Now that Geert Wilders has side-stepped in Dutch politics to become an opposition party, he has more time to promote his upcoming book, which will be published in the US. And it will of course be full of his ideology: how the islam is terrorising the West, how he is the victim and what we all should do about it. And a Dutch magazine has been allowed a read through of the book.
The interesting thing that occured is that the Magazine started fact-checking the book. Because somewhere near page 140 (in the Chapter Conquest) Wilders describes how he is being robbed by three Arab youth in his neighbourhood: Canal Island.
The true story however unfolds now in HP Magazine, which checked other books and sources (among which his own brother) to find out that:
- Wilders was attacked from behind and he has never ever seen the attackers,
- he was not in the Canal Island borough when being attacked but a well-to-do neighbourhood.
It's yet another example of how keen he is on living and portraying the world according to his truth.
Showing posts with label financial stability. Show all posts
Showing posts with label financial stability. Show all posts
09/12/2011
Eurocrisis at its peak (december 2011)... some forward thinking here
Well, I think the world has all very much suffered its eurocrisis fatique in the last months. Yet it is time for some new forward thinking on the euro. And I'm going to ensure it's a plain vanilla explanation here. The situation is: this euro-thingy was and is a cunning French plan. And we shouldn't fall for the cunning French for a second time.
Let my try to explain this in three simple steps. That will help you understand the world without constantly following tweets and live blogs. It is - after all - not really that complicated, although the rethorics of the French President Sarkozy and the German Bundeskanzlerin Merkel do create a bit of fog.
Step 1: Monetary union means moving money between regions that constitute the union
Let's look at history. In particular the year 1977. A group of experts, headed by Mr MacDougall, wrote a report on the possibilities for a monetary union and the consequence on public finance. It's a beautifully written report in typewriter format, the standard of those days. And it describes the functioning of monetary unions in a numbere of countries, thus providing the European Commission (9 countries then) with a bit of inspiration for the future.
Conclusion four in this report clearly outlines that an economic and monetary union will always (and permanently) lead to a redistribution of money from richer regions to poor ones via a number of methods (taxes, subsidies and so on):
The redistribution through public finance between regions in the countries studied tends to be reflected to a large extent (though not, of course, precisely because other factors are involved) in corresponding deficits in the balances of payments on current account of the poorer regions, with corresponding surpluses in the richer regions. These deficits and surpluses are of a continuing nature. Net flows of public finance in the range of 3 - 10 % of regional product are common for both relatively rich and relatively poor regions, but a few of the latter enjoy considerably higher net inflows, up to around 30 % of regional product.
The report then continues to describe diplomatically that it's too early for a monetary union now. It also becomes clear that the redistribution of income between regions requires a central form of taxation/income for the centre of the Union (the EU itself) and a bigger budget. Because that creates the mechanisms through which redistribution can occur.
2. The euro: cunning French plan consisting of well packaged creeping committments
In an earlier Dutch blogpost I mentioned and honoured the foresight of Bernard Connolly. This former EU civil servant described in 1995 the French policy: use the euro to gain more influence in the relationshop with Germany. Because without some form of cooperation, the German economy would rapidly show its tail lights to the weaker French economy. By introducing the euro, the French got their influence as well as the desired endgoal; a political union in Europa.
The French understood that going into the discussion with their main goal revealed: political union, would not work. So they chose the Monnet-strategy of creeping committments. Just start with a joint currency and understand that economics will then in the end lead to some crisis-moments. Which are then used to further cement the union. They cleverly disguised their main goal (as no one was ready and willing to committ) and suckered the Germans into believing that this 'no-bail-out'-clause was really worth the paper it was written on.
Of course the French were clever enough to understand that in times of crisis, such clauses will be dropped. They also succeeded in making the sanctions of the Treaty subject to political assessment. And thus they put Germany and Europe on the road of small creeping committments were there is only one way: forward. Until in the end, after some crisis-moments, the full policial union would be arrived at.
Step 3: French magic and illusions: confuse the public with the actuality and hide the real rabbit
I think that it's useless to be excited about the events in the market and politics. What's happening now is exactly what was planned by the French. The diverging economies and bad public finances in the EU have become a strain on the functioning of the European Union. So now is the time to cement forward towards the political union. And we see Merkel and Sarkozy using this opportunity to convince their people and local politicians that this is the time to really step up to the plate and cement some solid new agreements in place. And once again, the German-French axis is the dealmaker with the rest of Europe standing by.
The real choice: political union or not?
By using short term rethorics Sarkozy still hides the real choice as the magician hides his rabbit for his audience. And that choice is wheter or not we want a political union in Europe (where rich countries yearly pay the poor ones and where a central EU-taxation exists and is used to redistribute wealth).
Let's be clear: we failed to properly assess the French gameplan in 1994. We got suckered into their game of creeping committments with only one endconclusion: political union. And our politicians didn't see it, were unaware or otherwise incapable of noticing this. But now that we have seen this happening, we can choose to engage in todays rethorics on new pacts and unions or to step back and repeat the main question: do we really want this political union? Is there sufficient solidarity among all countries in Europe to start sending money from rich to poor countries?
The answer and most likely outcome: Marseillaise rather than the ninth of Beethoven
Our true challenge now is not to be confused by the magic, the tricks, the thick air, the fog and the 34th rescue plan for the Euro. So when brushing all that aside, what remains is a lack of solidarity in Europe to go forward towards a political union. But we can also see that our current style politicans lack the courage, guts or vision to really deal with that question openly. Then again, that is also a valid choice. It's the choice to remain the puppet/marionet in the French theatre.
My guess is that Sarkozy is a very smart man who foresees that the European countries will continue to fall for his cheap magic and will remain puppets in the French masterplan. And could that perhaps also be the reason why, at the end of his pro-Europa-speech, one week ago, we didn't hear the European anthem (the Ninth of Beethoven) but the Marseillaise?
Click here to the read the Dutch version of this blogpost.
Let my try to explain this in three simple steps. That will help you understand the world without constantly following tweets and live blogs. It is - after all - not really that complicated, although the rethorics of the French President Sarkozy and the German Bundeskanzlerin Merkel do create a bit of fog.
Step 1: Monetary union means moving money between regions that constitute the union
Let's look at history. In particular the year 1977. A group of experts, headed by Mr MacDougall, wrote a report on the possibilities for a monetary union and the consequence on public finance. It's a beautifully written report in typewriter format, the standard of those days. And it describes the functioning of monetary unions in a numbere of countries, thus providing the European Commission (9 countries then) with a bit of inspiration for the future.
Conclusion four in this report clearly outlines that an economic and monetary union will always (and permanently) lead to a redistribution of money from richer regions to poor ones via a number of methods (taxes, subsidies and so on):
The redistribution through public finance between regions in the countries studied tends to be reflected to a large extent (though not, of course, precisely because other factors are involved) in corresponding deficits in the balances of payments on current account of the poorer regions, with corresponding surpluses in the richer regions. These deficits and surpluses are of a continuing nature. Net flows of public finance in the range of 3 - 10 % of regional product are common for both relatively rich and relatively poor regions, but a few of the latter enjoy considerably higher net inflows, up to around 30 % of regional product.
The report then continues to describe diplomatically that it's too early for a monetary union now. It also becomes clear that the redistribution of income between regions requires a central form of taxation/income for the centre of the Union (the EU itself) and a bigger budget. Because that creates the mechanisms through which redistribution can occur.
2. The euro: cunning French plan consisting of well packaged creeping committments
In an earlier Dutch blogpost I mentioned and honoured the foresight of Bernard Connolly. This former EU civil servant described in 1995 the French policy: use the euro to gain more influence in the relationshop with Germany. Because without some form of cooperation, the German economy would rapidly show its tail lights to the weaker French economy. By introducing the euro, the French got their influence as well as the desired endgoal; a political union in Europa.
The French understood that going into the discussion with their main goal revealed: political union, would not work. So they chose the Monnet-strategy of creeping committments. Just start with a joint currency and understand that economics will then in the end lead to some crisis-moments. Which are then used to further cement the union. They cleverly disguised their main goal (as no one was ready and willing to committ) and suckered the Germans into believing that this 'no-bail-out'-clause was really worth the paper it was written on.
Of course the French were clever enough to understand that in times of crisis, such clauses will be dropped. They also succeeded in making the sanctions of the Treaty subject to political assessment. And thus they put Germany and Europe on the road of small creeping committments were there is only one way: forward. Until in the end, after some crisis-moments, the full policial union would be arrived at.
Step 3: French magic and illusions: confuse the public with the actuality and hide the real rabbit
I think that it's useless to be excited about the events in the market and politics. What's happening now is exactly what was planned by the French. The diverging economies and bad public finances in the EU have become a strain on the functioning of the European Union. So now is the time to cement forward towards the political union. And we see Merkel and Sarkozy using this opportunity to convince their people and local politicians that this is the time to really step up to the plate and cement some solid new agreements in place. And once again, the German-French axis is the dealmaker with the rest of Europe standing by.
The real choice: political union or not?
By using short term rethorics Sarkozy still hides the real choice as the magician hides his rabbit for his audience. And that choice is wheter or not we want a political union in Europe (where rich countries yearly pay the poor ones and where a central EU-taxation exists and is used to redistribute wealth).
Let's be clear: we failed to properly assess the French gameplan in 1994. We got suckered into their game of creeping committments with only one endconclusion: political union. And our politicians didn't see it, were unaware or otherwise incapable of noticing this. But now that we have seen this happening, we can choose to engage in todays rethorics on new pacts and unions or to step back and repeat the main question: do we really want this political union? Is there sufficient solidarity among all countries in Europe to start sending money from rich to poor countries?
