This fall, the Dutch elections will provide us with something we have all been waiting for: a true Dutch spring. While in the past years our country became a mock of a democracy with too much populist talk and too little true cooperation, we can see that there is change in the air. And I'll try to explain the sequence of events for you: the non-Dutch public.
From Fortuyn to Wilders: enter the populists...
As you know, ten years ago, we had a politician, Fortuyn, who sensed an enormous amount of dissatisfaction of the public with standard-politics and politicians. And he used this intelligently to mobilize the electorate to support his party. For many politicians, his strong emergence came out of nowhere and it was in fact the dawn of a different style of politics. More direct, more populistic and seeking the populist consensus rather than an optimal solution for all the public.
In a twist of history, Fortuyn was murdered. But PM Wilders had been looking closely and chose to emulate Fortuyn with clear and simple statements about Islam, mass-immigration. Essentially he played the classroom-bully for regular politicians, who found it hard to counteract his verbal agility. And in doing so he gained a lot of support. He also found it a good tactic to do some hate-speeching with respect to Islam/moslims but wasn't found guilty. Events in Norway later proved the effect of his hate-speech, but Wilder of course didn't want to take responsibility for infecting a young man's brain with nonsense.
As the 'Freedom Party' of Wilders grew quite big, he could enter into a construction where he helped a minority government rule the country for the past two years. But his party started to crumble from the inside, with some members leaving and explaining the inner workings of the party (Wilders rule is the one and only law). Given that there was no mass immigration of moslims he chose Europe as the new enemy to be used in campaigning. And he set up a notification-site to complain about Eastern European workers. But essentially the paint of his party started to fade and lose its effect.
At the same time, on the far left side, the Socialist Party adopted many of the stylistic elements of Wilders. In true populist style they banged similar drums on issues as Europe (no good), health care (don't touch it) and so on. Given that our Labour party was having too much internal debate due to a too decent leader (Cohen), this far left wing gained a lot of support in polls. The grand power party of the past, the Christian Democrats found themselves being punished once again and discovered that they alienated their constituency considerably by cooperating with Wilders in government.
Wilders breaks up the coalition
This spring, Wilders had to negotiate with the minority government on reforms to ensure that the Netherlands would remain within the 3% deficit criterium. After seven weeks, in which he dropped many of his previous populistic important demands, he suddenly stepped out. And thus, we were heading for new elections. And it is only through the responsible behaviour of five other parties (VVD, CDA, D66, GroenLinks and ChristenUnie) that we managed -in one week - to design and agree on a reform package that would keep us within the 3%
Since then it appeared we would see all the parties banging a populistic drum. Because that is what happened here in the Netherlands. In the last ten years our political debate became quite uncivilized, with name-calling and all kinds of unpoliteness. As such it may have been a reflection of a more general trend in society. Then again, when looking at the deepest desire of the Dutch (we have a government agency doing hefty research into this..: SCP), there was a loud and clear appeal for: less individualism, more respect, more collectivity, more honesty.
Meanwhile, our minority government had grown the habit of not listening to the representative organisations of the citizens. They didn't listen to their formally appointed Counsels of Advice. And they even ignored the negative advice of our Council of State (Raad van State) on legal proposals that were just unfit, undoable or unconstitutional. And thus, over on my Dutch blog, in february this year I wrote a longer blog-posting: Time for a Dutch spring.
The blog post outlines that the Dutch both need and desire a revolt in politics, just as badly as those in other countries of the world (even if we don't think we need it). I pleaded for more balance and more nuance in the political debate. And I hoped for a society where media don't go for the hype and the incident. In sum, the blog outlined that the true Dutch spring is within reach if we all, individually, act resposibly towards each other without letting the economic mantra's getting too much in the way.
Developments in the Dutch election campaign: we respond to decency and honesty !
The essence of what happened here in the Dutch election campaign is that the old populist talk didn't work any more. Citizend could see Wilders doing his usual kinds of populistic stuff, but in the back of our minds they all thought that his previous tough talk turned out to be nothing but a charade. And the same line of thinking was applied to the Socialist Party, at the other end of the politicial spectrum. So far right and far left were losing in the polls.
And while everyone had believed all the debat would be between Socialist Party leader Roemer and Liberal Party leader (and prime Minister) Rutte, a change was happening. Labour Party Leader Samsom chose to not sweet-talk the citizens. He outlined clearly the tough choices to be made (including possible help for a 3rd rescue package for Greece) rather than pretend that no more support would be given. And it is this, more true, nuanced approach that started to resonate. Within a time frame of weeks Samsom suddenly started making up to become just as big as the Labour Party (in the polls).
Rutte, the prime-Minister, made some errors in his campaign, resorting to verbalities rather than seriously answering legitimate questions. In an effort to steer his success he even tried to avoid sitting at the same table in a talk show, with a famous Dutch comedian: Freek de Jonge. The net result was negative however, because the one comedian filling in for Freek, was quite outspoken and well able to counter the verbalities of Rutte with spirited arguments.
Will we have a Dutch spring?
What I think (or perhaps hope) is that the Labour Party has rightly assessed that the public is fed up with the populist talk and scamming that all politicans were resorting to. They chose to position themselves differently than others and chose for honesty and nuance. And it looks as if that approach will get them the majority of votes and the chance to be in the lead for the formation of a new cabinet.
If indeed the PvdA turns out to become the biggest party, then we can rightly state that our election day: September 12, will have marked the beginning of a Dutch spring.
Showing posts with label EUPolitics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EUPolitics. Show all posts
04/06/2012
Eurozone troubles.... all originate in a wish to get back to normal?
In the recent days I've read a book by J. Beyen called: 'het spel en de knikkers'. It's a Dutch autobiography describing the life and career of a banker, central banker, former President of the BIS, Executive Director at the IMF, Minister of Foreign Affairs and so on. Beyen was for example one of the important Dutch delegates at the Bretton Woods conference. And his book - in particular the episode on the golden standard - is fascinating.
Golden Standard as the solution or the problem?
Until the First World War, the golden standard had become the de facto monetary norm for governments/countries. It consisted of a set of fixed exchange rates, which meant that local economies sometimes had to suffer, as devaluation was impossible. On the other hand, it allowed for a lot of international trade and stability and was thus praised and adopted. Until the First World War changed a lot and the golden standard was abandoned.
In his book, Beyen describes the major sentiment of policy makers after the First World War. And he calls it the desire to go 'back to normal'. A central theme in this desire was the re-establishment of the Golden Standard. Beyen also describes that monetary thinking at that time wasn't as advanced as in 1968 (when he wrote the book) He sketches that the system of fixed exchange rates in itself burdened the European economies, but policy makers weren't able to see this at the time: obsessed with getting back to normal.
Current flaws in Euroland thinking: still seeking a back to normal?
The musings and discussions all around Europe these days, in particular the new plans on a banking union, fascinate me enormously. The singlemindedness with which politicians now move forward into more Europe, more joint policy, more deposit guarantee may be variations on a similar desire: back to normal. Back to the Europe from before the crisis, using the same policy tools and concepts that we used before the financial and sovereign crisis broke out.
As a result, we are now witnessing policy makers, fully caught up in their goal to save Europe by designing futher institutions and policies. But, essentially, our politicians and civil servants fail to recognize that the European car doesn't respond any more to twists of the steering wheel. The only thing that has helped (only temporarily) is throwing money at the problem.
