. And in doing so, he provided evidence to the court that he will use any instance to voice his vision (which is exactly one of the elements of hate speech: the repetitive and consequent manner in which a suspect incites to hatred and unjustified discrimination). And I am confident that we will see some of this in a few moments, when again he will be offered the opportunity to make a statement.
Whereto from here?
In my view, the prosecutor has not done sufficient effort to make the criminal case against Wilders. There is a lot of material in which there are clear signs of Wilders' hate speech and demonizing of the Islam (and implicitly all followers/believers). Yet we haven't come round to properly discussing it in this case. And in this very important case for our democracy we are now faced with a court that wishes to speed things up. I am not confident that this is the best way forward.
If I look at the replies/reactions on Twitter during the case, I can see a lot of harsh and rude comments, some of those outright violent. While it would not be fair to argue that Wilders is the cause of all these arguments, he has indeed been creating (and thus legitimizing) a climate for such comments and visions. Also he is providing a bad example by continuing his denigrating talk with respect to Muslim people (calling them 'cattle that votes' in Parliament). And while it is up to the MP's to correct him in Parliament, it is also up to the Dutch courts to determine if he's gone too far in inciting hate.
So, it is only too bad that we may be rushing this trial forward where it might be better - both for us and for our democracy here - to take our time to properly consider pros and cons.
[Update... June 2, 2011: I returned home yesterday to discover that Geert Wilders mentioned Johan de Witt in court on June 1, during his trial. He mentioned de Witt in his plea for freedom and tried to model himself after my example. That inspired me to write him a letter in which I lecture him on fundamental rights, democracy and so on. That letter is too Dutch to translate, but my response essentially was that Wilders poses as a member of parliament but he does not act responsibly like one. Leading to the conclusion that: an ape 's an ape, a varlet 's a varlet, tho' they be clad in silk or scarlet.]
24/05/2011
Appointing the new President and two directors of our central bank: butterfingered fiddling with an aftertaste of sprouts...
Well, the dust has now settled in the Netherlands on the announcements with respect to the new President and directors of our central bank: De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB). It is clear that our Minister of Finance, de Jager, has appointed one of his own top-managers, Klaas Knot, as the next President of DNB, to succeed Nout Wellink. And Jan Sijbrand (former NIBC and ABN AMRO), is to become the Executive Director in charge of Supervision. And as a result of the clumsy process, one of the internal DNB-candidates, Lex Hoogduin, who was proposed/favoured by the Supervisory Board, drew his conclusions and decided to leave. So what we can also read in the press release of DNB is that a third new appointment is announced: that of Frank Eldersohn, who will be Executive Director in charge of the 'internal operations'; the day to day functioning in organisational/HR terms.
Let's review this appointment process from a distance, drawing on the numerous reports and bits of work that are available with respect to the functioning of DNB, AFM and financial supervision.
First some colours in the background
Traditionally, both DNB and the Authority Financial Markets (AFM) were given quite some leeway in how they organised their business and executed their constitutional supervisory roles. The consequence was that the AFM developed a policeman-style under Chairman Arthur Dokters van Leeuwen. His successor, Hans Hoogervorst, combined this approach with a political savyness and unnecessary PR-agressiveness. Hoogervorst used publicity incidents to hurt banks in their image and bashed the banks into his prescription: an academic frame-of-mind in which consumers are rational, yet deserve paternalistic protection from overcrediting and in which any form of kick-back is to be eliminated in the marketplace. I am afraid that the AFM is going to need quite some years to discover that they were wrong in assuming the consumer rationality and that they will in the end discover that the elimination of kick-backs means that financial advice for consumers has become far too expensive (and thus: out of reach) for the consumers. So through enforcement of their academic yoke, they will eventually make financial advice more costly, cumbersome and less available to the public at large. Similarly, we will find out in about 5 years -when the market has come to a complete standstill- that they have been beating to loud on the mortgages drum.
Now for DNB. While the AFM is noisily supervising the banks, DNB kept up their appearences in their old-fashioned supervisory stile in which banks are invited over for a cup of tea to discuss business. Whereas AFM was showing too much teeth, DNB showed too little. And that had an effect on the cooperation between the policing AFM and the ever-so-polite DNB. And then DNB got traumatized in 2006, by the failure of Bank van der Hoop. From that moment on, all things in DNB-life became legal. External advisors advised on each step of supervision, thus paralyzing DNB. DNB became afraid to move at all and also got stuck under the spell of Wellink. Wellink was in the Board since 1983 and had arrived at his second 7-year term. Which is impractical, as it is impossible to organise the required internal criticism and openness for such a long period. It just doesn't work as we can see from the examples of Kohl, Thatcher and Lubbers. As a consequence, the oil-tanker DNB was not able to respond promptly and properly in discussions on the ABN AMRO take-over, the failing of Icesave and the demise of DSB. Our readers should note however that it is not so helpful for the central bank to be surrounded by inconsistent and populist claptrap on complex banking issues. But that's all part of the game, so as a President you have to be able to handle that as well.
Our Ministry of Finance meanwhile lacked all vision on how to organise financial supervision. And I know this sounds harsh and crude, but it is a simple fact. Our independent Court of Auditors reported their amazement about the fact and the response of our Ministry was: our supervisory policy is embedded in the Law on Financial Supervision (WFT in Dutch). Well, the connoisseurs of that law will shrug their shoulders, smiling politely. Because the WFT is a beautiful, idealistic legal project that had the potentially to become a great legal structure for the financial sector, also through the nuanced use of open standards. In practice, however, every chapter of the WFT-law was introduced in a hurry so at present there is literally no understanding it any more. If we would consider the WFT to be a computer-application, it would be immediately classified as a spaghetti-bomb and a threat to business-continuity, requiring a comprehensive revamp and structural re-engineering.