The answer and most likely outcome: Marseillaise rather than the ninth of Beethoven
Our true challenge now is not to be confused by the magic, the tricks, the thick air, the fog and the 34th rescue plan for the Euro. So when brushing all that aside, what remains is a lack of solidarity in Europe to go forward towards a political union. But we can also see that our current style politicans lack the courage, guts or vision to really deal with that question openly. Then again, that is also a valid choice. It's the choice to remain the puppet/marionet in the French theatre.
My guess is that Sarkozy is a very smart man who foresees that the European countries will continue to fall for his cheap magic and will remain puppets in the French masterplan. And could that perhaps also be the reason why, at the end of his pro-Europa-speech, one week ago, we didn't hear the European anthem (the Ninth of Beethoven) but the Marseillaise?
Click here to the read the Dutch version of this blogpost.
01/11/2011
Eurocrisis: the frog may have been long boilt but we fail to notice...
Looking at todays market developments I am very much reminded by the complex discussions of 2007 and 2008. I think also these days, here in Europe we are failing to recognize that the political and decision process has gotten out of control. The bailout-frog is long boilt and dead, but we keep pretending it is alive and will be able to move. And heaven only knows wen reality will sink in.
Mind you, my personal opinion is that the Wednesday-package was not about bailing out Greece but about bailing out Europe. Given that clearly the EU governments don't have the support/cash to fund a bailout fund themselves, they had to provide the EFSF with sufficient flexibility to go shopping for funds in the market. Three cheers to Angela Merkel for finally understanding that...
And the European leaders of course also placed an emergency solution via the IMF in the background. In doing so the (emergency) plumbing is laid for a bailout of Europe. As a result, the financial markets could no longer determine whether the bazooka was sufficiently big. It's size is unknown, now that there is the possibility of some Chinese or Saudi Arabi or the IMF to step in. So, lot's of work to do, but the main problem was solved.
Thus, the essence of the EU-package was that it ensured that the EU itself would qualify for emergency packages, should push come to shove. And this appeared to work for a day or so. And while Draghi outlined to continue to take extra-ordinary measures, Italy got burnt in the market. So that did not bode too well.
And here we are now. Tuesday evening, first of november 2011. Berlusconi is meeting with his Cabinet to discuss measures. As is the Greek Prime Minister who presumably felt that the First November of 2011 was a good day to announce a referendum (1-11-11, it must mean something in Greek mythology). And of course, the Dutch Members of Parliament will also convene this evening. So there will be more discussions. And letters to parliament. And then our Prime Minister will say stuff. And then there will be the G20. And so on, and so on.
I understand that for those working in civil service, there is no giving up on Europe and procedure. They must continue to go the way that has been prescribed and try to make something out of this very desperate situation. But it is all quite similar to the myth/story of the boilt frog. If you put a frog in a glass of water it will jump out if it is heated quickly, but will not when the water is heated slowly. So in a situation of slow changes, the frog will boil to death.*
The whole EU-situation now reminds me very much of the complex discussions we had here in the Netherlands with the takeover of ABN AMRO by Barclays, followed by the bid of RBS/Fortis/Santander. This whole deal messed up incredibly and had all kinds of side effects (no attention paid to smaller banks with two of them failing subsequently: DSB Icesave). And the one major lesson that we could learn in the Netherlands was that it is essential to identify the moment in which a process has become too complex to handle.
And what I'm saying here: we may have passed that moment quite some months ago already. We are already witnessing the Lehman 2 moment in the markets, but European politicians are too busy to notice (as they are holding summits and meeting to prevent Lehman 2 from happening).
By the way: later scientists proved that the story was untrue and an urban myth. Maybe someday people will say the same of the Euro...
Mind you, my personal opinion is that the Wednesday-package was not about bailing out Greece but about bailing out Europe. Given that clearly the EU governments don't have the support/cash to fund a bailout fund themselves, they had to provide the EFSF with sufficient flexibility to go shopping for funds in the market. Three cheers to Angela Merkel for finally understanding that...
And the European leaders of course also placed an emergency solution via the IMF in the background. In doing so the (emergency) plumbing is laid for a bailout of Europe. As a result, the financial markets could no longer determine whether the bazooka was sufficiently big. It's size is unknown, now that there is the possibility of some Chinese or Saudi Arabi or the IMF to step in. So, lot's of work to do, but the main problem was solved.
Thus, the essence of the EU-package was that it ensured that the EU itself would qualify for emergency packages, should push come to shove. And this appeared to work for a day or so. And while Draghi outlined to continue to take extra-ordinary measures, Italy got burnt in the market. So that did not bode too well.
And here we are now. Tuesday evening, first of november 2011. Berlusconi is meeting with his Cabinet to discuss measures. As is the Greek Prime Minister who presumably felt that the First November of 2011 was a good day to announce a referendum (1-11-11, it must mean something in Greek mythology). And of course, the Dutch Members of Parliament will also convene this evening. So there will be more discussions. And letters to parliament. And then our Prime Minister will say stuff. And then there will be the G20. And so on, and so on.
I understand that for those working in civil service, there is no giving up on Europe and procedure. They must continue to go the way that has been prescribed and try to make something out of this very desperate situation. But it is all quite similar to the myth/story of the boilt frog. If you put a frog in a glass of water it will jump out if it is heated quickly, but will not when the water is heated slowly. So in a situation of slow changes, the frog will boil to death.*
The whole EU-situation now reminds me very much of the complex discussions we had here in the Netherlands with the takeover of ABN AMRO by Barclays, followed by the bid of RBS/Fortis/Santander. This whole deal messed up incredibly and had all kinds of side effects (no attention paid to smaller banks with two of them failing subsequently: DSB Icesave). And the one major lesson that we could learn in the Netherlands was that it is essential to identify the moment in which a process has become too complex to handle.
And what I'm saying here: we may have passed that moment quite some months ago already. We are already witnessing the Lehman 2 moment in the markets, but European politicians are too busy to notice (as they are holding summits and meeting to prevent Lehman 2 from happening).
By the way: later scientists proved that the story was untrue and an urban myth. Maybe someday people will say the same of the Euro...
11/10/2011
Waiting for the trojka report and the finale... will the euro go out with a bang...?
The times they are changing amazing.
One year ago in Deauville, we saw Merkel and Sarkozy decide on how to save Europe: getting the banks involved was the answer. Then this week we saw them saving Europe once again: a huge fund and effort was necessary. Everyone was hopeful; it really appeared as if they were going to get it right this time. Stock exchanges felt happy but the stakes are up. Because if Merkozy fail to get it right, the finale will certainly become a blast.
What I find amazing is that we could see a sovereign crisis turn into a full blown bank crisis in Europe, due to the political desire to take revenge on banks. If banks need to pay up as well, this hurts their income, their revenue and future divivends. So down with share prices and trust. Then, add a couple of local bank tax plans on top and those are all the ingredients you need for a full blown contagion in the financial market. Yet only a number of people, among which former Director Hoogduin of the Dutch Central Bank, dare to outline to Merkozy that they themselves have been the major factor that contributed to the feared 'contagion' in the financial markets.
So now we need an ever bigger final bazooka solution. And what concerns me now, is the tone with which both leaders of state keep referring to the trojka report and the decision afterwards. It's a tone that defers the topic to a technicality with subsequent political decision. It's not the tone that you would expect of leaders. Two real political leaders might refer to the report, but not give the trojka this much attention.
Because imagine yourself to be a member of the trojka. If all the eyes of the world are upon you, what are you going to say? You need to keep an optimistic tone, but then again, you can see that the Greek are evidently failing the standards. What to report then? Outlining that Greece missed the norm will mean oil on the fire of populist hardliners in the EU. And stressing that Greece is well underway means that the flak might be directed at the trojka itself. There's no way of doing it right.
So what may happen is that there will be a highly diplomatic press conference and report, so ambigous that it will do the least public harm. Still, the politicans are responsible for putting the trojka in this awkward position. They deflected a primary political issue to a group of experts while they should effectively solve it themselves. Because as things stands now, the trojka has too much politicial expectations deflected upon itself, to do its work properly. And in my opinion, this doesn't bode well at all.
So we could be up for a grand finale. Either because of the trojka report or because of the fact that the French and German are not going to agree on the details that they need to agree upon to shoot the final bazooka.
More and more I feel that this political (and sovereign) crisis has some similarities with these animated Disney films. Cat is chasing mouse. Running hard. Running off the cliff and keeps running in a straight line. Until the cat discovers there's no more ground underneath. Which is when the fall begins. Cat falls down and should be dead of course, but in this miracle world of Disney just irons out the bumps and starts chasing the mouse again....
Updated 1540: If you wish the end result, the joint statement, read the text below: a nice example of diplomacy beyond diplomacy. Greece gets the money while it doesn't fullfill earlier criteria. Where did we hear this before..?
PRESS RELEASE
11 October 2011 - Statement by the European Commission, the ECB and IMF on the Fifth Review Mission to Greece
Staff teams from the European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have concluded their fifth review mission to Greece to discuss recent economic developments. The mission has reached staff-level agreement with the authorities on the economic and financial policies needed to bring the government’s economic program back on track.