Are we missing something here?
While our monetary thinking may evolved quite a bit since the 1930s, our knowledge of policy and strategy making is not as widely and heavily discussed and modeled. In theory we could all be aware of mechanisms such as groupthink, tunnel vision, decision complexity, resource complexity etcetera. But in practice we fail to properly recognize and address the fundamental errors in policy making.
Having read the autobiography of Beyen, I tend to believe that we are now learning new lessons in the Eurozone. And the lessons are not so much related to monetary theories but to international policy making under stress. I therefore hereby propose the concept of policy illusion to be better recognized in the future. It is the understandable tendency of policy makers to continue doing what you were doing all the time, even when the world fundamentally required a different way of looking.
And so we can now see our policy makers making policy by looking so intensely at the rear-view mirror that they will miss the fork in the road ahead.
Golden Standard as the solution or the problem?
Until the First World War, the golden standard had become the de facto monetary norm for governments/countries. It consisted of a set of fixed exchange rates, which meant that local economies sometimes had to suffer, as devaluation was impossible. On the other hand, it allowed for a lot of international trade and stability and was thus praised and adopted. Until the First World War changed a lot and the golden standard was abandoned.
In his book, Beyen describes the major sentiment of policy makers after the First World War. And he calls it the desire to go 'back to normal'. A central theme in this desire was the re-establishment of the Golden Standard. Beyen also describes that monetary thinking at that time wasn't as advanced as in 1968 (when he wrote the book) He sketches that the system of fixed exchange rates in itself burdened the European economies, but policy makers weren't able to see this at the time: obsessed with getting back to normal.
Current flaws in Euroland thinking: still seeking a back to normal?
The musings and discussions all around Europe these days, in particular the new plans on a banking union, fascinate me enormously. The singlemindedness with which politicians now move forward into more Europe, more joint policy, more deposit guarantee may be variations on a similar desire: back to normal. Back to the Europe from before the crisis, using the same policy tools and concepts that we used before the financial and sovereign crisis broke out.
As a result, we are now witnessing policy makers, fully caught up in their goal to save Europe by designing futher institutions and policies. But, essentially, our politicians and civil servants fail to recognize that the European car doesn't respond any more to twists of the steering wheel. The only thing that has helped (only temporarily) is throwing money at the problem.
Are we missing something here?
While our monetary thinking may evolved quite a bit since the 1930s, our knowledge of policy and strategy making is not as widely and heavily discussed and modeled. In theory we could all be aware of mechanisms such as groupthink, tunnel vision, decision complexity, resource complexity etcetera. But in practice we fail to properly recognize and address the fundamental errors in policy making.
Having read the autobiography of Beyen, I tend to believe that we are now learning new lessons in the Eurozone. And the lessons are not so much related to monetary theories but to international policy making under stress. I therefore hereby propose the concept of policy illusion to be better recognized in the future. It is the understandable tendency of policy makers to continue doing what you were doing all the time, even when the world fundamentally required a different way of looking.
And so we can now see our policy makers making policy by looking so intensely at the rear-view mirror that they will miss the fork in the road ahead.
21/04/2012
Wilders stops his support for minority-government of the Netherlands...
The breaking news here in the Netherlands is that Geert Wilders has left the building. And 'the building' is the so-called Catshuis, the seat of our prime-Minister. It is here that, during the past 7 weeks, the VVD (liberals) and CDA (christian-democrats) have negotiated with the PVV (Freedom Party) to agree on further austerity measures. And our prime-Minister Mark Rutte has just explained to the public that the Freedom Party has stopped the negotiations and was no longer willing to take its responsibility for the measures. CDA-delegate Verhagen has mirrored this remark so we can see that the blame-game has now started.
It is interesting to note that this step of Wilders occured only 12 hours after the group was provided with the data of the Dutch Planning Agency that had calculated the impact of the jointly agreed draft austerity-measures. And our foreign readers should also note that Wilders is increasingly losing momentum. Hero Brinkman has left the PVV, a couple of weeks ago. And the quite unelegant bashing of the Queen as well as Turkish official Gül last week, didn't win him a lot of supporters either (he immediately lost 2 seats in the polls).
So now we find ourselves in a tricky situation in the Netherlands: we need austerity measures and we need our government to act. But the support-construction with the Freedom Party have turned the past 2 years into a standstill with no serious economic reforms and lots of symbolic regulatory measures to please the public (and the PVV-voter). So while everyone in the Netherlands understands the need to reform, it is also clear that it is now time for new elections. The experiment with PVV has failed to work.
Our Prime Minister has of course phoned the Queen but has not resigned yet. He stated that the situation is so serious that he wants to discuss further steps with Parliament. And he leaves open the possibility that there will first be an agreement on government finances and afterwards elections. While some parties will want to follow this pragmatic route, it remains to be seen if the big opposition parties such as the left wing Socialistische Partij and the Partij van de Arbeid are willing to cooperate.
Geert Wilders has also given a press conference, just now, and he specifically blames Europe. He had outlined that he has stepped away, that he no longer supports the minority-government. And he stated that especially the cuts for elderly pensioners formed a serious issue for him.In the press-talk afterwards he repeatedly outlined that he did not wish to comply with the 3% rule of Brussel. So he started blaming Brussels and he started the election game.
It is clear to me that for Wilders, the duration of his cooperation with the minority-government was long enough to gain creditibility as a true states-man. And as he is losing support among the public, as his party starts to crumble, he must have decided that if ever, now is the time to capitalize on his popularity and to try his jump to become the biggest party in the Netherlands. In doing so he demonstrates once more that his major quality does not pertain to leading a party or a state, but is one of walking away from the debate and challenges that are really relevant to the nation.
It is interesting to note that this step of Wilders occured only 12 hours after the group was provided with the data of the Dutch Planning Agency that had calculated the impact of the jointly agreed draft austerity-measures. And our foreign readers should also note that Wilders is increasingly losing momentum. Hero Brinkman has left the PVV, a couple of weeks ago. And the quite unelegant bashing of the Queen as well as Turkish official Gül last week, didn't win him a lot of supporters either (he immediately lost 2 seats in the polls).
So now we find ourselves in a tricky situation in the Netherlands: we need austerity measures and we need our government to act. But the support-construction with the Freedom Party have turned the past 2 years into a standstill with no serious economic reforms and lots of symbolic regulatory measures to please the public (and the PVV-voter). So while everyone in the Netherlands understands the need to reform, it is also clear that it is now time for new elections. The experiment with PVV has failed to work.
Our Prime Minister has of course phoned the Queen but has not resigned yet. He stated that the situation is so serious that he wants to discuss further steps with Parliament. And he leaves open the possibility that there will first be an agreement on government finances and afterwards elections. While some parties will want to follow this pragmatic route, it remains to be seen if the big opposition parties such as the left wing Socialistische Partij and the Partij van de Arbeid are willing to cooperate.
Geert Wilders has also given a press conference, just now, and he specifically blames Europe. He had outlined that he has stepped away, that he no longer supports the minority-government. And he stated that especially the cuts for elderly pensioners formed a serious issue for him.In the press-talk afterwards he repeatedly outlined that he did not wish to comply with the 3% rule of Brussel. So he started blaming Brussels and he started the election game.