Equally important is the fact that in the late nineties the internal organization of Finance was overturned. While the former Ministry would have a department dealing with the financial sector as such, the new departments were split up on the basis of regulatory aspects such as: stability, market conduct, generally and so on. This led to less visibility and understanding of the impact of legislative changes for the sector as such. Thus, the sector was facing a Ministry that looked like a conveyor belt pushing out partial amendments.
Change, but how?
It is clear that the above institutional and supervisory framework is not sufficiently apt to deal with large market shocks and changes. And it is not surprising that the various players in the field reflected on the best way forward. So there were reports of what had happened on DNB's supervision (report Scheltema). Politicians came up with an examination (de Wit), largely a rehashing of international reports. The banks founded a Maas Committee that emphasized in the final report the importance of good governance, stronger risk management and a more integrated assessment of societal interests. And the Ministry of Finance started thinking about a supervisory policy version 0.1 or 1.0.
What surprised me was how the discussion on the desired culture-change at DNB took place. This followed from the report Scheltema, but everyone could know that for such a change to have effect, it is necessary to embed it in a good institutional structure and to be supported and spearheaded by a good leader: the President himself. I looked with increasing astonishment at the senseless rush that was displayed by all actors in the play. Within one month an implementation plan for cultural change should be made. And while DNB met this request of parliament without complaint, it goes without saying that this will have absolutely no effect whatsoever. Because the President, spearheading the change, was going to be replaced in a years time.
While in the Netherlands we were discussing and pondering the above, our Government fell apart in February 2010, which meant that no ravishing or fundamental changes could be expected. Still, it appeared that our Ministry of Finance had decided that their links to supervisors AFM and DNB should be strengthened. So they colluded with Members of Parliament to obtain the discretion to guide and demand action from supervisors (without the realization that the WFT does not really allow them such an action). Furthermore, the Minister of Finance quickly said he was changing the appointment rules for Presidents to a maximum of one re-election. In doing so he inelegantly and unnecessarily bruised Wellink. And our Minister became more responsible for the succession planning at DNB, which requires a forward-looking approach.
The appointment process of the President and directors of the Dutch central bank (DNB)
What I noticed last year is that the tone of voice and the noise-level of publicity by the AFM appeared to decrease, already while Hoogervorst was still running the AFM. The penalties for banks were lower and the public reactions of banks with respect to the behavior of the AFM were milder. Hoogervorst was sent on (or perhaps: off) to his beloved international work. And at the same time the Ministry of Finance appointed his Treasurer, Ronald Gerritsen as the new Chairman at the AFM. Which brings the Ministry of Finance closer to the fire.
As for DNB, there is of course the weekly lunch-meeting de Jager and Wellink. I imagine that early-on they discussed how to organise the succession. And it must have been obvious that Hoogduin was the intended successor, as such a preference (of the Supervisory Board) doesn’t suddenly fall from a blue sky down. Yet, both Wellink and De Jager will have noted that Hoogduin had little track record in Bank Supervision. And my idea is that the Ministry of Finance proposed a division of responsibilities between supervisory and monetary policy, so that Hoogduin could be appointed as new president of DNB. And that part of the succession planning proceeded nicely: Parliament agreed with the idea and we moved on.
But then, in May things suddenly went wrong. The discussion on succession hit the streets, the public and parliament. This surprised me, but also allowed me a moment to share my views on my preference. But the Members of Parliament did not want Hoogduin to be the next DNB-President as he was no outsider and could thus not be the one to spearhead the culture change at DNB. And then, one of the three candidates, Kremers, also stepped out of the race. To him, the Supervisory Board of DNB was unable to outline clearly what his position would be (no doubt this was a discussion on the relationship between the President and the almost independent director of Bank Supervision at the DNB).
What struck me was that we were very much running out of time. It was May, while we needed a President as of July. And you don’t want to be choosing your next central bank President in such a time-squeeze (it seems that shows such as Idols and X-factor even use more time to pick their winner). Anyway, we went through somewhat indistinct and misty weeks, to find out that one of the other top officials of Finance, Knot (who has a DNB-ring to him as he worked their for many years) will become our next President at DNB. With former Crown-prince Hoogduin choosing to leave, because he undoubtedly envisaged his future to be different than it now had become.
The net effect of all this fiddling: there are suddenly two new directors and a new President at DNB as of July 1, 2011. And do note that Klaas Knot is not really an outsider. He originally worked for the Insurance Supervisor and had a quick career at DNB for some 10 years. He became the right-hand advisor of Wellink in his international meetings/work. And a number of years ago he was appointed as a top-civil servant at the Ministry of Finance, possibly as part of a master plan in which Wellink arranged his long-term succession (or simply just took good care of the career of his closest advisor). Now, with the butterfingered public discussion on the succession and role of Hoogduin underway, the choice for Klaas Knot was advanced in time (he might have been on the schedule to succeed Hoogduin). And my guess is that the lack of enthousiasm of Knot for internal and organisational matters may have led him to outline that he didn’t wish to take up the ‘internal affairs’ portfolio of Hoogduin as a part of his role of President.
What struck me is that perhaps Kees van Dijkhuizen and Nout Wellink may have still played important roles behind the curtains. The new director supervision of DNB is currently working for NIBC, (the same bank where van Dijkhuizen is CFO). So both Wellink and van Dijkhuizen, may have each supported their trusted candidates/protegees in view of their qualities. And those qualities certainly do not need to be questioned as the competences of both Knot and Sijbrand speak for themselves.
What I do have a concern about, is that the new management at DNB may get a structure that was focused on the old idea of Hoogduin as the new President. And there now is a separation of the domain of internal affairs and organisation (Eldersohn), Bank Supervision (Sijbrand) and general management and monetary affairs (the President). If the DNB-improvement for the future lies in a cultural change, it is clear that this requires leadership from the future President. But that President is not directly responsible; his two Directors are. And that is a rather unfortunate organizational setting. Furthermore, Knot may not be willing to tighten the knots for his old colleagues when doing the cultural/organisation change. Nevertheless, with sufficient quality, coordination and perhaps a good fresh breeze in the organisation as a result of the new Director Supervision, we should just hope for the best.