Regarding the outlook, the recession will be deeper than was anticipated in June and a recovery is now expected only from 2013 onwards. There is no evidence yet of improvement in investor sentiment and the related increase in investments, in part because the reform momentum has not gained the critical mass necessary to begin transforming the investment climate. However, exports are rebounding—albeit from a low base—and a shift towards a more dynamic export sector, supported by a moderation of unit labor costs, should lead to more balanced and sustainable growth over the medium term. Inflation has come down over the last year and is expected to remain below the euro area average in the period ahead.
In the fiscal area, the government has achieved a major reduction in the deficit since the start of the program despite a deep recession. However, the achievement of the fiscal target for 2011 is no longer within reach, partly because of a further drop in GDP, but also because of slippages in the implementation of some of the agreed measures.
As for 2012, the mission believes that the additional measures announced by the government, in combination with a determined implementation of the adjusted Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, should be sufficient to bring the fiscal program back on track and ensure that the deficit target of EUR 14.9 billion will be met.
Looking to 2013-14, additional measures are likely to be needed to meet program targets. Such measures should be adopted in the context of an update of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy by mid-2012. To ensure that the program is growth-friendly, and in view of the ambitious assumptions regarding improvement in revenue administration already embedded in the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, it is essential that such measures focus on the expenditure side.
In the area of privatisation, progress has been achieved with the creation of a professionally managed privatisation fund. However, delays in the preparation of the assets for privatisation, and to some extent worse market conditions, mean that revenues in 2011 will be significantly lower than expected. The government remains, however, committed to the revenue target of EUR 35 billion by the end of 2014. Ensuring that the privatisation fund remains independent from political pressures remains key for success in this area.
Banks have improved their capital base through market-based means. As evident from this weekend’s resolution of Proton Bank, the recent amendment of the banking law ensures that non-viable banks can be wound down while protecting depositors' interest and preserving the stability of the financial system.
As to structural reforms, areas of progress include the transport sector, licensing procedures, and regulated professions. As overall progress has been uneven, a reinvigoration of reforms remains the overarching challenge facing the authorities. In this regard, the decision to suspend the mandatory extension of sector-level collective agreements to the firm level is a major step forward, as it will help ensure the flexibility in the labour market needed to boost growth and prevent high unemployment from getting entrenched.
Overall, the authorities continue to make important progress, notably with regard to fiscal consolidation. To ensure a further reduction in the deficit in a socially acceptable manner and to set the stage for a recovery to take hold, it is essential that the authorities put more emphasis on structural reforms in the public sector and the economy more broadly.
The success of the program continues to depend on mobilizing adequate financing from private sector involvement (PSI) and the official sector. Ongoing discussions on PSI together with assurances provided by European leaders at their July 21 summit suggest that the program remains fully financed.
Once the Eurogroup and the IMF’s Executive Board have approved the conclusions of the fifth review, the next tranche of EUR 8 billion (EUR 5.8 billion by the euro area Member States, and EUR 2.2 billion by the IMF) will become available, most likely, in early November.
One year ago in Deauville, we saw Merkel and Sarkozy decide on how to save Europe: getting the banks involved was the answer. Then this week we saw them saving Europe once again: a huge fund and effort was necessary. Everyone was hopeful; it really appeared as if they were going to get it right this time. Stock exchanges felt happy but the stakes are up. Because if Merkozy fail to get it right, the finale will certainly become a blast.
What I find amazing is that we could see a sovereign crisis turn into a full blown bank crisis in Europe, due to the political desire to take revenge on banks. If banks need to pay up as well, this hurts their income, their revenue and future divivends. So down with share prices and trust. Then, add a couple of local bank tax plans on top and those are all the ingredients you need for a full blown contagion in the financial market. Yet only a number of people, among which former Director Hoogduin of the Dutch Central Bank, dare to outline to Merkozy that they themselves have been the major factor that contributed to the feared 'contagion' in the financial markets.
So now we need an ever bigger final bazooka solution. And what concerns me now, is the tone with which both leaders of state keep referring to the trojka report and the decision afterwards. It's a tone that defers the topic to a technicality with subsequent political decision. It's not the tone that you would expect of leaders. Two real political leaders might refer to the report, but not give the trojka this much attention.
Because imagine yourself to be a member of the trojka. If all the eyes of the world are upon you, what are you going to say? You need to keep an optimistic tone, but then again, you can see that the Greek are evidently failing the standards. What to report then? Outlining that Greece missed the norm will mean oil on the fire of populist hardliners in the EU. And stressing that Greece is well underway means that the flak might be directed at the trojka itself. There's no way of doing it right.
So what may happen is that there will be a highly diplomatic press conference and report, so ambigous that it will do the least public harm. Still, the politicans are responsible for putting the trojka in this awkward position. They deflected a primary political issue to a group of experts while they should effectively solve it themselves. Because as things stands now, the trojka has too much politicial expectations deflected upon itself, to do its work properly. And in my opinion, this doesn't bode well at all.
So we could be up for a grand finale. Either because of the trojka report or because of the fact that the French and German are not going to agree on the details that they need to agree upon to shoot the final bazooka.
More and more I feel that this political (and sovereign) crisis has some similarities with these animated Disney films. Cat is chasing mouse. Running hard. Running off the cliff and keeps running in a straight line. Until the cat discovers there's no more ground underneath. Which is when the fall begins. Cat falls down and should be dead of course, but in this miracle world of Disney just irons out the bumps and starts chasing the mouse again....
Updated 1540: If you wish the end result, the joint statement, read the text below: a nice example of diplomacy beyond diplomacy. Greece gets the money while it doesn't fullfill earlier criteria. Where did we hear this before..?
PRESS RELEASE
11 October 2011 - Statement by the European Commission, the ECB and IMF on the Fifth Review Mission to Greece
Staff teams from the European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have concluded their fifth review mission to Greece to discuss recent economic developments. The mission has reached staff-level agreement with the authorities on the economic and financial policies needed to bring the government’s economic program back on track.
Regarding the outlook, the recession will be deeper than was anticipated in June and a recovery is now expected only from 2013 onwards. There is no evidence yet of improvement in investor sentiment and the related increase in investments, in part because the reform momentum has not gained the critical mass necessary to begin transforming the investment climate. However, exports are rebounding—albeit from a low base—and a shift towards a more dynamic export sector, supported by a moderation of unit labor costs, should lead to more balanced and sustainable growth over the medium term. Inflation has come down over the last year and is expected to remain below the euro area average in the period ahead.
In the fiscal area, the government has achieved a major reduction in the deficit since the start of the program despite a deep recession. However, the achievement of the fiscal target for 2011 is no longer within reach, partly because of a further drop in GDP, but also because of slippages in the implementation of some of the agreed measures.
As for 2012, the mission believes that the additional measures announced by the government, in combination with a determined implementation of the adjusted Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, should be sufficient to bring the fiscal program back on track and ensure that the deficit target of EUR 14.9 billion will be met.
Looking to 2013-14, additional measures are likely to be needed to meet program targets. Such measures should be adopted in the context of an update of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy by mid-2012. To ensure that the program is growth-friendly, and in view of the ambitious assumptions regarding improvement in revenue administration already embedded in the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, it is essential that such measures focus on the expenditure side.
In the area of privatisation, progress has been achieved with the creation of a professionally managed privatisation fund. However, delays in the preparation of the assets for privatisation, and to some extent worse market conditions, mean that revenues in 2011 will be significantly lower than expected. The government remains, however, committed to the revenue target of EUR 35 billion by the end of 2014. Ensuring that the privatisation fund remains independent from political pressures remains key for success in this area.
Banks have improved their capital base through market-based means. As evident from this weekend’s resolution of Proton Bank, the recent amendment of the banking law ensures that non-viable banks can be wound down while protecting depositors' interest and preserving the stability of the financial system.
As to structural reforms, areas of progress include the transport sector, licensing procedures, and regulated professions. As overall progress has been uneven, a reinvigoration of reforms remains the overarching challenge facing the authorities. In this regard, the decision to suspend the mandatory extension of sector-level collective agreements to the firm level is a major step forward, as it will help ensure the flexibility in the labour market needed to boost growth and prevent high unemployment from getting entrenched.
Overall, the authorities continue to make important progress, notably with regard to fiscal consolidation. To ensure a further reduction in the deficit in a socially acceptable manner and to set the stage for a recovery to take hold, it is essential that the authorities put more emphasis on structural reforms in the public sector and the economy more broadly.
The success of the program continues to depend on mobilizing adequate financing from private sector involvement (PSI) and the official sector. Ongoing discussions on PSI together with assurances provided by European leaders at their July 21 summit suggest that the program remains fully financed.
Once the Eurogroup and the IMF’s Executive Board have approved the conclusions of the fifth review, the next tranche of EUR 8 billion (EUR 5.8 billion by the euro area Member States, and EUR 2.2 billion by the IMF) will become available, most likely, in early November.
13/09/2011
Interesting development... default Greece confirmed/rumoured (sort of) by Dutch Ministry of Finance..
This morning, Bert Bruggink, CFO Rabobank, was quoted in Financieele Dagblad, saying that -looking at the markets- it was not the question if but when Greece would default. And RTL Nieuws informed the public that the Ministry of Finance was now preparing for all possible (and unthinkable) options in the crisis. Which lead to clippings in the press: 'Dutch Ministry of Finance thinks that default of Greece is imminent.'
Tomorrow, Dutch parliament will discuss the EFSF in parliament. But PvdA (Labour) does not wish to support the extension of the fund if Finland still has its demand for collateral on the table. The 'Green-Left'-party states that with the extension, the EU should also decide on the Euro-commissioner for budget (the MarkRutte proposal). And the Socialist Party doesn't want the EFSF to take over bond-buying from the ECB as, the ECB has 'unlimited funds'.