It is clear to me that for Wilders, the duration of his cooperation with the minority-government was long enough to gain creditibility as a true states-man. And as he is losing support among the public, as his party starts to crumble, he must have decided that if ever, now is the time to capitalize on his popularity and to try his jump to become the biggest party in the Netherlands. In doing so he demonstrates once more that his major quality does not pertain to leading a party or a state, but is one of walking away from the debate and challenges that are really relevant to the nation.
14/02/2012
Silly Geert Wilders seeks attention with anti-eastern European website
This blog is to update and inform the foreign readers about the current status of things here in the Netherlands. And in particular with respect to our narcistic party leader Wilders of the PVV. He has set up a website where complaints can be filed about neighbours from Eastern Europe, when they make too much noise. According to the Freedom Party PVV, the site is a great succes, with 14000 complaints filed on the first day and 40.000 after a week.
It is interesting to note the subsequent debate in the Netherlands (and rest of Europe). First of all, it appears that no one recalculates the data of the PVV. So the silly claim of 14000 in one day (meaning 10 complaints per minute, during 24 hours) goes unchallenged. And the same goes for the claim of 40.000 in one week (4 complaints a minute, during 7 days of non stop operation). Even if the PVV would themselves be filling in the forms on their website (which they did in a previous incident, about traffic incidents in The Hague), they would have a hard time typing it all.
Second, we had this bureau of discrimination, stating quickly that the site of Wilders would not constitute discrimination. Well, it seems to me clear that the site is discriminatory. But foreign readers should note that here in the Netherlands we lost our ability to value and protect human rights. We have had judges here that outlined that Wilders was not doing hatespeech (only to be corrected one month later when Breivik demonstrated that the effect even crossed our borders). And some maintain the fiction that this site is not discriminatory. In doing so, we completely forget our historic heritage (liberty of religion, as stated in the Union of Utrecht in the 16th century) as well as the relevant international guidances on human rights. So our Prime Minister turns a blind eye to the issue.
The reasons for doing so are not illogical by the way. Our Prime-Minister essentially chooses to ignore most of the stupid actions of the Freedom Party and its narcist leader. And in psychological terms that is indeed a correct approach which clearly works. The Freedom party is losing a lot of traction in voting polls with the Socialist Party (SP) gaining a lot. And the effect is so strong that Wilders himself starts showing up in interviews and tv programs. And that is new: he would normally just tweet and never give interviews. So he feels the heat and now seeks to regain influence.
But then again, when the subject involves discrimination, one may think twice when turning the blind eye. Fortunatety we have a lot of creative Dutch people that quickly set up all kinds of websites to hug the Polish, to report all scary PVV-MP's and so on. So foreigner shouldn't take this stuff to seriously; it's certainly isn't the common opinion. See also how our Dutch Commissioner Kroes aptly responded: why not create a website to complain about blonded hair? So the thing that our Prime-Minister should do is to inform and advise all foreign nations to use a similar approach: just ignore Wilders on this one.
And while I'm tempted to do the same, I figured it might be good to explain this to the foreign readers. So do note that this whole charade is the proverbial 'cornered cat that jumps strangely' (as we say here in the Netherlands).
It is interesting to note the subsequent debate in the Netherlands (and rest of Europe). First of all, it appears that no one recalculates the data of the PVV. So the silly claim of 14000 in one day (meaning 10 complaints per minute, during 24 hours) goes unchallenged. And the same goes for the claim of 40.000 in one week (4 complaints a minute, during 7 days of non stop operation). Even if the PVV would themselves be filling in the forms on their website (which they did in a previous incident, about traffic incidents in The Hague), they would have a hard time typing it all.
Second, we had this bureau of discrimination, stating quickly that the site of Wilders would not constitute discrimination. Well, it seems to me clear that the site is discriminatory. But foreign readers should note that here in the Netherlands we lost our ability to value and protect human rights. We have had judges here that outlined that Wilders was not doing hatespeech (only to be corrected one month later when Breivik demonstrated that the effect even crossed our borders). And some maintain the fiction that this site is not discriminatory. In doing so, we completely forget our historic heritage (liberty of religion, as stated in the Union of Utrecht in the 16th century) as well as the relevant international guidances on human rights. So our Prime Minister turns a blind eye to the issue.
The reasons for doing so are not illogical by the way. Our Prime-Minister essentially chooses to ignore most of the stupid actions of the Freedom Party and its narcist leader. And in psychological terms that is indeed a correct approach which clearly works. The Freedom party is losing a lot of traction in voting polls with the Socialist Party (SP) gaining a lot. And the effect is so strong that Wilders himself starts showing up in interviews and tv programs. And that is new: he would normally just tweet and never give interviews. So he feels the heat and now seeks to regain influence.
But then again, when the subject involves discrimination, one may think twice when turning the blind eye. Fortunatety we have a lot of creative Dutch people that quickly set up all kinds of websites to hug the Polish, to report all scary PVV-MP's and so on. So foreigner shouldn't take this stuff to seriously; it's certainly isn't the common opinion. See also how our Dutch Commissioner Kroes aptly responded: why not create a website to complain about blonded hair? So the thing that our Prime-Minister should do is to inform and advise all foreign nations to use a similar approach: just ignore Wilders on this one.
And while I'm tempted to do the same, I figured it might be good to explain this to the foreign readers. So do note that this whole charade is the proverbial 'cornered cat that jumps strangely' (as we say here in the Netherlands).
23/01/2012
France and Germany wish to soften the Basel rules...
It's about a year ago that I outlined in this blog that the European politicians had a choice to either continue the introduction of planned bank regulations (leading to no growth in the future and Europa as an open air museum) or to postpone them. Today we can read in the Financial Times that France and Germany indeed wish to slow down the introduction of Basel 3 rules.
While I think that this is indeed the better way forward, things did change in the last year. We have become aware that our governments in Europe are quite unable to tackle the serious issues at hand. It took Merkel and Sarkozy a year to discover that their Deauville agreement with Private Sector Involvement was a shot in their own foot. And similarly they needed quite some time to discover that there was some merit in the banks' arguments on the timing and impact of Basel 3.
But why, why does it have to take a year before this sort of insights sink in?
While I think that this is indeed the better way forward, things did change in the last year. We have become aware that our governments in Europe are quite unable to tackle the serious issues at hand. It took Merkel and Sarkozy a year to discover that their Deauville agreement with Private Sector Involvement was a shot in their own foot. And similarly they needed quite some time to discover that there was some merit in the banks' arguments on the timing and impact of Basel 3.
But why, why does it have to take a year before this sort of insights sink in?
09/12/2011
Eurocrisis at its peak (december 2011)... some forward thinking here
Well, I think the world has all very much suffered its eurocrisis fatique in the last months. Yet it is time for some new forward thinking on the euro. And I'm going to ensure it's a plain vanilla explanation here. The situation is: this euro-thingy was and is a cunning French plan. And we shouldn't fall for the cunning French for a second time.
Let my try to explain this in three simple steps. That will help you understand the world without constantly following tweets and live blogs. It is - after all - not really that complicated, although the rethorics of the French President Sarkozy and the German Bundeskanzlerin Merkel do create a bit of fog.