Incidentally, I should also mention that the Supervisory Board has not made any statement at all. It appears to me that the unhealthy intervention of the Ministry of Finance with respect to the succession of the President (not a minor job) does not bode well for the future. And this is the same Ministry that formally provides the Supervisory Board with very strong powers in the future. In my view, it is strange to have a Ministry doing your job as the Supervisory Board, so I am amazed that none of them respond or resign. It’s a stunning silence that we can witness, which seems to imply that the Supervisory Board Members rather stick to the status and prestige of being the DNB-Supervisory Board Member than to the content of their job: ensure proper governance at DNB.
Conclusion: butterfingered fiddling with an aftertaste of sprouts...
If we look at the importance of proper supervision and a good central bank in a country, we must realize that DNB is a central element of the most vital (financial) infrastructure in the Netherlands. And that means we must do our utmost best to maintain this infrastructure and to ensure that is and will be functioning properly. I am therefore quite surprised about:
- the lack of debate on financial supervision and resulting institutional structure (the right for a Minister to mandate specific action to the Supervisor is absolutely undesirable),
- the faulty structure imposed on DNB (the split of responsibilities between supervisory director and president, the unworkable role for the Supervisory Board)
- the stunning silence that from the Supervisory Board, now that their preferred candidate has not been chosen and decided to leave,
- the outright poor planning, timing and limited secrecy surrounding the reappointment process. The fact that the process became public domain didn’t do anyone good and was quite awkward to observe, leaving some of the people involved with a bit of a stain on their image.
We can conclude that we have now effectively already built in the core structural weaknesses that will give rise to future incidents with respect to DNB and Bank Supervision. It's all quite embarassing given that the essence of government is planning and designing ahead in order to prevent incidents and structural weaknesses, rather than to ensure them.
For now I am left with a sense of shame about how we have executed this succession planning process in the Netherlands. If my English vocabulary and Google Translate are correct I could qualify this as a major bit of butterfingered fiddling that leaves an aftertaste of our beloved Dutch sprouts. It makes me realize that the Netherlands is too small in size and population to be able to achieve the proper professional levels necessary that suit a mature democracy and financial market. That is a bit depressing, but that’s the way it is.
Of course the biggest role of the Netherlands in the financial world stems from the Golden Age. And since then we were in decline until former President Vissering lifted us up by his international stature and authority. Similarly, Duisenberg was special and President Wellink has done an incredible good job (although in the end hindered by a monoculture within his own organization). But alas, if we continue conducting ourselves the way we have been doing recently, we can be certain to slide away into a pragmatist way of doing that certainly does not justify a place at the international financial conference tables.
With only ourselves to blame for that.
Let's review this appointment process from a distance, drawing on the numerous reports and bits of work that are available with respect to the functioning of DNB, AFM and financial supervision.
First some colours in the background
Traditionally, both DNB and the Authority Financial Markets (AFM) were given quite some leeway in how they organised their business and executed their constitutional supervisory roles. The consequence was that the AFM developed a policeman-style under Chairman Arthur Dokters van Leeuwen. His successor, Hans Hoogervorst, combined this approach with a political savyness and unnecessary PR-agressiveness. Hoogervorst used publicity incidents to hurt banks in their image and bashed the banks into his prescription: an academic frame-of-mind in which consumers are rational, yet deserve paternalistic protection from overcrediting and in which any form of kick-back is to be eliminated in the marketplace. I am afraid that the AFM is going to need quite some years to discover that they were wrong in assuming the consumer rationality and that they will in the end discover that the elimination of kick-backs means that financial advice for consumers has become far too expensive (and thus: out of reach) for the consumers. So through enforcement of their academic yoke, they will eventually make financial advice more costly, cumbersome and less available to the public at large. Similarly, we will find out in about 5 years -when the market has come to a complete standstill- that they have been beating to loud on the mortgages drum.
Now for DNB. While the AFM is noisily supervising the banks, DNB kept up their appearences in their old-fashioned supervisory stile in which banks are invited over for a cup of tea to discuss business. Whereas AFM was showing too much teeth, DNB showed too little. And that had an effect on the cooperation between the policing AFM and the ever-so-polite DNB. And then DNB got traumatized in 2006, by the failure of Bank van der Hoop. From that moment on, all things in DNB-life became legal. External advisors advised on each step of supervision, thus paralyzing DNB. DNB became afraid to move at all and also got stuck under the spell of Wellink. Wellink was in the Board since 1983 and had arrived at his second 7-year term. Which is impractical, as it is impossible to organise the required internal criticism and openness for such a long period. It just doesn't work as we can see from the examples of Kohl, Thatcher and Lubbers. As a consequence, the oil-tanker DNB was not able to respond promptly and properly in discussions on the ABN AMRO take-over, the failing of Icesave and the demise of DSB. Our readers should note however that it is not so helpful for the central bank to be surrounded by inconsistent and populist claptrap on complex banking issues. But that's all part of the game, so as a President you have to be able to handle that as well.
Our Ministry of Finance meanwhile lacked all vision on how to organise financial supervision. And I know this sounds harsh and crude, but it is a simple fact. Our independent Court of Auditors reported their amazement about the fact and the response of our Ministry was: our supervisory policy is embedded in the Law on Financial Supervision (WFT in Dutch). Well, the connoisseurs of that law will shrug their shoulders, smiling politely. Because the WFT is a beautiful, idealistic legal project that had the potentially to become a great legal structure for the financial sector, also through the nuanced use of open standards. In practice, however, every chapter of the WFT-law was introduced in a hurry so at present there is literally no understanding it any more. If we would consider the WFT to be a computer-application, it would be immediately classified as a spaghetti-bomb and a threat to business-continuity, requiring a comprehensive revamp and structural re-engineering.