Meanwhile, national radio bulletins send out the message that sources near to the Ministry of Finance outline that it is preparing for default (19.57). While formally the Ministry may not be calling for orderly default and denies it (20.20). Which means that the 'open' and transparant communication of Minister de Jager, once again creates more confusion than necessary. It's a bit like BNP formally denying the informal rumour about its financial health.
So, looking at this confusion, it does indeed look as if the default of Greece is imminent...
Tomorrow, Dutch parliament will discuss the EFSF in parliament. But PvdA (Labour) does not wish to support the extension of the fund if Finland still has its demand for collateral on the table. The 'Green-Left'-party states that with the extension, the EU should also decide on the Euro-commissioner for budget (the MarkRutte proposal). And the Socialist Party doesn't want the EFSF to take over bond-buying from the ECB as, the ECB has 'unlimited funds'.
Meanwhile, national radio bulletins send out the message that sources near to the Ministry of Finance outline that it is preparing for default (19.57). While formally the Ministry may not be calling for orderly default and denies it (20.20). Which means that the 'open' and transparant communication of Minister de Jager, once again creates more confusion than necessary. It's a bit like BNP formally denying the informal rumour about its financial health.
So, looking at this confusion, it does indeed look as if the default of Greece is imminent...
05/09/2011
Eurocrisis: a clash of old (long term) and new (opportunistic) political thinking
These days I'm trying to get my head around the current developments in international and European markets and politics. There's a real flood of former politicians emphasizing that Europe is the solution, rather than the problem (see for example the statement by the Council for the Future of Europe). And here in the Netherlands we had former Prime Minister Wim Kok as well as former Minster of Finance Gerrit Zalm explaining to us on television that we need to remember the benefits of Europe and use it as a road to the solution. And I fully agree. As a whole, the eurozone is not doing so bad, but we do have a serious internal management and discipline problem.
Leadership today may be far more difficult than when the euro was formed..
Many commentators outline that now is the time to show leadership, based on a long term vision. And that is most certainly an important element of any solution. But I sense there may be more to it. There are some tectonic plates moving beneath todays politics. And the theory that I'm forming right now, is that most commentators are overlooking the movements of those plates as they are standing on those plates themselves (and incorrectly assume that they're not moving).
My theory is that, due to these slowly moving tectonic plates in the political environment, it might be much harder for todays leaders to exhibit the same leadership as their predecessors. So the solution to the eurocrisis is not just about leadership, but requires an appreciation of those fundamental trends as well.
What are the fundamental trends that now constrain our leaders?
The slowly moving 'tectonic plates' that constrain our leaders are:
1- a long period without war and a fading memory of bad economic circumstances,
2- a growing mastering of technology, leading to a shift in risk-sensitivity and a new control-perspective on the ability to control developments,
3- less religious attitudes, loss of self-discipline and focus on individual welfare,
4- electoral behaviour that is no longer focused on full political vision or ideology but can be seen as short-term shopping behaviour; the contract term of citizen and politicians decreased considerably,
5- the rise of the internet and social media, leading to increased scrutiny by the public, less margin for politicians to implement long term solutions and to oversimplification of complex problems in the public debate.
So what am I saying is:
1- In Europe, we have forgotten how rich we really are and where we came from. So the financial and geopolitical benefits of Europe (income, peace and peace of mind) are taken for granted. And as we grow older, this individual and collective memory fades more and more.
2- The advancing technology incites a sense of control into the modern human being and people are less inclined to accept the limitations of life; we are used to demand more, get more, expect more, demand more and so on. The succes of technology also provides us with a sense that we can control more than we really can. And it shifts our risk-sensitivity. Risks that in former times were acceptable or considered an act of God, are now subject to preventive and containment measures, with the people seeking a culprit if insufficient measures were taken. Essentially technology makes us become spoilt brats that don't want to bite the sour apple for our health if there is a sweeter alternative around the corner.
3- The increased welfare and growing economy allow for the realization of many wishes. And the traditional religions slowly lose ground to an economic religion in which there is little place for self restraint or group thinking and solidarity.
4- In the political domain, the economization also occurs and voting becomes more an act like shopping than an act like determining which church/religion you wish to belong to. The lifelong committment to ideologies fades away and needs to make place for opportunistic electoral behaviour. In turn, the political parties need to focus more on short term issues and popularity to survive and represent the interest of their electorate.
5- Whereas in former times some leeway in government and politics could be created by controlling and restraining the flow of information, the rise of Internet and social media make it almost impossible to create time/intellectual room for debate/solutions. These media also allow for collective intelligence and feedback which is very much quicker than before. So politicians can no longer design political solutions which do not work in practice or contain design-errors. Similarly they cannot decide or choose open-ended solutions, hoping that some underlying fundamental problem will be solved by time rather than politics.
Thus, in order to solve the Eurocrisis, we don't just need leadership, but also:
- increased awareness about the benefits peace, peace of mind and economic growth that Europe has brought us and brings us,
- the ability to bite through a sour apple rather than postpone solutions,
- the awareness that we're in it together, even if it doesn't feel like that,
- politicians with the leadership to appeal to the publics desire for stability and growth and the fact that only with their prolonged loyalty can the public expect a better long term outcome,
- consistent solutions to the technical, financial and political issues at stake; any backdoor or design error will get back at us within a years time-frame.
See also the Dutch version of this post here.
Leadership today may be far more difficult than when the euro was formed..
Many commentators outline that now is the time to show leadership, based on a long term vision. And that is most certainly an important element of any solution. But I sense there may be more to it. There are some tectonic plates moving beneath todays politics. And the theory that I'm forming right now, is that most commentators are overlooking the movements of those plates as they are standing on those plates themselves (and incorrectly assume that they're not moving).
My theory is that, due to these slowly moving tectonic plates in the political environment, it might be much harder for todays leaders to exhibit the same leadership as their predecessors. So the solution to the eurocrisis is not just about leadership, but requires an appreciation of those fundamental trends as well.
What are the fundamental trends that now constrain our leaders?
The slowly moving 'tectonic plates' that constrain our leaders are:
1- a long period without war and a fading memory of bad economic circumstances,
2- a growing mastering of technology, leading to a shift in risk-sensitivity and a new control-perspective on the ability to control developments,
3- less religious attitudes, loss of self-discipline and focus on individual welfare,
4- electoral behaviour that is no longer focused on full political vision or ideology but can be seen as short-term shopping behaviour; the contract term of citizen and politicians decreased considerably,
5- the rise of the internet and social media, leading to increased scrutiny by the public, less margin for politicians to implement long term solutions and to oversimplification of complex problems in the public debate.
So what am I saying is:
1- In Europe, we have forgotten how rich we really are and where we came from. So the financial and geopolitical benefits of Europe (income, peace and peace of mind) are taken for granted. And as we grow older, this individual and collective memory fades more and more.
2- The advancing technology incites a sense of control into the modern human being and people are less inclined to accept the limitations of life; we are used to demand more, get more, expect more, demand more and so on. The succes of technology also provides us with a sense that we can control more than we really can. And it shifts our risk-sensitivity. Risks that in former times were acceptable or considered an act of God, are now subject to preventive and containment measures, with the people seeking a culprit if insufficient measures were taken. Essentially technology makes us become spoilt brats that don't want to bite the sour apple for our health if there is a sweeter alternative around the corner.
3- The increased welfare and growing economy allow for the realization of many wishes. And the traditional religions slowly lose ground to an economic religion in which there is little place for self restraint or group thinking and solidarity.
4- In the political domain, the economization also occurs and voting becomes more an act like shopping than an act like determining which church/religion you wish to belong to. The lifelong committment to ideologies fades away and needs to make place for opportunistic electoral behaviour. In turn, the political parties need to focus more on short term issues and popularity to survive and represent the interest of their electorate.
5- Whereas in former times some leeway in government and politics could be created by controlling and restraining the flow of information, the rise of Internet and social media make it almost impossible to create time/intellectual room for debate/solutions. These media also allow for collective intelligence and feedback which is very much quicker than before. So politicians can no longer design political solutions which do not work in practice or contain design-errors. Similarly they cannot decide or choose open-ended solutions, hoping that some underlying fundamental problem will be solved by time rather than politics.
Thus, in order to solve the Eurocrisis, we don't just need leadership, but also:
- increased awareness about the benefits peace, peace of mind and economic growth that Europe has brought us and brings us,
- the ability to bite through a sour apple rather than postpone solutions,
- the awareness that we're in it together, even if it doesn't feel like that,
- politicians with the leadership to appeal to the publics desire for stability and growth and the fact that only with their prolonged loyalty can the public expect a better long term outcome,
- consistent solutions to the technical, financial and political issues at stake; any backdoor or design error will get back at us within a years time-frame.
See also the Dutch version of this post here.
13/08/2011
Fed is moving the wrong way with announcement of longer period for low rates...
The full FOMC statement for August 9 says that “low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run” warrant maintaining current rates until “at least” 2013. Although perhaps not surprising, it is not a smart thing to do. So many things can happen, among which feed-forward into an economic system that we do not really grasp. So why outline the policy goal now for such a long time?
My opinion is quite a bit based on the thoughts of Stephen Axelrod, a very senior policy expert of the FED. He explained (in this excellent book of his: Inside the Fed) that he thinks such a pre-announcement policy is not a wise thing to do (p 157).