Step 1: Monetary union means moving money between regions that constitute the union
Let's look at history. In particular the year 1977. A group of experts, headed by Mr MacDougall, wrote a report on the possibilities for a monetary union and the consequence on public finance. It's a beautifully written report in typewriter format, the standard of those days. And it describes the functioning of monetary unions in a numbere of countries, thus providing the European Commission (9 countries then) with a bit of inspiration for the future.
Conclusion four in this report clearly outlines that an economic and monetary union will always (and permanently) lead to a redistribution of money from richer regions to poor ones via a number of methods (taxes, subsidies and so on):
The redistribution through public finance between regions in the countries studied tends to be reflected to a large extent (though not, of course, precisely because other factors are involved) in corresponding deficits in the balances of payments on current account of the poorer regions, with corresponding surpluses in the richer regions. These deficits and surpluses are of a continuing nature. Net flows of public finance in the range of 3 - 10 % of regional product are common for both relatively rich and relatively poor regions, but a few of the latter enjoy considerably higher net inflows, up to around 30 % of regional product.
The report then continues to describe diplomatically that it's too early for a monetary union now. It also becomes clear that the redistribution of income between regions requires a central form of taxation/income for the centre of the Union (the EU itself) and a bigger budget. Because that creates the mechanisms through which redistribution can occur.
2. The euro: cunning French plan consisting of well packaged creeping committments
In an earlier Dutch blogpost I mentioned and honoured the foresight of Bernard Connolly. This former EU civil servant described in 1995 the French policy: use the euro to gain more influence in the relationshop with Germany. Because without some form of cooperation, the German economy would rapidly show its tail lights to the weaker French economy. By introducing the euro, the French got their influence as well as the desired endgoal; a political union in Europa.
The French understood that going into the discussion with their main goal revealed: political union, would not work. So they chose the Monnet-strategy of creeping committments. Just start with a joint currency and understand that economics will then in the end lead to some crisis-moments. Which are then used to further cement the union. They cleverly disguised their main goal (as no one was ready and willing to committ) and suckered the Germans into believing that this 'no-bail-out'-clause was really worth the paper it was written on.
Of course the French were clever enough to understand that in times of crisis, such clauses will be dropped. They also succeeded in making the sanctions of the Treaty subject to political assessment. And thus they put Germany and Europe on the road of small creeping committments were there is only one way: forward. Until in the end, after some crisis-moments, the full policial union would be arrived at.
Step 3: French magic and illusions: confuse the public with the actuality and hide the real rabbit
I think that it's useless to be excited about the events in the market and politics. What's happening now is exactly what was planned by the French. The diverging economies and bad public finances in the EU have become a strain on the functioning of the European Union. So now is the time to cement forward towards the political union. And we see Merkel and Sarkozy using this opportunity to convince their people and local politicians that this is the time to really step up to the plate and cement some solid new agreements in place. And once again, the German-French axis is the dealmaker with the rest of Europe standing by.
The real choice: political union or not?
By using short term rethorics Sarkozy still hides the real choice as the magician hides his rabbit for his audience. And that choice is wheter or not we want a political union in Europe (where rich countries yearly pay the poor ones and where a central EU-taxation exists and is used to redistribute wealth).
Let's be clear: we failed to properly assess the French gameplan in 1994. We got suckered into their game of creeping committments with only one endconclusion: political union. And our politicians didn't see it, were unaware or otherwise incapable of noticing this. But now that we have seen this happening, we can choose to engage in todays rethorics on new pacts and unions or to step back and repeat the main question: do we really want this political union? Is there sufficient solidarity among all countries in Europe to start sending money from rich to poor countries?
The answer and most likely outcome: Marseillaise rather than the ninth of Beethoven
Our true challenge now is not to be confused by the magic, the tricks, the thick air, the fog and the 34th rescue plan for the Euro. So when brushing all that aside, what remains is a lack of solidarity in Europe to go forward towards a political union. But we can also see that our current style politicans lack the courage, guts or vision to really deal with that question openly. Then again, that is also a valid choice. It's the choice to remain the puppet/marionet in the French theatre.
My guess is that Sarkozy is a very smart man who foresees that the European countries will continue to fall for his cheap magic and will remain puppets in the French masterplan. And could that perhaps also be the reason why, at the end of his pro-Europa-speech, one week ago, we didn't hear the European anthem (the Ninth of Beethoven) but the Marseillaise?
Click here to the read the Dutch version of this blogpost.
Let my try to explain this in three simple steps. That will help you understand the world without constantly following tweets and live blogs. It is - after all - not really that complicated, although the rethorics of the French President Sarkozy and the German Bundeskanzlerin Merkel do create a bit of fog.
Step 1: Monetary union means moving money between regions that constitute the union
Let's look at history. In particular the year 1977. A group of experts, headed by Mr MacDougall, wrote a report on the possibilities for a monetary union and the consequence on public finance. It's a beautifully written report in typewriter format, the standard of those days. And it describes the functioning of monetary unions in a numbere of countries, thus providing the European Commission (9 countries then) with a bit of inspiration for the future.
Conclusion four in this report clearly outlines that an economic and monetary union will always (and permanently) lead to a redistribution of money from richer regions to poor ones via a number of methods (taxes, subsidies and so on):
The redistribution through public finance between regions in the countries studied tends to be reflected to a large extent (though not, of course, precisely because other factors are involved) in corresponding deficits in the balances of payments on current account of the poorer regions, with corresponding surpluses in the richer regions. These deficits and surpluses are of a continuing nature. Net flows of public finance in the range of 3 - 10 % of regional product are common for both relatively rich and relatively poor regions, but a few of the latter enjoy considerably higher net inflows, up to around 30 % of regional product.
The report then continues to describe diplomatically that it's too early for a monetary union now. It also becomes clear that the redistribution of income between regions requires a central form of taxation/income for the centre of the Union (the EU itself) and a bigger budget. Because that creates the mechanisms through which redistribution can occur.
2. The euro: cunning French plan consisting of well packaged creeping committments
In an earlier Dutch blogpost I mentioned and honoured the foresight of Bernard Connolly. This former EU civil servant described in 1995 the French policy: use the euro to gain more influence in the relationshop with Germany. Because without some form of cooperation, the German economy would rapidly show its tail lights to the weaker French economy. By introducing the euro, the French got their influence as well as the desired endgoal; a political union in Europa.
The French understood that going into the discussion with their main goal revealed: political union, would not work. So they chose the Monnet-strategy of creeping committments. Just start with a joint currency and understand that economics will then in the end lead to some crisis-moments. Which are then used to further cement the union. They cleverly disguised their main goal (as no one was ready and willing to committ) and suckered the Germans into believing that this 'no-bail-out'-clause was really worth the paper it was written on.
Of course the French were clever enough to understand that in times of crisis, such clauses will be dropped. They also succeeded in making the sanctions of the Treaty subject to political assessment. And thus they put Germany and Europe on the road of small creeping committments were there is only one way: forward. Until in the end, after some crisis-moments, the full policial union would be arrived at.