Equally important is the fact that in the late nineties the internal organization of Finance was overturned. While the former Ministry would have a department dealing with the financial sector as such, the new departments were split up on the basis of regulatory aspects such as: stability, market conduct, generally and so on. This led to less visibility and understanding of the impact of legislative changes for the sector as such. Thus, the sector was facing a Ministry that looked like a conveyor belt pushing out partial amendments.
Change, but how?
It is clear that the above institutional and supervisory framework is not sufficiently apt to deal with large market shocks and changes. And it is not surprising that the various players in the field reflected on the best way forward. So there were reports of what had happened on DNB's supervision (report Scheltema). Politicians came up with an examination (de Wit), largely a rehashing of international reports. The banks founded a Maas Committee that emphasized in the final report the importance of good governance, stronger risk management and a more integrated assessment of societal interests. And the Ministry of Finance started thinking about a supervisory policy version 0.1 or 1.0.
What surprised me was how the discussion on the desired culture-change at DNB took place. This followed from the report Scheltema, but everyone could know that for such a change to have effect, it is necessary to embed it in a good institutional structure and to be supported and spearheaded by a good leader: the President himself. I looked with increasing astonishment at the senseless rush that was displayed by all actors in the play. Within one month an implementation plan for cultural change should be made. And while DNB met this request of parliament without complaint, it goes without saying that this will have absolutely no effect whatsoever. Because the President, spearheading the change, was going to be replaced in a years time.
While in the Netherlands we were discussing and pondering the above, our Government fell apart in February 2010, which meant that no ravishing or fundamental changes could be expected. Still, it appeared that our Ministry of Finance had decided that their links to supervisors AFM and DNB should be strengthened. So they colluded with Members of Parliament to obtain the discretion to guide and demand action from supervisors (without the realization that the WFT does not really allow them such an action). Furthermore, the Minister of Finance quickly said he was changing the appointment rules for Presidents to a maximum of one re-election. In doing so he inelegantly and unnecessarily bruised Wellink. And our Minister became more responsible for the succession planning at DNB, which requires a forward-looking approach.
The appointment process of the President and directors of the Dutch central bank (DNB)
What I noticed last year is that the tone of voice and the noise-level of publicity by the AFM appeared to decrease, already while Hoogervorst was still running the AFM. The penalties for banks were lower and the public reactions of banks with respect to the behavior of the AFM were milder. Hoogervorst was sent on (or perhaps: off) to his beloved international work. And at the same time the Ministry of Finance appointed his Treasurer, Ronald Gerritsen as the new Chairman at the AFM. Which brings the Ministry of Finance closer to the fire.
As for DNB, there is of course the weekly lunch-meeting de Jager and Wellink. I imagine that early-on they discussed how to organise the succession. And it must have been obvious that Hoogduin was the intended successor, as such a preference (of the Supervisory Board) doesn’t suddenly fall from a blue sky down. Yet, both Wellink and De Jager will have noted that Hoogduin had little track record in Bank Supervision. And my idea is that the Ministry of Finance proposed a division of responsibilities between supervisory and monetary policy, so that Hoogduin could be appointed as new president of DNB. And that part of the succession planning proceeded nicely: Parliament agreed with the idea and we moved on.
But then, in May things suddenly went wrong. The discussion on succession hit the streets, the public and parliament. This surprised me, but also allowed me a moment to share my views on my preference. But the Members of Parliament did not want Hoogduin to be the next DNB-President as he was no outsider and could thus not be the one to spearhead the culture change at DNB. And then, one of the three candidates, Kremers, also stepped out of the race. To him, the Supervisory Board of DNB was unable to outline clearly what his position would be (no doubt this was a discussion on the relationship between the President and the almost independent director of Bank Supervision at the DNB).
What struck me was that we were very much running out of time. It was May, while we needed a President as of July. And you don’t want to be choosing your next central bank President in such a time-squeeze (it seems that shows such as Idols and X-factor even use more time to pick their winner). Anyway, we went through somewhat indistinct and misty weeks, to find out that one of the other top officials of Finance, Knot (who has a DNB-ring to him as he worked their for many years) will become our next President at DNB. With former Crown-prince Hoogduin choosing to leave, because he undoubtedly envisaged his future to be different than it now had become.
The net effect of all this fiddling: there are suddenly two new directors and a new President at DNB as of July 1, 2011. And do note that Klaas Knot is not really an outsider. He originally worked for the Insurance Supervisor and had a quick career at DNB for some 10 years. He became the right-hand advisor of Wellink in his international meetings/work. And a number of years ago he was appointed as a top-civil servant at the Ministry of Finance, possibly as part of a master plan in which Wellink arranged his long-term succession (or simply just took good care of the career of his closest advisor). Now, with the butterfingered public discussion on the succession and role of Hoogduin underway, the choice for Klaas Knot was advanced in time (he might have been on the schedule to succeed Hoogduin). And my guess is that the lack of enthousiasm of Knot for internal and organisational matters may have led him to outline that he didn’t wish to take up the ‘internal affairs’ portfolio of Hoogduin as a part of his role of President.
What struck me is that perhaps Kees van Dijkhuizen and Nout Wellink may have still played important roles behind the curtains. The new director supervision of DNB is currently working for NIBC, (the same bank where van Dijkhuizen is CFO). So both Wellink and van Dijkhuizen, may have each supported their trusted candidates/protegees in view of their qualities. And those qualities certainly do not need to be questioned as the competences of both Knot and Sijbrand speak for themselves.