In general I think it is best all around for officials to avoid commentary about the future of rates they cannot directly control or are unwilling to control - that is, rates other than the funds rate. I also think it is best to avoid commenting on the probable future of rates they do control. In either event, they taint the information being conveyed back to themselves and other market participants by the behavior of rates. Also, and more dangerously, because of misinterpretations and unintended consequences, they risk causing reactions in businesses' and individual's spending and borrowing decisions that make the underlying economic and also financial situation worse rather than better for the economy and its future.
In short, the future is unknowable both to the Fed and to the market. Little seems to be gained, and much can be lost in the terms of the chairman's and the Fed's credibility and policy effectiveness, by getting into the mug's game of exposing policy intentions and wishes that may be both misinterpreted and in the end, as market conditions change, misleading.
So in my opinion Bernanke is heading into very dangerous territory now.
My opinion is quite a bit based on the thoughts of Stephen Axelrod, a very senior policy expert of the FED. He explained (in this excellent book of his: Inside the Fed) that he thinks such a pre-announcement policy is not a wise thing to do (p 157).
In general I think it is best all around for officials to avoid commentary about the future of rates they cannot directly control or are unwilling to control - that is, rates other than the funds rate. I also think it is best to avoid commenting on the probable future of rates they do control. In either event, they taint the information being conveyed back to themselves and other market participants by the behavior of rates. Also, and more dangerously, because of misinterpretations and unintended consequences, they risk causing reactions in businesses' and individual's spending and borrowing decisions that make the underlying economic and also financial situation worse rather than better for the economy and its future.
In short, the future is unknowable both to the Fed and to the market. Little seems to be gained, and much can be lost in the terms of the chairman's and the Fed's credibility and policy effectiveness, by getting into the mug's game of exposing policy intentions and wishes that may be both misinterpreted and in the end, as market conditions change, misleading.
So in my opinion Bernanke is heading into very dangerous territory now.
17/07/2011
Still amazed at the 'tough' stance of Netherlands Jan Cees de Jager in Greek Crisis
As the readers of this blog know already, here in the Netherlands we have a minority government that has to lean on support of the PVV to survive. With the end result that we have a divided caretaker government that steers on a day-to-day basis, and is unable to steer on long-term policy goals or to achieve fundamental changes.
As a result we see the current government and in particular our Minister of Finance, Jan Cees de Jager, surfing the waves of public sentiment rather than those of solid government. De Jager time and again has to account for the public sentiment and does so in particular with respect to todays political and macro-economic European crisis. He continues to stress that private entities will have to pay along to save Greece. And he says: there will be no more money going to Greece, unless this condition is fulfilled.
Well, this tough policy stance, copied from the Germans, is not bringing us in Europe or the Netherlands anywhere. All it does is prolong the crisis, as we have seen last week in all the market turbulence about Italy and the stress tresting of banks. So perhaps de Jager will slowly retreat. But still we can imagine some more populist talk to enter the European policy arena. Because the populist PVV is still banging the drum that no more money should go to Greece.
It is interesting to analyze the position of de Jager, using some of the insights of former President of the central bank: Nout Wellink. Just two weeks ago, on the day of his departure from the central bank, a book was published with the title 'Wellink talking'. And in it Wellink outlines that at some point in time, bad collateral of banks may result in losses for the ECB and thus also hit the Dutch tax payer. It is telling and striking that only very few people in the Netherlands realize that our 'tough talk' with respect to the Greek situation is just for show. The real costs of this crisis may well end up at the Dutch tax payer via the back door of the ECB.
Although by now I should have gotten used to the 'pragmatic', visionless way in which our government operates, I still remain amazed at the Ostrich policy that our Ministry of Finance uses in dealing with the EU-crisis. If indeed at some point in time the central banks or bankers were to blame for a crisis, now is the time that we can fully blame politicians for not deciding, for bowing towards populists and for a complete lack of leadership.
As a result we see the current government and in particular our Minister of Finance, Jan Cees de Jager, surfing the waves of public sentiment rather than those of solid government. De Jager time and again has to account for the public sentiment and does so in particular with respect to todays political and macro-economic European crisis. He continues to stress that private entities will have to pay along to save Greece. And he says: there will be no more money going to Greece, unless this condition is fulfilled.
Well, this tough policy stance, copied from the Germans, is not bringing us in Europe or the Netherlands anywhere. All it does is prolong the crisis, as we have seen last week in all the market turbulence about Italy and the stress tresting of banks. So perhaps de Jager will slowly retreat. But still we can imagine some more populist talk to enter the European policy arena. Because the populist PVV is still banging the drum that no more money should go to Greece.
It is interesting to analyze the position of de Jager, using some of the insights of former President of the central bank: Nout Wellink. Just two weeks ago, on the day of his departure from the central bank, a book was published with the title 'Wellink talking'. And in it Wellink outlines that at some point in time, bad collateral of banks may result in losses for the ECB and thus also hit the Dutch tax payer. It is telling and striking that only very few people in the Netherlands realize that our 'tough talk' with respect to the Greek situation is just for show. The real costs of this crisis may well end up at the Dutch tax payer via the back door of the ECB.
Although by now I should have gotten used to the 'pragmatic', visionless way in which our government operates, I still remain amazed at the Ostrich policy that our Ministry of Finance uses in dealing with the EU-crisis. If indeed at some point in time the central banks or bankers were to blame for a crisis, now is the time that we can fully blame politicians for not deciding, for bowing towards populists and for a complete lack of leadership.
29/06/2011
Greece: let's help the Greek people in solving the democratic errors that caused the financial trouble!
In an earlier post, I outlined that both the EU-countries and Greece were sort of stuck with politicians that may have not done their job well. Populist politicians in the EU have widened the gap with Greece by portraying all the Greek as bandits. Meanwhile, within Greece there is a huge difference between have's and have-nots and between politicians and the people. So while the world may treat Greece as one people, we overlook the distinctions within the Greek people.
ZeroHedge featured an article that made this distinction more specific. The article outlines that Greece may essentially be a kleptocracy. In such a system, a financial and political Elite skims and concentrates the wealth of the nation via corruption and embezzlement while being protected by the winking complicity of their fellow plunderers who hold civil and financial authority.
At present all eyes are focused on Greece and the votes in parliament. While most eyes will focus on the financial part of the vote, I am thinking now about the ramifications for Greece as a democracy and its citizenry. Imagine yourself to be a Greek voter that has over time learnt to live with corruption and the fact that an elite holds the jobs and priviliges. In this role you are essentially illegally taxed by the elite, in order to get services from the state that it should provide you for free or at much lower costs. And now this elite has also frauded the European system so much, that it is obliged to introduce a formal tax upon you as well. This double-taxing appears to be quite unfair and incorrect. And what can you do about it?
The current workings of the Greek democracy will thus inevitably lead to further social unrest than we see already. The people will want to rise up against their political elite in a similar way that in the Middle-East countries we see the people rise against its dictators and their family-clans. And that's what we see in the streets now. It's the same process, but the Greek elite is less pronounced, leass easy to catch and less easy to portray as a single entity.
I am afraid that the EU people and politicians will be so much clouded by their economic mindset and reasoning, that they will misstake and portray the Greek people's resistance as inappropriate given the amount of fraud that has occurred so far in Greek government (the elite). This may lead EU leaders and politicians to explicitly or implicitly favour a violent suppression of completely justified Greek protests.
In my opinion, our attention in the EU should not just be focused on the financial issue. We should take a broader perspective and try to determine how we can help the Greek public get a government with less corruption and less implicit taxes, allowing them to pay the formal taxes that Greece needs to come out of the crisis.
The stakes are high. And not just financially. If we overlook this issue, then essentially we are supporting the dictatorship of the Greek political elite.
And is that something we want the European Union to be based on?
Click here for a Dutch translation of this blogposting.
ZeroHedge featured an article that made this distinction more specific. The article outlines that Greece may essentially be a kleptocracy. In such a system, a financial and political Elite skims and concentrates the wealth of the nation via corruption and embezzlement while being protected by the winking complicity of their fellow plunderers who hold civil and financial authority.
At present all eyes are focused on Greece and the votes in parliament. While most eyes will focus on the financial part of the vote, I am thinking now about the ramifications for Greece as a democracy and its citizenry. Imagine yourself to be a Greek voter that has over time learnt to live with corruption and the fact that an elite holds the jobs and priviliges. In this role you are essentially illegally taxed by the elite, in order to get services from the state that it should provide you for free or at much lower costs. And now this elite has also frauded the European system so much, that it is obliged to introduce a formal tax upon you as well. This double-taxing appears to be quite unfair and incorrect. And what can you do about it?
The current workings of the Greek democracy will thus inevitably lead to further social unrest than we see already. The people will want to rise up against their political elite in a similar way that in the Middle-East countries we see the people rise against its dictators and their family-clans. And that's what we see in the streets now. It's the same process, but the Greek elite is less pronounced, leass easy to catch and less easy to portray as a single entity.
I am afraid that the EU people and politicians will be so much clouded by their economic mindset and reasoning, that they will misstake and portray the Greek people's resistance as inappropriate given the amount of fraud that has occurred so far in Greek government (the elite). This may lead EU leaders and politicians to explicitly or implicitly favour a violent suppression of completely justified Greek protests.
In my opinion, our attention in the EU should not just be focused on the financial issue. We should take a broader perspective and try to determine how we can help the Greek public get a government with less corruption and less implicit taxes, allowing them to pay the formal taxes that Greece needs to come out of the crisis.