Step 3: French magic and illusions: confuse the public with the actuality and hide the real rabbit
I think that it's useless to be excited about the events in the market and politics. What's happening now is exactly what was planned by the French. The diverging economies and bad public finances in the EU have become a strain on the functioning of the European Union. So now is the time to cement forward towards the political union. And we see Merkel and Sarkozy using this opportunity to convince their people and local politicians that this is the time to really step up to the plate and cement some solid new agreements in place. And once again, the German-French axis is the dealmaker with the rest of Europe standing by.
The real choice: political union or not?
By using short term rethorics Sarkozy still hides the real choice as the magician hides his rabbit for his audience. And that choice is wheter or not we want a political union in Europe (where rich countries yearly pay the poor ones and where a central EU-taxation exists and is used to redistribute wealth).
Let's be clear: we failed to properly assess the French gameplan in 1994. We got suckered into their game of creeping committments with only one endconclusion: political union. And our politicians didn't see it, were unaware or otherwise incapable of noticing this. But now that we have seen this happening, we can choose to engage in todays rethorics on new pacts and unions or to step back and repeat the main question: do we really want this political union? Is there sufficient solidarity among all countries in Europe to start sending money from rich to poor countries?
The answer and most likely outcome: Marseillaise rather than the ninth of Beethoven
Our true challenge now is not to be confused by the magic, the tricks, the thick air, the fog and the 34th rescue plan for the Euro. So when brushing all that aside, what remains is a lack of solidarity in Europe to go forward towards a political union. But we can also see that our current style politicans lack the courage, guts or vision to really deal with that question openly. Then again, that is also a valid choice. It's the choice to remain the puppet/marionet in the French theatre.
My guess is that Sarkozy is a very smart man who foresees that the European countries will continue to fall for his cheap magic and will remain puppets in the French masterplan. And could that perhaps also be the reason why, at the end of his pro-Europa-speech, one week ago, we didn't hear the European anthem (the Ninth of Beethoven) but the Marseillaise?
Click here to the read the Dutch version of this blogpost.
01/11/2011
Eurocrisis: the frog may have been long boilt but we fail to notice...
Looking at todays market developments I am very much reminded by the complex discussions of 2007 and 2008. I think also these days, here in Europe we are failing to recognize that the political and decision process has gotten out of control. The bailout-frog is long boilt and dead, but we keep pretending it is alive and will be able to move. And heaven only knows wen reality will sink in.
Mind you, my personal opinion is that the Wednesday-package was not about bailing out Greece but about bailing out Europe. Given that clearly the EU governments don't have the support/cash to fund a bailout fund themselves, they had to provide the EFSF with sufficient flexibility to go shopping for funds in the market. Three cheers to Angela Merkel for finally understanding that...
And the European leaders of course also placed an emergency solution via the IMF in the background. In doing so the (emergency) plumbing is laid for a bailout of Europe. As a result, the financial markets could no longer determine whether the bazooka was sufficiently big. It's size is unknown, now that there is the possibility of some Chinese or Saudi Arabi or the IMF to step in. So, lot's of work to do, but the main problem was solved.
Thus, the essence of the EU-package was that it ensured that the EU itself would qualify for emergency packages, should push come to shove. And this appeared to work for a day or so. And while Draghi outlined to continue to take extra-ordinary measures, Italy got burnt in the market. So that did not bode too well.
And here we are now. Tuesday evening, first of november 2011. Berlusconi is meeting with his Cabinet to discuss measures. As is the Greek Prime Minister who presumably felt that the First November of 2011 was a good day to announce a referendum (1-11-11, it must mean something in Greek mythology). And of course, the Dutch Members of Parliament will also convene this evening. So there will be more discussions. And letters to parliament. And then our Prime Minister will say stuff. And then there will be the G20. And so on, and so on.
I understand that for those working in civil service, there is no giving up on Europe and procedure. They must continue to go the way that has been prescribed and try to make something out of this very desperate situation. But it is all quite similar to the myth/story of the boilt frog. If you put a frog in a glass of water it will jump out if it is heated quickly, but will not when the water is heated slowly. So in a situation of slow changes, the frog will boil to death.*
The whole EU-situation now reminds me very much of the complex discussions we had here in the Netherlands with the takeover of ABN AMRO by Barclays, followed by the bid of RBS/Fortis/Santander. This whole deal messed up incredibly and had all kinds of side effects (no attention paid to smaller banks with two of them failing subsequently: DSB Icesave). And the one major lesson that we could learn in the Netherlands was that it is essential to identify the moment in which a process has become too complex to handle.
And what I'm saying here: we may have passed that moment quite some months ago already. We are already witnessing the Lehman 2 moment in the markets, but European politicians are too busy to notice (as they are holding summits and meeting to prevent Lehman 2 from happening).
By the way: later scientists proved that the story was untrue and an urban myth. Maybe someday people will say the same of the Euro...
Mind you, my personal opinion is that the Wednesday-package was not about bailing out Greece but about bailing out Europe. Given that clearly the EU governments don't have the support/cash to fund a bailout fund themselves, they had to provide the EFSF with sufficient flexibility to go shopping for funds in the market. Three cheers to Angela Merkel for finally understanding that...
And the European leaders of course also placed an emergency solution via the IMF in the background. In doing so the (emergency) plumbing is laid for a bailout of Europe. As a result, the financial markets could no longer determine whether the bazooka was sufficiently big. It's size is unknown, now that there is the possibility of some Chinese or Saudi Arabi or the IMF to step in. So, lot's of work to do, but the main problem was solved.
Thus, the essence of the EU-package was that it ensured that the EU itself would qualify for emergency packages, should push come to shove. And this appeared to work for a day or so. And while Draghi outlined to continue to take extra-ordinary measures, Italy got burnt in the market. So that did not bode too well.
And here we are now. Tuesday evening, first of november 2011. Berlusconi is meeting with his Cabinet to discuss measures. As is the Greek Prime Minister who presumably felt that the First November of 2011 was a good day to announce a referendum (1-11-11, it must mean something in Greek mythology). And of course, the Dutch Members of Parliament will also convene this evening. So there will be more discussions. And letters to parliament. And then our Prime Minister will say stuff. And then there will be the G20. And so on, and so on.
I understand that for those working in civil service, there is no giving up on Europe and procedure. They must continue to go the way that has been prescribed and try to make something out of this very desperate situation. But it is all quite similar to the myth/story of the boilt frog. If you put a frog in a glass of water it will jump out if it is heated quickly, but will not when the water is heated slowly. So in a situation of slow changes, the frog will boil to death.*
The whole EU-situation now reminds me very much of the complex discussions we had here in the Netherlands with the takeover of ABN AMRO by Barclays, followed by the bid of RBS/Fortis/Santander. This whole deal messed up incredibly and had all kinds of side effects (no attention paid to smaller banks with two of them failing subsequently: DSB Icesave). And the one major lesson that we could learn in the Netherlands was that it is essential to identify the moment in which a process has become too complex to handle.
And what I'm saying here: we may have passed that moment quite some months ago already. We are already witnessing the Lehman 2 moment in the markets, but European politicians are too busy to notice (as they are holding summits and meeting to prevent Lehman 2 from happening).
By the way: later scientists proved that the story was untrue and an urban myth. Maybe someday people will say the same of the Euro...
13/09/2011
Interesting development... default Greece confirmed/rumoured (sort of) by Dutch Ministry of Finance..