What I do have a concern about, is that the new management at DNB may get a structure that was focused on the old idea of Hoogduin as the new President. And there now is a separation of the domain of internal affairs and organisation (Eldersohn), Bank Supervision (Sijbrand) and general management and monetary affairs (the President). If the DNB-improvement for the future lies in a cultural change, it is clear that this requires leadership from the future President. But that President is not directly responsible; his two Directors are. And that is a rather unfortunate organizational setting. Furthermore, Knot may not be willing to tighten the knots for his old colleagues when doing the cultural/organisation change. Nevertheless, with sufficient quality, coordination and perhaps a good fresh breeze in the organisation as a result of the new Director Supervision, we should just hope for the best.
Incidentally, I should also mention that the Supervisory Board has not made any statement at all. It appears to me that the unhealthy intervention of the Ministry of Finance with respect to the succession of the President (not a minor job) does not bode well for the future. And this is the same Ministry that formally provides the Supervisory Board with very strong powers in the future. In my view, it is strange to have a Ministry doing your job as the Supervisory Board, so I am amazed that none of them respond or resign. It’s a stunning silence that we can witness, which seems to imply that the Supervisory Board Members rather stick to the status and prestige of being the DNB-Supervisory Board Member than to the content of their job: ensure proper governance at DNB.
Conclusion: butterfingered fiddling with an aftertaste of sprouts...
If we look at the importance of proper supervision and a good central bank in a country, we must realize that DNB is a central element of the most vital (financial) infrastructure in the Netherlands. And that means we must do our utmost best to maintain this infrastructure and to ensure that is and will be functioning properly. I am therefore quite surprised about:
- the lack of debate on financial supervision and resulting institutional structure (the right for a Minister to mandate specific action to the Supervisor is absolutely undesirable),
- the faulty structure imposed on DNB (the split of responsibilities between supervisory director and president, the unworkable role for the Supervisory Board)
- the stunning silence that from the Supervisory Board, now that their preferred candidate has not been chosen and decided to leave,
- the outright poor planning, timing and limited secrecy surrounding the reappointment process. The fact that the process became public domain didn’t do anyone good and was quite awkward to observe, leaving some of the people involved with a bit of a stain on their image.
We can conclude that we have now effectively already built in the core structural weaknesses that will give rise to future incidents with respect to DNB and Bank Supervision. It's all quite embarassing given that the essence of government is planning and designing ahead in order to prevent incidents and structural weaknesses, rather than to ensure them.
For now I am left with a sense of shame about how we have executed this succession planning process in the Netherlands. If my English vocabulary and Google Translate are correct I could qualify this as a major bit of butterfingered fiddling that leaves an aftertaste of our beloved Dutch sprouts. It makes me realize that the Netherlands is too small in size and population to be able to achieve the proper professional levels necessary that suit a mature democracy and financial market. That is a bit depressing, but that’s the way it is.
Of course the biggest role of the Netherlands in the financial world stems from the Golden Age. And since then we were in decline until former President Vissering lifted us up by his international stature and authority. Similarly, Duisenberg was special and President Wellink has done an incredible good job (although in the end hindered by a monoculture within his own organization). But alas, if we continue conducting ourselves the way we have been doing recently, we can be certain to slide away into a pragmatist way of doing that certainly does not justify a place at the international financial conference tables.
With only ourselves to blame for that.
10/05/2011
Foreign reporters discover that Geert Wilders only proclaims freedom for himself..... not for the nation
The last months we have witnessed a couple of incidents here in the Netherlands, where a whole bunch of writers, cartoonists and invited speakers are being 'asked', 'convinced' or otherwise bullied in order to refrain from the quite logical comparison of the developments with respect to Wilders Freedom Party with those of the German/Dutch pre-second world-war years. I won't bore you with the details, but the examples are really numerous (see over on the Dutch blog). And this phenomenon now has also hit the international radar, due to this article by a Canadian journalist. For those readers who think that this case is an incident: it isn't. It's a feature of the double-speak that Geert Wilders uses.
Where Geert Wilders is 'fighting' for freedom of speach. He essentially means: freedom of speech for himself alone. For example, he proclaims the right to compare the Quran with Mein Kampf and to suggest that the Quran should be forbidden. And a number more of such comparisons have given rise to a court case against Wilders. Which leads to an interesting paradox. In the court case Wilders claims to be the agent for freedom of speech. Meanwhile Geert Wilders and his followers are insisting that people stop comparing them to the other populist movements and politicians that are around, such as Hitler, Mussolini.. etc.
As for my personal opinion, I happily exercise my freedom of speech by outlining to you foreigners that, having monitored a lot of his appearances and the trial as well, I am pretty confident that Geert Wilders is a narcist, whose opinions should not be read as a vision for the country or the people, but as a reflection of an otherwise distorted mind. Geert Wilders is himself a son of a immigrants from the former Dutch colony (Indonesia). Whereas his parents (and he himself) strongly assimilated and adapted to the Netherlands, he feels that all other immigrants should be forced to undergo the same treatment. So it is the regular tragic of the one being bullied that now bullies the others, as he wishes to do unto them the same pain as was inflicted on himself. Essentially his is quite a sad story, but here in the Netherlands we are merely unfortunate that he is projecting it upon the state of the Netherlands.
Where Geert Wilders is 'fighting' for freedom of speach. He essentially means: freedom of speech for himself alone. For example, he proclaims the right to compare the Quran with Mein Kampf and to suggest that the Quran should be forbidden. And a number more of such comparisons have given rise to a court case against Wilders. Which leads to an interesting paradox. In the court case Wilders claims to be the agent for freedom of speech. Meanwhile Geert Wilders and his followers are insisting that people stop comparing them to the other populist movements and politicians that are around, such as Hitler, Mussolini.. etc.