The stakes are high. And not just financially. If we overlook this issue, then essentially we are supporting the dictatorship of the Greek political elite.
And is that something we want the European Union to be based on?
Click here for a Dutch translation of this blogposting.
21/06/2011
Greece: we Europeans need to bypass politicians and support the Greek people
At pressing times like these, it may be time for the citizens themselves to speak out and connect to Greece and its people. The euro has a very positive cost-benefit ratio as it shielded Europe from uncanny complicated situation when the financial crisis hit in 2007. Without it we would have had highly fragmented local financial disasters all over Europe. Politicians are forgetting this too quickly and choosing for populistic lines of reasoning to satisfy what, in their view, is the peoples wish/opinion.
On both a political and human level, there is no other way than supporting the Greek. But we shouldn't let only the politicians and bankers do the work. It is now time for European labour unions, companies, families, sports clubs, stamp collectors and what have you, to reach out to the Greek counterparts that they have been in touch with over the last years.
The message to them could be one of human and moral support, outlining that both the Greek people and the European people are stuck with politicians that sometimes don't do their job right. In Greece they frauded a bit too much and in Europe they are just too populist and lack the leadership to stand up for the euro now. But if we look underneath it all, there is only one thing to do: support the Greek, sympathize with their situation and encourage/support them to make the best of it.
24/05/2011
Appointing the new President and two directors of our central bank: butterfingered fiddling with an aftertaste of sprouts...
Well, the dust has now settled in the Netherlands on the announcements with respect to the new President and directors of our central bank: De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB). It is clear that our Minister of Finance, de Jager, has appointed one of his own top-managers, Klaas Knot, as the next President of DNB, to succeed Nout Wellink. And Jan Sijbrand (former NIBC and ABN AMRO), is to become the Executive Director in charge of Supervision. And as a result of the clumsy process, one of the internal DNB-candidates, Lex Hoogduin, who was proposed/favoured by the Supervisory Board, drew his conclusions and decided to leave. So what we can also read in the press release of DNB is that a third new appointment is announced: that of Frank Eldersohn, who will be Executive Director in charge of the 'internal operations'; the day to day functioning in organisational/HR terms.
Let's review this appointment process from a distance, drawing on the numerous reports and bits of work that are available with respect to the functioning of DNB, AFM and financial supervision.
First some colours in the background
Traditionally, both DNB and the Authority Financial Markets (AFM) were given quite some leeway in how they organised their business and executed their constitutional supervisory roles. The consequence was that the AFM developed a policeman-style under Chairman Arthur Dokters van Leeuwen. His successor, Hans Hoogervorst, combined this approach with a political savyness and unnecessary PR-agressiveness. Hoogervorst used publicity incidents to hurt banks in their image and bashed the banks into his prescription: an academic frame-of-mind in which consumers are rational, yet deserve paternalistic protection from overcrediting and in which any form of kick-back is to be eliminated in the marketplace. I am afraid that the AFM is going to need quite some years to discover that they were wrong in assuming the consumer rationality and that they will in the end discover that the elimination of kick-backs means that financial advice for consumers has become far too expensive (and thus: out of reach) for the consumers. So through enforcement of their academic yoke, they will eventually make financial advice more costly, cumbersome and less available to the public at large. Similarly, we will find out in about 5 years -when the market has come to a complete standstill- that they have been beating to loud on the mortgages drum.
Now for DNB. While the AFM is noisily supervising the banks, DNB kept up their appearences in their old-fashioned supervisory stile in which banks are invited over for a cup of tea to discuss business. Whereas AFM was showing too much teeth, DNB showed too little. And that had an effect on the cooperation between the policing AFM and the ever-so-polite DNB. And then DNB got traumatized in 2006, by the failure of Bank van der Hoop. From that moment on, all things in DNB-life became legal. External advisors advised on each step of supervision, thus paralyzing DNB. DNB became afraid to move at all and also got stuck under the spell of Wellink. Wellink was in the Board since 1983 and had arrived at his second 7-year term. Which is impractical, as it is impossible to organise the required internal criticism and openness for such a long period. It just doesn't work as we can see from the examples of Kohl, Thatcher and Lubbers. As a consequence, the oil-tanker DNB was not able to respond promptly and properly in discussions on the ABN AMRO take-over, the failing of Icesave and the demise of DSB. Our readers should note however that it is not so helpful for the central bank to be surrounded by inconsistent and populist claptrap on complex banking issues. But that's all part of the game, so as a President you have to be able to handle that as well.
Our Ministry of Finance meanwhile lacked all vision on how to organise financial supervision. And I know this sounds harsh and crude, but it is a simple fact. Our independent Court of Auditors reported their amazement about the fact and the response of our Ministry was: our supervisory policy is embedded in the Law on Financial Supervision (WFT in Dutch). Well, the connoisseurs of that law will shrug their shoulders, smiling politely. Because the WFT is a beautiful, idealistic legal project that had the potentially to become a great legal structure for the financial sector, also through the nuanced use of open standards. In practice, however, every chapter of the WFT-law was introduced in a hurry so at present there is literally no understanding it any more. If we would consider the WFT to be a computer-application, it would be immediately classified as a spaghetti-bomb and a threat to business-continuity, requiring a comprehensive revamp and structural re-engineering.
Equally important is the fact that in the late nineties the internal organization of Finance was overturned. While the former Ministry would have a department dealing with the financial sector as such, the new departments were split up on the basis of regulatory aspects such as: stability, market conduct, generally and so on. This led to less visibility and understanding of the impact of legislative changes for the sector as such. Thus, the sector was facing a Ministry that looked like a conveyor belt pushing out partial amendments.
Change, but how?
It is clear that the above institutional and supervisory framework is not sufficiently apt to deal with large market shocks and changes. And it is not surprising that the various players in the field reflected on the best way forward. So there were reports of what had happened on DNB's supervision (report Scheltema). Politicians came up with an examination (de Wit), largely a rehashing of international reports. The banks founded a Maas Committee that emphasized in the final report the importance of good governance, stronger risk management and a more integrated assessment of societal interests. And the Ministry of Finance started thinking about a supervisory policy version 0.1 or 1.0.
What surprised me was how the discussion on the desired culture-change at DNB took place. This followed from the report Scheltema, but everyone could know that for such a change to have effect, it is necessary to embed it in a good institutional structure and to be supported and spearheaded by a good leader: the President himself. I looked with increasing astonishment at the senseless rush that was displayed by all actors in the play. Within one month an implementation plan for cultural change should be made. And while DNB met this request of parliament without complaint, it goes without saying that this will have absolutely no effect whatsoever. Because the President, spearheading the change, was going to be replaced in a years time.
While in the Netherlands we were discussing and pondering the above, our Government fell apart in February 2010, which meant that no ravishing or fundamental changes could be expected. Still, it appeared that our Ministry of Finance had decided that their links to supervisors AFM and DNB should be strengthened. So they colluded with Members of Parliament to obtain the discretion to guide and demand action from supervisors (without the realization that the WFT does not really allow them such an action). Furthermore, the Minister of Finance quickly said he was changing the appointment rules for Presidents to a maximum of one re-election. In doing so he inelegantly and unnecessarily bruised Wellink. And our Minister became more responsible for the succession planning at DNB, which requires a forward-looking approach.
The appointment process of the President and directors of the Dutch central bank (DNB)
What I noticed last year is that the tone of voice and the noise-level of publicity by the AFM appeared to decrease, already while Hoogervorst was still running the AFM. The penalties for banks were lower and the public reactions of banks with respect to the behavior of the AFM were milder. Hoogervorst was sent on (or perhaps: off) to his beloved international work. And at the same time the Ministry of Finance appointed his Treasurer, Ronald Gerritsen as the new Chairman at the AFM. Which brings the Ministry of Finance closer to the fire.
As for DNB, there is of course the weekly lunch-meeting de Jager and Wellink. I imagine that early-on they discussed how to organise the succession. And it must have been obvious that Hoogduin was the intended successor, as such a preference (of the Supervisory Board) doesn’t suddenly fall from a blue sky down. Yet, both Wellink and De Jager will have noted that Hoogduin had little track record in Bank Supervision. And my idea is that the Ministry of Finance proposed a division of responsibilities between supervisory and monetary policy, so that Hoogduin could be appointed as new president of DNB. And that part of the succession planning proceeded nicely: Parliament agreed with the idea and we moved on.
But then, in May things suddenly went wrong. The discussion on succession hit the streets, the public and parliament. This surprised me, but also allowed me a moment to share my views on my preference. But the Members of Parliament did not want Hoogduin to be the next DNB-President as he was no outsider and could thus not be the one to spearhead the culture change at DNB. And then, one of the three candidates, Kremers, also stepped out of the race. To him, the Supervisory Board of DNB was unable to outline clearly what his position would be (no doubt this was a discussion on the relationship between the President and the almost independent director of Bank Supervision at the DNB).
What struck me was that we were very much running out of time. It was May, while we needed a President as of July. And you don’t want to be choosing your next central bank President in such a time-squeeze (it seems that shows such as Idols and X-factor even use more time to pick their winner). Anyway, we went through somewhat indistinct and misty weeks, to find out that one of the other top officials of Finance, Knot (who has a DNB-ring to him as he worked their for many years) will become our next President at DNB. With former Crown-prince Hoogduin choosing to leave, because he undoubtedly envisaged his future to be different than it now had become.