This morning, Bert Bruggink, CFO Rabobank, was quoted in Financieele Dagblad, saying that -looking at the markets- it was not the question if but when Greece would default. And RTL Nieuws informed the public that the Ministry of Finance was now preparing for all possible (and unthinkable) options in the crisis. Which lead to clippings in the press: 'Dutch Ministry of Finance thinks that default of Greece is imminent.'
Tomorrow, Dutch parliament will discuss the EFSF in parliament. But PvdA (Labour) does not wish to support the extension of the fund if Finland still has its demand for collateral on the table. The 'Green-Left'-party states that with the extension, the EU should also decide on the Euro-commissioner for budget (the MarkRutte proposal). And the Socialist Party doesn't want the EFSF to take over bond-buying from the ECB as, the ECB has 'unlimited funds'.
Meanwhile, national radio bulletins send out the message that sources near to the Ministry of Finance outline that it is preparing for default (19.57). While formally the Ministry may not be calling for orderly default and denies it (20.20). Which means that the 'open' and transparant communication of Minister de Jager, once again creates more confusion than necessary. It's a bit like BNP formally denying the informal rumour about its financial health.
So, looking at this confusion, it does indeed look as if the default of Greece is imminent...
Tomorrow, Dutch parliament will discuss the EFSF in parliament. But PvdA (Labour) does not wish to support the extension of the fund if Finland still has its demand for collateral on the table. The 'Green-Left'-party states that with the extension, the EU should also decide on the Euro-commissioner for budget (the MarkRutte proposal). And the Socialist Party doesn't want the EFSF to take over bond-buying from the ECB as, the ECB has 'unlimited funds'.
Meanwhile, national radio bulletins send out the message that sources near to the Ministry of Finance outline that it is preparing for default (19.57). While formally the Ministry may not be calling for orderly default and denies it (20.20). Which means that the 'open' and transparant communication of Minister de Jager, once again creates more confusion than necessary. It's a bit like BNP formally denying the informal rumour about its financial health.
So, looking at this confusion, it does indeed look as if the default of Greece is imminent...
05/09/2011
Eurocrisis: a clash of old (long term) and new (opportunistic) political thinking
These days I'm trying to get my head around the current developments in international and European markets and politics. There's a real flood of former politicians emphasizing that Europe is the solution, rather than the problem (see for example the statement by the Council for the Future of Europe). And here in the Netherlands we had former Prime Minister Wim Kok as well as former Minster of Finance Gerrit Zalm explaining to us on television that we need to remember the benefits of Europe and use it as a road to the solution. And I fully agree. As a whole, the eurozone is not doing so bad, but we do have a serious internal management and discipline problem.
Leadership today may be far more difficult than when the euro was formed..
Many commentators outline that now is the time to show leadership, based on a long term vision. And that is most certainly an important element of any solution. But I sense there may be more to it. There are some tectonic plates moving beneath todays politics. And the theory that I'm forming right now, is that most commentators are overlooking the movements of those plates as they are standing on those plates themselves (and incorrectly assume that they're not moving).
My theory is that, due to these slowly moving tectonic plates in the political environment, it might be much harder for todays leaders to exhibit the same leadership as their predecessors. So the solution to the eurocrisis is not just about leadership, but requires an appreciation of those fundamental trends as well.
What are the fundamental trends that now constrain our leaders?
The slowly moving 'tectonic plates' that constrain our leaders are:
1- a long period without war and a fading memory of bad economic circumstances,
2- a growing mastering of technology, leading to a shift in risk-sensitivity and a new control-perspective on the ability to control developments,
3- less religious attitudes, loss of self-discipline and focus on individual welfare,
4- electoral behaviour that is no longer focused on full political vision or ideology but can be seen as short-term shopping behaviour; the contract term of citizen and politicians decreased considerably,
5- the rise of the internet and social media, leading to increased scrutiny by the public, less margin for politicians to implement long term solutions and to oversimplification of complex problems in the public debate.
So what am I saying is:
1- In Europe, we have forgotten how rich we really are and where we came from. So the financial and geopolitical benefits of Europe (income, peace and peace of mind) are taken for granted. And as we grow older, this individual and collective memory fades more and more.
2- The advancing technology incites a sense of control into the modern human being and people are less inclined to accept the limitations of life; we are used to demand more, get more, expect more, demand more and so on. The succes of technology also provides us with a sense that we can control more than we really can. And it shifts our risk-sensitivity. Risks that in former times were acceptable or considered an act of God, are now subject to preventive and containment measures, with the people seeking a culprit if insufficient measures were taken. Essentially technology makes us become spoilt brats that don't want to bite the sour apple for our health if there is a sweeter alternative around the corner.
3- The increased welfare and growing economy allow for the realization of many wishes. And the traditional religions slowly lose ground to an economic religion in which there is little place for self restraint or group thinking and solidarity.
4- In the political domain, the economization also occurs and voting becomes more an act like shopping than an act like determining which church/religion you wish to belong to. The lifelong committment to ideologies fades away and needs to make place for opportunistic electoral behaviour. In turn, the political parties need to focus more on short term issues and popularity to survive and represent the interest of their electorate.
5- Whereas in former times some leeway in government and politics could be created by controlling and restraining the flow of information, the rise of Internet and social media make it almost impossible to create time/intellectual room for debate/solutions. These media also allow for collective intelligence and feedback which is very much quicker than before. So politicians can no longer design political solutions which do not work in practice or contain design-errors. Similarly they cannot decide or choose open-ended solutions, hoping that some underlying fundamental problem will be solved by time rather than politics.
Thus, in order to solve the Eurocrisis, we don't just need leadership, but also:
- increased awareness about the benefits peace, peace of mind and economic growth that Europe has brought us and brings us,
- the ability to bite through a sour apple rather than postpone solutions,
- the awareness that we're in it together, even if it doesn't feel like that,
- politicians with the leadership to appeal to the publics desire for stability and growth and the fact that only with their prolonged loyalty can the public expect a better long term outcome,
- consistent solutions to the technical, financial and political issues at stake; any backdoor or design error will get back at us within a years time-frame.
See also the Dutch version of this post here.
Leadership today may be far more difficult than when the euro was formed..
Many commentators outline that now is the time to show leadership, based on a long term vision. And that is most certainly an important element of any solution. But I sense there may be more to it. There are some tectonic plates moving beneath todays politics. And the theory that I'm forming right now, is that most commentators are overlooking the movements of those plates as they are standing on those plates themselves (and incorrectly assume that they're not moving).
My theory is that, due to these slowly moving tectonic plates in the political environment, it might be much harder for todays leaders to exhibit the same leadership as their predecessors. So the solution to the eurocrisis is not just about leadership, but requires an appreciation of those fundamental trends as well.
What are the fundamental trends that now constrain our leaders?
The slowly moving 'tectonic plates' that constrain our leaders are:
1- a long period without war and a fading memory of bad economic circumstances,
2- a growing mastering of technology, leading to a shift in risk-sensitivity and a new control-perspective on the ability to control developments,
3- less religious attitudes, loss of self-discipline and focus on individual welfare,
4- electoral behaviour that is no longer focused on full political vision or ideology but can be seen as short-term shopping behaviour; the contract term of citizen and politicians decreased considerably,
5- the rise of the internet and social media, leading to increased scrutiny by the public, less margin for politicians to implement long term solutions and to oversimplification of complex problems in the public debate.