As for my personal opinion, I happily exercise my freedom of speech by outlining to you foreigners that, having monitored a lot of his appearances and the trial as well, I am pretty confident that Geert Wilders is a narcist, whose opinions should not be read as a vision for the country or the people, but as a reflection of an otherwise distorted mind. Geert Wilders is himself a son of a immigrants from the former Dutch colony (Indonesia). Whereas his parents (and he himself) strongly assimilated and adapted to the Netherlands, he feels that all other immigrants should be forced to undergo the same treatment. So it is the regular tragic of the one being bullied that now bullies the others, as he wishes to do unto them the same pain as was inflicted on himself. Essentially his is quite a sad story, but here in the Netherlands we are merely unfortunate that he is projecting it upon the state of the Netherlands.
02/05/2011
Latest news on successor for Wellink; candidate Kremers no longer available..
The last couple of weeks, we witnessed an interesting public debate on the question which candidate would be the best to be the successor to President Wellink of the Dutch central bank (DNB). Where at first we expected a silent appointment by government, on the basis of a list of three candidates, last week the debate came out in the open, thanks to the Financieele Dagblad. After which the Minister of Finance and a number of politicians hurried to outline that there would not be a choice on the basis of political background.
Today, the Financieele Dagblad once again stirs the debate by announcing the news that one of the candidates Kremers, has withdrawn from the race for President. If I try to guess why I can only come up with two reasons. One is a sense of personal pride, where Kremers perhaps feels so superior that the idea that he is not the number 1 candidate, is unbearable to him. And rather than awaiting the outcome of the race he steps down, so that until eternity he can claim: 'I was in the race to become President of DNB but declined in order for government to be able to solve the issue'. But there is also a second/third option and that is that he has got another offer on the table, which he accepted. And that offer could either be from DNB/Ministry of Finance (and constitute an appointment as Director for Bank Supervision) or from his own bank (getting more money or a different role or stuff like that).
So now the race for President is between Hoogduin en van Dijkhuizen. But we must not overlook the silent game of DNB in this. That might be a game of time and pragmatism. Because, if the government decides at the end of May that van Dijkhuizen is the man, van Dijkhuizen only has one month left to leave his current job and start his new job on July 1. So every kind of delay might be an advantage to the insider candidate. And that might be the silent strategy by DNB. We just don't know.
The only thing we do know: To be continued.
PS. And the next part of the sequel occurred this very afternoon. Wellink has indicated on a conference that he was certain that the new Director Supervision would be an outsider. So that means more possibility that we will end up with Kremers to be appointed in that role.
Today, the Financieele Dagblad once again stirs the debate by announcing the news that one of the candidates Kremers, has withdrawn from the race for President. If I try to guess why I can only come up with two reasons. One is a sense of personal pride, where Kremers perhaps feels so superior that the idea that he is not the number 1 candidate, is unbearable to him. And rather than awaiting the outcome of the race he steps down, so that until eternity he can claim: 'I was in the race to become President of DNB but declined in order for government to be able to solve the issue'. But there is also a second/third option and that is that he has got another offer on the table, which he accepted. And that offer could either be from DNB/Ministry of Finance (and constitute an appointment as Director for Bank Supervision) or from his own bank (getting more money or a different role or stuff like that).
So now the race for President is between Hoogduin en van Dijkhuizen. But we must not overlook the silent game of DNB in this. That might be a game of time and pragmatism. Because, if the government decides at the end of May that van Dijkhuizen is the man, van Dijkhuizen only has one month left to leave his current job and start his new job on July 1. So every kind of delay might be an advantage to the insider candidate. And that might be the silent strategy by DNB. We just don't know.
The only thing we do know: To be continued.
PS. And the next part of the sequel occurred this very afternoon. Wellink has indicated on a conference that he was certain that the new Director Supervision would be an outsider. So that means more possibility that we will end up with Kremers to be appointed in that role.
30/04/2011
The British royal wedding discloses that the abdication of Queen Beatrix is at hand... !
All right, I must confess, I watched most of the wedding on the BBC-channel, so I can't really give the complete Dutch picture. But there's one thing that I found remarkable today and yesterday. It appears that most people 'buy' the reasoning that Beatrix was unable to make it to the royal wedding, as she had to be back for the Queens Day celebrations, next day. Well, we're happily celebrating it now and oh surprise: we can see both Beatrix and Crown Prince Willem-Alexander and his wife Maxima. So, there must be magic technology that has warped them back over the small pond from London to the Netherlands. Which underlines that the official argument was a fake placeholder. So what may have been happening really?
In my view, the absence of Queen Beatrix is significant because she is the kind of royal to be present and to recognize the relevance of these occasions. The only reason why she wouldn't visit the wedding has to do with her job as a Queen and her ambition (and achievement) to do that job in an excellent way. And that can only mean one thing. She understands that it is important for Willem-Alexander and Maxima to step to the forefront and get the formal attention of the Windsors and their guests, without being burdened by the presence of their superior in hierarchy. So we must be nearing the date of her abdication.
In fact, the current moment(um) for abdication appears to be quite good. RTL nieuws today released the outcome of research that showes that 69% of the public find Crown Prince Willem-Alexander ready for the throne. 57 % are of the opinion that the Queen should remain part of government. 73 % finds that the Queen should remain head of state to symbolize national unity, with 65% outlining that the Queen also should stick to that role to facilitate international commerce. And asked for the best year of abdication, the preferences are: this jear (20,5%), 2012 (39%), 2013 (15,1%), later than 2013 (25,4%).
It is interesting by the way to note the current popularity for the Dutch royal family. I think, one of the reasons that it appears to increase, is the fact that we have a minority cabinet and an uncertain and unstable future with respect to our democracy and government. So the public seek the stability that the role of the Royal Family brings, while some MP's are still riding the older wave of removing the Dutch Royal Family from government.
As for the actual date of abdication, my guess is that Beatrix is a long term planner. So I would put my money on 2013 (or 2018), when she reaches the age of 75 (or 80).