The net effect of all this fiddling: there are suddenly two new directors and a new President at DNB as of July 1, 2011. And do note that Klaas Knot is not really an outsider. He originally worked for the Insurance Supervisor and had a quick career at DNB for some 10 years. He became the right-hand advisor of Wellink in his international meetings/work. And a number of years ago he was appointed as a top-civil servant at the Ministry of Finance, possibly as part of a master plan in which Wellink arranged his long-term succession (or simply just took good care of the career of his closest advisor). Now, with the butterfingered public discussion on the succession and role of Hoogduin underway, the choice for Klaas Knot was advanced in time (he might have been on the schedule to succeed Hoogduin). And my guess is that the lack of enthousiasm of Knot for internal and organisational matters may have led him to outline that he didn’t wish to take up the ‘internal affairs’ portfolio of Hoogduin as a part of his role of President.
What struck me is that perhaps Kees van Dijkhuizen and Nout Wellink may have still played important roles behind the curtains. The new director supervision of DNB is currently working for NIBC, (the same bank where van Dijkhuizen is CFO). So both Wellink and van Dijkhuizen, may have each supported their trusted candidates/protegees in view of their qualities. And those qualities certainly do not need to be questioned as the competences of both Knot and Sijbrand speak for themselves.
What I do have a concern about, is that the new management at DNB may get a structure that was focused on the old idea of Hoogduin as the new President. And there now is a separation of the domain of internal affairs and organisation (Eldersohn), Bank Supervision (Sijbrand) and general management and monetary affairs (the President). If the DNB-improvement for the future lies in a cultural change, it is clear that this requires leadership from the future President. But that President is not directly responsible; his two Directors are. And that is a rather unfortunate organizational setting. Furthermore, Knot may not be willing to tighten the knots for his old colleagues when doing the cultural/organisation change. Nevertheless, with sufficient quality, coordination and perhaps a good fresh breeze in the organisation as a result of the new Director Supervision, we should just hope for the best.
Incidentally, I should also mention that the Supervisory Board has not made any statement at all. It appears to me that the unhealthy intervention of the Ministry of Finance with respect to the succession of the President (not a minor job) does not bode well for the future. And this is the same Ministry that formally provides the Supervisory Board with very strong powers in the future. In my view, it is strange to have a Ministry doing your job as the Supervisory Board, so I am amazed that none of them respond or resign. It’s a stunning silence that we can witness, which seems to imply that the Supervisory Board Members rather stick to the status and prestige of being the DNB-Supervisory Board Member than to the content of their job: ensure proper governance at DNB.
Conclusion: butterfingered fiddling with an aftertaste of sprouts...
If we look at the importance of proper supervision and a good central bank in a country, we must realize that DNB is a central element of the most vital (financial) infrastructure in the Netherlands. And that means we must do our utmost best to maintain this infrastructure and to ensure that is and will be functioning properly. I am therefore quite surprised about:
- the lack of debate on financial supervision and resulting institutional structure (the right for a Minister to mandate specific action to the Supervisor is absolutely undesirable),
- the faulty structure imposed on DNB (the split of responsibilities between supervisory director and president, the unworkable role for the Supervisory Board)
- the stunning silence that from the Supervisory Board, now that their preferred candidate has not been chosen and decided to leave,
- the outright poor planning, timing and limited secrecy surrounding the reappointment process. The fact that the process became public domain didn’t do anyone good and was quite awkward to observe, leaving some of the people involved with a bit of a stain on their image.
We can conclude that we have now effectively already built in the core structural weaknesses that will give rise to future incidents with respect to DNB and Bank Supervision. It's all quite embarassing given that the essence of government is planning and designing ahead in order to prevent incidents and structural weaknesses, rather than to ensure them.
For now I am left with a sense of shame about how we have executed this succession planning process in the Netherlands. If my English vocabulary and Google Translate are correct I could qualify this as a major bit of butterfingered fiddling that leaves an aftertaste of our beloved Dutch sprouts. It makes me realize that the Netherlands is too small in size and population to be able to achieve the proper professional levels necessary that suit a mature democracy and financial market. That is a bit depressing, but that’s the way it is.
Of course the biggest role of the Netherlands in the financial world stems from the Golden Age. And since then we were in decline until former President Vissering lifted us up by his international stature and authority. Similarly, Duisenberg was special and President Wellink has done an incredible good job (although in the end hindered by a monoculture within his own organization). But alas, if we continue conducting ourselves the way we have been doing recently, we can be certain to slide away into a pragmatist way of doing that certainly does not justify a place at the international financial conference tables.
With only ourselves to blame for that.
Let's review this appointment process from a distance, drawing on the numerous reports and bits of work that are available with respect to the functioning of DNB, AFM and financial supervision.
First some colours in the background
Traditionally, both DNB and the Authority Financial Markets (AFM) were given quite some leeway in how they organised their business and executed their constitutional supervisory roles. The consequence was that the AFM developed a policeman-style under Chairman Arthur Dokters van Leeuwen. His successor, Hans Hoogervorst, combined this approach with a political savyness and unnecessary PR-agressiveness. Hoogervorst used publicity incidents to hurt banks in their image and bashed the banks into his prescription: an academic frame-of-mind in which consumers are rational, yet deserve paternalistic protection from overcrediting and in which any form of kick-back is to be eliminated in the marketplace. I am afraid that the AFM is going to need quite some years to discover that they were wrong in assuming the consumer rationality and that they will in the end discover that the elimination of kick-backs means that financial advice for consumers has become far too expensive (and thus: out of reach) for the consumers. So through enforcement of their academic yoke, they will eventually make financial advice more costly, cumbersome and less available to the public at large. Similarly, we will find out in about 5 years -when the market has come to a complete standstill- that they have been beating to loud on the mortgages drum.
Now for DNB. While the AFM is noisily supervising the banks, DNB kept up their appearences in their old-fashioned supervisory stile in which banks are invited over for a cup of tea to discuss business. Whereas AFM was showing too much teeth, DNB showed too little. And that had an effect on the cooperation between the policing AFM and the ever-so-polite DNB. And then DNB got traumatized in 2006, by the failure of Bank van der Hoop. From that moment on, all things in DNB-life became legal. External advisors advised on each step of supervision, thus paralyzing DNB. DNB became afraid to move at all and also got stuck under the spell of Wellink. Wellink was in the Board since 1983 and had arrived at his second 7-year term. Which is impractical, as it is impossible to organise the required internal criticism and openness for such a long period. It just doesn't work as we can see from the examples of Kohl, Thatcher and Lubbers. As a consequence, the oil-tanker DNB was not able to respond promptly and properly in discussions on the ABN AMRO take-over, the failing of Icesave and the demise of DSB. Our readers should note however that it is not so helpful for the central bank to be surrounded by inconsistent and populist claptrap on complex banking issues. But that's all part of the game, so as a President you have to be able to handle that as well.
Our Ministry of Finance meanwhile lacked all vision on how to organise financial supervision. And I know this sounds harsh and crude, but it is a simple fact. Our independent Court of Auditors reported their amazement about the fact and the response of our Ministry was: our supervisory policy is embedded in the Law on Financial Supervision (WFT in Dutch). Well, the connoisseurs of that law will shrug their shoulders, smiling politely. Because the WFT is a beautiful, idealistic legal project that had the potentially to become a great legal structure for the financial sector, also through the nuanced use of open standards. In practice, however, every chapter of the WFT-law was introduced in a hurry so at present there is literally no understanding it any more. If we would consider the WFT to be a computer-application, it would be immediately classified as a spaghetti-bomb and a threat to business-continuity, requiring a comprehensive revamp and structural re-engineering.
Equally important is the fact that in the late nineties the internal organization of Finance was overturned. While the former Ministry would have a department dealing with the financial sector as such, the new departments were split up on the basis of regulatory aspects such as: stability, market conduct, generally and so on. This led to less visibility and understanding of the impact of legislative changes for the sector as such. Thus, the sector was facing a Ministry that looked like a conveyor belt pushing out partial amendments.
Change, but how?
It is clear that the above institutional and supervisory framework is not sufficiently apt to deal with large market shocks and changes. And it is not surprising that the various players in the field reflected on the best way forward. So there were reports of what had happened on DNB's supervision (report Scheltema). Politicians came up with an examination (de Wit), largely a rehashing of international reports. The banks founded a Maas Committee that emphasized in the final report the importance of good governance, stronger risk management and a more integrated assessment of societal interests. And the Ministry of Finance started thinking about a supervisory policy version 0.1 or 1.0.
What surprised me was how the discussion on the desired culture-change at DNB took place. This followed from the report Scheltema, but everyone could know that for such a change to have effect, it is necessary to embed it in a good institutional structure and to be supported and spearheaded by a good leader: the President himself. I looked with increasing astonishment at the senseless rush that was displayed by all actors in the play. Within one month an implementation plan for cultural change should be made. And while DNB met this request of parliament without complaint, it goes without saying that this will have absolutely no effect whatsoever. Because the President, spearheading the change, was going to be replaced in a years time.
While in the Netherlands we were discussing and pondering the above, our Government fell apart in February 2010, which meant that no ravishing or fundamental changes could be expected. Still, it appeared that our Ministry of Finance had decided that their links to supervisors AFM and DNB should be strengthened. So they colluded with Members of Parliament to obtain the discretion to guide and demand action from supervisors (without the realization that the WFT does not really allow them such an action). Furthermore, the Minister of Finance quickly said he was changing the appointment rules for Presidents to a maximum of one re-election. In doing so he inelegantly and unnecessarily bruised Wellink. And our Minister became more responsible for the succession planning at DNB, which requires a forward-looking approach.