So what am I saying is:
1- In Europe, we have forgotten how rich we really are and where we came from. So the financial and geopolitical benefits of Europe (income, peace and peace of mind) are taken for granted. And as we grow older, this individual and collective memory fades more and more.
2- The advancing technology incites a sense of control into the modern human being and people are less inclined to accept the limitations of life; we are used to demand more, get more, expect more, demand more and so on. The succes of technology also provides us with a sense that we can control more than we really can. And it shifts our risk-sensitivity. Risks that in former times were acceptable or considered an act of God, are now subject to preventive and containment measures, with the people seeking a culprit if insufficient measures were taken. Essentially technology makes us become spoilt brats that don't want to bite the sour apple for our health if there is a sweeter alternative around the corner.
3- The increased welfare and growing economy allow for the realization of many wishes. And the traditional religions slowly lose ground to an economic religion in which there is little place for self restraint or group thinking and solidarity.
4- In the political domain, the economization also occurs and voting becomes more an act like shopping than an act like determining which church/religion you wish to belong to. The lifelong committment to ideologies fades away and needs to make place for opportunistic electoral behaviour. In turn, the political parties need to focus more on short term issues and popularity to survive and represent the interest of their electorate.
5- Whereas in former times some leeway in government and politics could be created by controlling and restraining the flow of information, the rise of Internet and social media make it almost impossible to create time/intellectual room for debate/solutions. These media also allow for collective intelligence and feedback which is very much quicker than before. So politicians can no longer design political solutions which do not work in practice or contain design-errors. Similarly they cannot decide or choose open-ended solutions, hoping that some underlying fundamental problem will be solved by time rather than politics.
Thus, in order to solve the Eurocrisis, we don't just need leadership, but also:
- increased awareness about the benefits peace, peace of mind and economic growth that Europe has brought us and brings us,
- the ability to bite through a sour apple rather than postpone solutions,
- the awareness that we're in it together, even if it doesn't feel like that,
- politicians with the leadership to appeal to the publics desire for stability and growth and the fact that only with their prolonged loyalty can the public expect a better long term outcome,
- consistent solutions to the technical, financial and political issues at stake; any backdoor or design error will get back at us within a years time-frame.
See also the Dutch version of this post here.
02/09/2011
How political opportunity helps dampen the economy
Today the Dutch Central Bank released its economic monitor. And that monitor warned that the good times are over. We are getting depressed again and growth will slow. See below the first signs of the downturn in dark blue:
It is quite clear to me that this time, it will be hard for politicians to blame the banks or anyone other than themselves. We know from research that bad news on financial markets and stock exchanges is affecting all the people in the public (although in the Netherlands only 1/16th is actually actively holding its own securities). And it is of course not more than fair to say that it is the clumsy and opportunistic behaviour of politicians with respect to budgets and eurocrisis that have significantly contributed to the turmoil in the market, this last half year. Add to this the fact that the politicians chose to also curtail all future economic growth by imposing taxes, buffers, liquidity traps and all that stuff onto banks.
So we are now back in the dried up markets, with depressed consumer outlooks with mainly the politicians to blame. Central banks are heavily overstepping their mandates to try and save the day but still we see no signs of true leadership in the Netherlands, Europe or the US. And somehow I have the impression that it may a take quite some time before our Dutch politicians will truly acknowledge that it was their own opportunistic behaviour that helped spark this crisis and slowdown/downturn.
17/07/2011
Still amazed at the 'tough' stance of Netherlands Jan Cees de Jager in Greek Crisis
As the readers of this blog know already, here in the Netherlands we have a minority government that has to lean on support of the PVV to survive. With the end result that we have a divided caretaker government that steers on a day-to-day basis, and is unable to steer on long-term policy goals or to achieve fundamental changes.
As a result we see the current government and in particular our Minister of Finance, Jan Cees de Jager, surfing the waves of public sentiment rather than those of solid government. De Jager time and again has to account for the public sentiment and does so in particular with respect to todays political and macro-economic European crisis. He continues to stress that private entities will have to pay along to save Greece. And he says: there will be no more money going to Greece, unless this condition is fulfilled.
Well, this tough policy stance, copied from the Germans, is not bringing us in Europe or the Netherlands anywhere. All it does is prolong the crisis, as we have seen last week in all the market turbulence about Italy and the stress tresting of banks. So perhaps de Jager will slowly retreat. But still we can imagine some more populist talk to enter the European policy arena. Because the populist PVV is still banging the drum that no more money should go to Greece.
It is interesting to analyze the position of de Jager, using some of the insights of former President of the central bank: Nout Wellink. Just two weeks ago, on the day of his departure from the central bank, a book was published with the title 'Wellink talking'. And in it Wellink outlines that at some point in time, bad collateral of banks may result in losses for the ECB and thus also hit the Dutch tax payer. It is telling and striking that only very few people in the Netherlands realize that our 'tough talk' with respect to the Greek situation is just for show. The real costs of this crisis may well end up at the Dutch tax payer via the back door of the ECB.
Although by now I should have gotten used to the 'pragmatic', visionless way in which our government operates, I still remain amazed at the Ostrich policy that our Ministry of Finance uses in dealing with the EU-crisis. If indeed at some point in time the central banks or bankers were to blame for a crisis, now is the time that we can fully blame politicians for not deciding, for bowing towards populists and for a complete lack of leadership.
As a result we see the current government and in particular our Minister of Finance, Jan Cees de Jager, surfing the waves of public sentiment rather than those of solid government. De Jager time and again has to account for the public sentiment and does so in particular with respect to todays political and macro-economic European crisis. He continues to stress that private entities will have to pay along to save Greece. And he says: there will be no more money going to Greece, unless this condition is fulfilled.
Well, this tough policy stance, copied from the Germans, is not bringing us in Europe or the Netherlands anywhere. All it does is prolong the crisis, as we have seen last week in all the market turbulence about Italy and the stress tresting of banks. So perhaps de Jager will slowly retreat. But still we can imagine some more populist talk to enter the European policy arena. Because the populist PVV is still banging the drum that no more money should go to Greece.
It is interesting to analyze the position of de Jager, using some of the insights of former President of the central bank: Nout Wellink. Just two weeks ago, on the day of his departure from the central bank, a book was published with the title 'Wellink talking'. And in it Wellink outlines that at some point in time, bad collateral of banks may result in losses for the ECB and thus also hit the Dutch tax payer. It is telling and striking that only very few people in the Netherlands realize that our 'tough talk' with respect to the Greek situation is just for show. The real costs of this crisis may well end up at the Dutch tax payer via the back door of the ECB.
Although by now I should have gotten used to the 'pragmatic', visionless way in which our government operates, I still remain amazed at the Ostrich policy that our Ministry of Finance uses in dealing with the EU-crisis. If indeed at some point in time the central banks or bankers were to blame for a crisis, now is the time that we can fully blame politicians for not deciding, for bowing towards populists and for a complete lack of leadership.
29/06/2011
Greece: let's help the Greek people in solving the democratic errors that caused the financial trouble!
In an earlier post, I outlined that both the EU-countries and Greece were sort of stuck with politicians that may have not done their job well. Populist politicians in the EU have widened the gap with Greece by portraying all the Greek as bandits. Meanwhile, within Greece there is a huge difference between have's and have-nots and between politicians and the people. So while the world may treat Greece as one people, we overlook the distinctions within the Greek people.