PS. I just heard an interview on Amsterdam TV with a movie director who was shooting in 2009 in Amsterdam. He had heard from his network of camera/sound buddies that a special studio had to be set up in the Royal Palace that day, so that he prepared for the announcement of abdication (to be included in his filming). But it never came to that as one deranged mind conceived the idea to try and drive his car into the Royal Family bus. All of which makes 2013 more likely than 2018.
In my view, the absence of Queen Beatrix is significant because she is the kind of royal to be present and to recognize the relevance of these occasions. The only reason why she wouldn't visit the wedding has to do with her job as a Queen and her ambition (and achievement) to do that job in an excellent way. And that can only mean one thing. She understands that it is important for Willem-Alexander and Maxima to step to the forefront and get the formal attention of the Windsors and their guests, without being burdened by the presence of their superior in hierarchy. So we must be nearing the date of her abdication.
In fact, the current moment(um) for abdication appears to be quite good. RTL nieuws today released the outcome of research that showes that 69% of the public find Crown Prince Willem-Alexander ready for the throne. 57 % are of the opinion that the Queen should remain part of government. 73 % finds that the Queen should remain head of state to symbolize national unity, with 65% outlining that the Queen also should stick to that role to facilitate international commerce. And asked for the best year of abdication, the preferences are: this jear (20,5%), 2012 (39%), 2013 (15,1%), later than 2013 (25,4%).
It is interesting by the way to note the current popularity for the Dutch royal family. I think, one of the reasons that it appears to increase, is the fact that we have a minority cabinet and an uncertain and unstable future with respect to our democracy and government. So the public seek the stability that the role of the Royal Family brings, while some MP's are still riding the older wave of removing the Dutch Royal Family from government.
As for the actual date of abdication, my guess is that Beatrix is a long term planner. So I would put my money on 2013 (or 2018), when she reaches the age of 75 (or 80).
PS. I just heard an interview on Amsterdam TV with a movie director who was shooting in 2009 in Amsterdam. He had heard from his network of camera/sound buddies that a special studio had to be set up in the Royal Palace that day, so that he prepared for the announcement of abdication (to be included in his filming). But it never came to that as one deranged mind conceived the idea to try and drive his car into the Royal Family bus. All of which makes 2013 more likely than 2018.
11/04/2011
The successor to Wellink: why I think van Dijkhuizen is the best for the job !
These days, decisions are in the making about the best man to succeed Wellink as the President of De Nederlandsche Bank (our central bank). There are three candidates for the job: Hoogduin, Kremers, en van Dijkhuizen. Whereas in former days, the President used to be responsible for both monetary and supervisory matters, the Minister of Finance, JanCees de Jager, is now choosing for a separation of duties (see here Dutch source 1 and here Dutch source 2). Due to the failures in Dutch banking supervision of the last years, there will be a separate executive director responsible for bank supervision. That director can independently judge and committ the whole central bank board (and its President). And as to the general set-up for bank supervision in the Netherlands, I am amazed at the following statement of the Ministry of Finance:
The Minister trusts very strongly on the internal systems of checks and balances of De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the Authority for Financial Markets (AFM). Both supervisors are themselves responsible for the proper functioning of their internal governance, the legality of their expenditure, the execution of supervision and the determination of priorities and accents of their work.
I find the above quote highly interesting and surprising because things haven't gone that well at the two Dutch supervisors of financial institutions. Too much money has been billed to the institutions under supervision, which had to be corrected by the administrative judge in an appeal (while the Ministry of Finance and supervisors for years ignored the complaints of representative organisation that highlighted this excessive billing). Three banks have failed, not the least as the result of a strong monoculture at the prudential supervisor, DNB. And the AFM has shot bullets as well as blanks by using open norms on anything that moved. So with a Ministry of Finance that doesn't change any of this and just trusts those supervisors to continue doing their job well, we don't have to wonder why the Netherlands will be quite likely to soon face another financial crisis or failing bank. Perhaps the only positive thing that we can say for the Ministry of Finance is that at last, they have formulated some sort of vison on supervision 0.1, because so far it was the only Ministry in the Government that hadn't done its homework properly.
Yet,it might also be the case that the Ministry does not aim to steer policies by a proper structure, but by manning the supervisors with the proper President. It might be this choice that underlies the choice of the Ministry for Ronald Gerritsen, currenty it's own secretary-general, for the role of President of the Authority for Financial Markets (AFM). And similarly one might expect a choice for Kees van Dijkhuizen (former Treasury of the State, just as Wellink was), for the new boss at DNB. But let's not rush too much with my personal preference.
Apart from all the above, we have to be aware of the challenges for the successor of Wellink. The first one is that he (a she could not be found apparently) needs to work with an impossible governance structure in which a pigheaded Director of Supervision can committ the whole DNB-board without consulting them in advance. Second of all, the new President needs to be someone who is able to change the internal culture at DNB from a Kings-Court attitude to more street-wisdom. it must be someone that not just thinks, or prefers study of legal implications, but is also able and willing to act. So we are looking for a pro-active and inspiring leader, with sufficient political flexibility and insight.
Looking at the candidates it is obvious that not all of them are known to the public. Hoogduin, is an abstract macro-economic expert and doing very well in that role. But it is also clear that the analytical approach isn't suited to the public and staff: it's not the man to inspire staff with a warm / human vision and he appears to be less able in communicating simple messages to the public at large. In his way of work he is thus quite likely to condense problems into a set of mathematical equations of an economic logic, which dictate the outcome in the long run. Finally it is unknown whether his political antenna is sufficiently well tuned.