The appointment process of the President and directors of the Dutch central bank (DNB)
What I noticed last year is that the tone of voice and the noise-level of publicity by the AFM appeared to decrease, already while Hoogervorst was still running the AFM. The penalties for banks were lower and the public reactions of banks with respect to the behavior of the AFM were milder. Hoogervorst was sent on (or perhaps: off) to his beloved international work. And at the same time the Ministry of Finance appointed his Treasurer, Ronald Gerritsen as the new Chairman at the AFM. Which brings the Ministry of Finance closer to the fire.
As for DNB, there is of course the weekly lunch-meeting de Jager and Wellink. I imagine that early-on they discussed how to organise the succession. And it must have been obvious that Hoogduin was the intended successor, as such a preference (of the Supervisory Board) doesn’t suddenly fall from a blue sky down. Yet, both Wellink and De Jager will have noted that Hoogduin had little track record in Bank Supervision. And my idea is that the Ministry of Finance proposed a division of responsibilities between supervisory and monetary policy, so that Hoogduin could be appointed as new president of DNB. And that part of the succession planning proceeded nicely: Parliament agreed with the idea and we moved on.
But then, in May things suddenly went wrong. The discussion on succession hit the streets, the public and parliament. This surprised me, but also allowed me a moment to share my views on my preference. But the Members of Parliament did not want Hoogduin to be the next DNB-President as he was no outsider and could thus not be the one to spearhead the culture change at DNB. And then, one of the three candidates, Kremers, also stepped out of the race. To him, the Supervisory Board of DNB was unable to outline clearly what his position would be (no doubt this was a discussion on the relationship between the President and the almost independent director of Bank Supervision at the DNB).
What struck me was that we were very much running out of time. It was May, while we needed a President as of July. And you don’t want to be choosing your next central bank President in such a time-squeeze (it seems that shows such as Idols and X-factor even use more time to pick their winner). Anyway, we went through somewhat indistinct and misty weeks, to find out that one of the other top officials of Finance, Knot (who has a DNB-ring to him as he worked their for many years) will become our next President at DNB. With former Crown-prince Hoogduin choosing to leave, because he undoubtedly envisaged his future to be different than it now had become.
The net effect of all this fiddling: there are suddenly two new directors and a new President at DNB as of July 1, 2011. And do note that Klaas Knot is not really an outsider. He originally worked for the Insurance Supervisor and had a quick career at DNB for some 10 years. He became the right-hand advisor of Wellink in his international meetings/work. And a number of years ago he was appointed as a top-civil servant at the Ministry of Finance, possibly as part of a master plan in which Wellink arranged his long-term succession (or simply just took good care of the career of his closest advisor). Now, with the butterfingered public discussion on the succession and role of Hoogduin underway, the choice for Klaas Knot was advanced in time (he might have been on the schedule to succeed Hoogduin). And my guess is that the lack of enthousiasm of Knot for internal and organisational matters may have led him to outline that he didn’t wish to take up the ‘internal affairs’ portfolio of Hoogduin as a part of his role of President.
What struck me is that perhaps Kees van Dijkhuizen and Nout Wellink may have still played important roles behind the curtains. The new director supervision of DNB is currently working for NIBC, (the same bank where van Dijkhuizen is CFO). So both Wellink and van Dijkhuizen, may have each supported their trusted candidates/protegees in view of their qualities. And those qualities certainly do not need to be questioned as the competences of both Knot and Sijbrand speak for themselves.
What I do have a concern about, is that the new management at DNB may get a structure that was focused on the old idea of Hoogduin as the new President. And there now is a separation of the domain of internal affairs and organisation (Eldersohn), Bank Supervision (Sijbrand) and general management and monetary affairs (the President). If the DNB-improvement for the future lies in a cultural change, it is clear that this requires leadership from the future President. But that President is not directly responsible; his two Directors are. And that is a rather unfortunate organizational setting. Furthermore, Knot may not be willing to tighten the knots for his old colleagues when doing the cultural/organisation change. Nevertheless, with sufficient quality, coordination and perhaps a good fresh breeze in the organisation as a result of the new Director Supervision, we should just hope for the best.
Incidentally, I should also mention that the Supervisory Board has not made any statement at all. It appears to me that the unhealthy intervention of the Ministry of Finance with respect to the succession of the President (not a minor job) does not bode well for the future. And this is the same Ministry that formally provides the Supervisory Board with very strong powers in the future. In my view, it is strange to have a Ministry doing your job as the Supervisory Board, so I am amazed that none of them respond or resign. It’s a stunning silence that we can witness, which seems to imply that the Supervisory Board Members rather stick to the status and prestige of being the DNB-Supervisory Board Member than to the content of their job: ensure proper governance at DNB.
Conclusion: butterfingered fiddling with an aftertaste of sprouts...
If we look at the importance of proper supervision and a good central bank in a country, we must realize that DNB is a central element of the most vital (financial) infrastructure in the Netherlands. And that means we must do our utmost best to maintain this infrastructure and to ensure that is and will be functioning properly. I am therefore quite surprised about:
- the lack of debate on financial supervision and resulting institutional structure (the right for a Minister to mandate specific action to the Supervisor is absolutely undesirable),
- the faulty structure imposed on DNB (the split of responsibilities between supervisory director and president, the unworkable role for the Supervisory Board)
- the stunning silence that from the Supervisory Board, now that their preferred candidate has not been chosen and decided to leave,
- the outright poor planning, timing and limited secrecy surrounding the reappointment process. The fact that the process became public domain didn’t do anyone good and was quite awkward to observe, leaving some of the people involved with a bit of a stain on their image.
We can conclude that we have now effectively already built in the core structural weaknesses that will give rise to future incidents with respect to DNB and Bank Supervision. It's all quite embarassing given that the essence of government is planning and designing ahead in order to prevent incidents and structural weaknesses, rather than to ensure them.
For now I am left with a sense of shame about how we have executed this succession planning process in the Netherlands. If my English vocabulary and Google Translate are correct I could qualify this as a major bit of butterfingered fiddling that leaves an aftertaste of our beloved Dutch sprouts. It makes me realize that the Netherlands is too small in size and population to be able to achieve the proper professional levels necessary that suit a mature democracy and financial market. That is a bit depressing, but that’s the way it is.
Of course the biggest role of the Netherlands in the financial world stems from the Golden Age. And since then we were in decline until former President Vissering lifted us up by his international stature and authority. Similarly, Duisenberg was special and President Wellink has done an incredible good job (although in the end hindered by a monoculture within his own organization). But alas, if we continue conducting ourselves the way we have been doing recently, we can be certain to slide away into a pragmatist way of doing that certainly does not justify a place at the international financial conference tables.
With only ourselves to blame for that.
19/05/2011
Will history repeat itself....?
One of these days I was wondering if we weren't heading towards a similar situation as in the run-up to the crisis. A prolongued period of low interest rates. Asset bubbles. Tech-stock and IPO's all over the place. And so on. And I recalled that one of the earlier FSF-reports had some good lines on that matter. The Report on Market and Institutional Resilience in April 2008 noted:
The turmoil in the most advanced financial markets that started in the summer of 2007 was the culmination of an exceptional boom in credit growth and leverage in the financial system. This boom was fed by a long period of benign economic and financial conditions, including historically low real interest rates and abundant liquidity, which increased the amount of risk and leverage that borrowers, investors and intermediaries were willing to take on, and by a wave of financial innovation, which expanded the system’s capacity to generate credit assets and leverage but outpaced its capacity to manage the associated risks.
What I found interesting in the aftermath of the report and its follow up, is that most attention focused on what banks, supervisors could do, but that central banks were kept out of the discussion and follow up. While the man in the street started taking up all the technical discussions in the report (on perverse renumeration inventives, capital buffers, securitisation that got out of hand, US housing market deficiencies), the role of central banks never made it to the spotlight of political discussion. Yet, it is clear that the central banks, providing easy money, played a very important part (as recognized by the words: including historically low interest rates).
And now, three years down the line, we have all fastened seatbelts with all kinds of regulations for banks, against short selling, increased buffers for Basel, risk tax for systemic institutions, new liquidity frameworks, harsher credit rating agencies and so on. But central banks maintain low policy rates that got us here in the first place.... so that makes me wonder: will history repeat itself?
We will soon find out.
The turmoil in the most advanced financial markets that started in the summer of 2007 was the culmination of an exceptional boom in credit growth and leverage in the financial system. This boom was fed by a long period of benign economic and financial conditions, including historically low real interest rates and abundant liquidity, which increased the amount of risk and leverage that borrowers, investors and intermediaries were willing to take on, and by a wave of financial innovation, which expanded the system’s capacity to generate credit assets and leverage but outpaced its capacity to manage the associated risks.
What I found interesting in the aftermath of the report and its follow up, is that most attention focused on what banks, supervisors could do, but that central banks were kept out of the discussion and follow up. While the man in the street started taking up all the technical discussions in the report (on perverse renumeration inventives, capital buffers, securitisation that got out of hand, US housing market deficiencies), the role of central banks never made it to the spotlight of political discussion. Yet, it is clear that the central banks, providing easy money, played a very important part (as recognized by the words: including historically low interest rates).
And now, three years down the line, we have all fastened seatbelts with all kinds of regulations for banks, against short selling, increased buffers for Basel, risk tax for systemic institutions, new liquidity frameworks, harsher credit rating agencies and so on. But central banks maintain low policy rates that got us here in the first place.... so that makes me wonder: will history repeat itself?
We will soon find out.
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