Kremers is the architect of the current supervisory (Twin Peaks) system. After his job at the Ministry of Finance (in the nineties), he joined IMF. From there he congratulated the Ministry with te well chosen twin peaks regulatory system. In fact, he thus complimented himself over a distance and this was quite embarrassing to watch. It is unclear what job he holds exactly at RBS, after the merger. He does fit the criterion however, that he used to work at the Ministry of Finance worked. And he will also be politcially versatile, though lacking in hands-on experience. He seems too self-involved in his mental ideas and recipes. Placing him in the chair of President of DNB, means that DNB gets a new version of a mastermind at the top who has an audience bowing for his great thoughts. It is exactly this symbiotic groupthink relationship between Wellink and his staff that needs to be changed and with Kremers, it seems unlikely that his unhealthy relationship between leader / staff will change. So Kremers is not the right candidate, although many may say he is the right man because of the increasing importance of avoiding systemic risk (and relationship with the IMF).
Finally, Kees van Dijkhuizen. He worked as the Dutch Treasurer and then at NIBC, which wasn't the most obvious choice as it was a bank in special circumstances and trouble (takeover by Kaupthing didn't succeed so NIBC is still in the hands of a a consortium of JC Flowers). He actually worked there in silence, introduced a new consumer savings account (NIBC Direct), to broaden its funding, and made some steps into expansion abroad. All are quite healthy and logical steps, and what appeals to me in this is the hands-on nature. Dijkhuizen, then, is the only candidate that demontrates his ability in hands-on management in both public and private sector, surrounded by complex political, macroeconomic and market dynamics. It seems to me that the richness and diversity of qualities you need to succeed as he does, are precisely the qualities that we require of the new president of DNB.
Henceforth my sincere advice and conclusion: van Dijkhuizen is the best man for the job!
The Minister trusts very strongly on the internal systems of checks and balances of De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the Authority for Financial Markets (AFM). Both supervisors are themselves responsible for the proper functioning of their internal governance, the legality of their expenditure, the execution of supervision and the determination of priorities and accents of their work.
I find the above quote highly interesting and surprising because things haven't gone that well at the two Dutch supervisors of financial institutions. Too much money has been billed to the institutions under supervision, which had to be corrected by the administrative judge in an appeal (while the Ministry of Finance and supervisors for years ignored the complaints of representative organisation that highlighted this excessive billing). Three banks have failed, not the least as the result of a strong monoculture at the prudential supervisor, DNB. And the AFM has shot bullets as well as blanks by using open norms on anything that moved. So with a Ministry of Finance that doesn't change any of this and just trusts those supervisors to continue doing their job well, we don't have to wonder why the Netherlands will be quite likely to soon face another financial crisis or failing bank. Perhaps the only positive thing that we can say for the Ministry of Finance is that at last, they have formulated some sort of vison on supervision 0.1, because so far it was the only Ministry in the Government that hadn't done its homework properly.
Yet,it might also be the case that the Ministry does not aim to steer policies by a proper structure, but by manning the supervisors with the proper President. It might be this choice that underlies the choice of the Ministry for Ronald Gerritsen, currenty it's own secretary-general, for the role of President of the Authority for Financial Markets (AFM). And similarly one might expect a choice for Kees van Dijkhuizen (former Treasury of the State, just as Wellink was), for the new boss at DNB. But let's not rush too much with my personal preference.
Apart from all the above, we have to be aware of the challenges for the successor of Wellink. The first one is that he (a she could not be found apparently) needs to work with an impossible governance structure in which a pigheaded Director of Supervision can committ the whole DNB-board without consulting them in advance. Second of all, the new President needs to be someone who is able to change the internal culture at DNB from a Kings-Court attitude to more street-wisdom. it must be someone that not just thinks, or prefers study of legal implications, but is also able and willing to act. So we are looking for a pro-active and inspiring leader, with sufficient political flexibility and insight.
Looking at the candidates it is obvious that not all of them are known to the public. Hoogduin, is an abstract macro-economic expert and doing very well in that role. But it is also clear that the analytical approach isn't suited to the public and staff: it's not the man to inspire staff with a warm / human vision and he appears to be less able in communicating simple messages to the public at large. In his way of work he is thus quite likely to condense problems into a set of mathematical equations of an economic logic, which dictate the outcome in the long run. Finally it is unknown whether his political antenna is sufficiently well tuned.
Kremers is the architect of the current supervisory (Twin Peaks) system. After his job at the Ministry of Finance (in the nineties), he joined IMF. From there he congratulated the Ministry with te well chosen twin peaks regulatory system. In fact, he thus complimented himself over a distance and this was quite embarrassing to watch. It is unclear what job he holds exactly at RBS, after the merger. He does fit the criterion however, that he used to work at the Ministry of Finance worked. And he will also be politcially versatile, though lacking in hands-on experience. He seems too self-involved in his mental ideas and recipes. Placing him in the chair of President of DNB, means that DNB gets a new version of a mastermind at the top who has an audience bowing for his great thoughts. It is exactly this symbiotic groupthink relationship between Wellink and his staff that needs to be changed and with Kremers, it seems unlikely that his unhealthy relationship between leader / staff will change. So Kremers is not the right candidate, although many may say he is the right man because of the increasing importance of avoiding systemic risk (and relationship with the IMF).
Finally, Kees van Dijkhuizen. He worked as the Dutch Treasurer and then at NIBC, which wasn't the most obvious choice as it was a bank in special circumstances and trouble (takeover by Kaupthing didn't succeed so NIBC is still in the hands of a a consortium of JC Flowers). He actually worked there in silence, introduced a new consumer savings account (NIBC Direct), to broaden its funding, and made some steps into expansion abroad. All are quite healthy and logical steps, and what appeals to me in this is the hands-on nature. Dijkhuizen, then, is the only candidate that demontrates his ability in hands-on management in both public and private sector, surrounded by complex political, macroeconomic and market dynamics. It seems to me that the richness and diversity of qualities you need to succeed as he does, are precisely the qualities that we require of the new president of DNB.
Henceforth my sincere advice and conclusion: van Dijkhuizen is the best man for the job!
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