ZeroHedge featured an article that made this distinction more specific. The article outlines that Greece may essentially be a kleptocracy. In such a system, a financial and political Elite skims and concentrates the wealth of the nation via corruption and embezzlement while being protected by the winking complicity of their fellow plunderers who hold civil and financial authority.
At present all eyes are focused on Greece and the votes in parliament. While most eyes will focus on the financial part of the vote, I am thinking now about the ramifications for Greece as a democracy and its citizenry. Imagine yourself to be a Greek voter that has over time learnt to live with corruption and the fact that an elite holds the jobs and priviliges. In this role you are essentially illegally taxed by the elite, in order to get services from the state that it should provide you for free or at much lower costs. And now this elite has also frauded the European system so much, that it is obliged to introduce a formal tax upon you as well. This double-taxing appears to be quite unfair and incorrect. And what can you do about it?
The current workings of the Greek democracy will thus inevitably lead to further social unrest than we see already. The people will want to rise up against their political elite in a similar way that in the Middle-East countries we see the people rise against its dictators and their family-clans. And that's what we see in the streets now. It's the same process, but the Greek elite is less pronounced, leass easy to catch and less easy to portray as a single entity.
I am afraid that the EU people and politicians will be so much clouded by their economic mindset and reasoning, that they will misstake and portray the Greek people's resistance as inappropriate given the amount of fraud that has occurred so far in Greek government (the elite). This may lead EU leaders and politicians to explicitly or implicitly favour a violent suppression of completely justified Greek protests.
In my opinion, our attention in the EU should not just be focused on the financial issue. We should take a broader perspective and try to determine how we can help the Greek public get a government with less corruption and less implicit taxes, allowing them to pay the formal taxes that Greece needs to come out of the crisis.
The stakes are high. And not just financially. If we overlook this issue, then essentially we are supporting the dictatorship of the Greek political elite.
And is that something we want the European Union to be based on?
Click here for a Dutch translation of this blogposting.
ZeroHedge featured an article that made this distinction more specific. The article outlines that Greece may essentially be a kleptocracy. In such a system, a financial and political Elite skims and concentrates the wealth of the nation via corruption and embezzlement while being protected by the winking complicity of their fellow plunderers who hold civil and financial authority.
At present all eyes are focused on Greece and the votes in parliament. While most eyes will focus on the financial part of the vote, I am thinking now about the ramifications for Greece as a democracy and its citizenry. Imagine yourself to be a Greek voter that has over time learnt to live with corruption and the fact that an elite holds the jobs and priviliges. In this role you are essentially illegally taxed by the elite, in order to get services from the state that it should provide you for free or at much lower costs. And now this elite has also frauded the European system so much, that it is obliged to introduce a formal tax upon you as well. This double-taxing appears to be quite unfair and incorrect. And what can you do about it?
The current workings of the Greek democracy will thus inevitably lead to further social unrest than we see already. The people will want to rise up against their political elite in a similar way that in the Middle-East countries we see the people rise against its dictators and their family-clans. And that's what we see in the streets now. It's the same process, but the Greek elite is less pronounced, leass easy to catch and less easy to portray as a single entity.
I am afraid that the EU people and politicians will be so much clouded by their economic mindset and reasoning, that they will misstake and portray the Greek people's resistance as inappropriate given the amount of fraud that has occurred so far in Greek government (the elite). This may lead EU leaders and politicians to explicitly or implicitly favour a violent suppression of completely justified Greek protests.
In my opinion, our attention in the EU should not just be focused on the financial issue. We should take a broader perspective and try to determine how we can help the Greek public get a government with less corruption and less implicit taxes, allowing them to pay the formal taxes that Greece needs to come out of the crisis.
The stakes are high. And not just financially. If we overlook this issue, then essentially we are supporting the dictatorship of the Greek political elite.
And is that something we want the European Union to be based on?
Click here for a Dutch translation of this blogposting.
21/06/2011
Greece: we Europeans need to bypass politicians and support the Greek people
At pressing times like these, it may be time for the citizens themselves to speak out and connect to Greece and its people. The euro has a very positive cost-benefit ratio as it shielded Europe from uncanny complicated situation when the financial crisis hit in 2007. Without it we would have had highly fragmented local financial disasters all over Europe. Politicians are forgetting this too quickly and choosing for populistic lines of reasoning to satisfy what, in their view, is the peoples wish/opinion.
On both a political and human level, there is no other way than supporting the Greek. But we shouldn't let only the politicians and bankers do the work. It is now time for European labour unions, companies, families, sports clubs, stamp collectors and what have you, to reach out to the Greek counterparts that they have been in touch with over the last years.
The message to them could be one of human and moral support, outlining that both the Greek people and the European people are stuck with politicians that sometimes don't do their job right. In Greece they frauded a bit too much and in Europe they are just too populist and lack the leadership to stand up for the euro now. But if we look underneath it all, there is only one thing to do: support the Greek, sympathize with their situation and encourage/support them to make the best of it.
28/04/2011
Bernanke sticks to low rates.... risky... but understandable
These days I watched and listened the first press conference by Ben Bernanke, in which he elaborated on the US-FOMC monetary policy. After a nervous start, he started getting the hang of it when it all became 'technical'. Whereas Trichet is a fully certified clueless-empty-can-but-very-capable-regent who brushes off all complicated questions with a number of standard mantras, Bernanke was in good shape. The guy very obviously knows what he is talking about and that is a huge relief in comparison to Trichet. I noticed that in general, also the US-FED-watchers shared the view that this was a good first premiere by Bernanke (see also here).
Wat Bernanke told us, is that the FOMC, with its double mandate on price stability and employment, chose to prioritize the economic growth and employment by maintaining low interest rates for the time being. The quantitative easing will end in June, but there will be reinvestments of matured bonds. The Fed considers a stop on this reinvesting as a tightening of monetary policy and will only do so after due consideration and on the basis of an explicit FOMC decision. So, for now, we will face a prolongued period (at least three months) of low interest rates in the US. Employment is the main thing.
The market effects were quickly visible with a happy stock market and a diving dollar. Meanwhile I was pondering the thought if the economy in the US would really be in such a bad shape that it deserved further easy-money? Or could there be another angle at all this?
I realised that we are in the run up to new elections and recalled literature from a while ago: research by the FED that observed a correlation between the behaviour of the FED/FOMC and the pre-election year. This would be either an explicit or implicit case of the principal-agent situation. Meaning that in the year before the elections, the US Presidents appreciates a solid economy which then creates jobs that he can show off with in the election year. And from that perspective, the FED-decision is quite clear (and a case in point).
Still, this is playing with fire, as we are in the same situation that brought us the financial crisis: a prolongued perod with low interest rates, which may seduce markets into taking too much risk. Which may lead to the situation where we get rid of the hangover by taking a new beer, the day after (as we all know, the recipe for die-hard alcoholism). En also our central bank (De Nederlandsche Bank NV) states a serious warning in its financial stability report which does not sound happy at all:
Just as in the run-up to the crisis, we can observe overliquidity in the worldwide financial system, with global imbalances. These developments may, in the medium term, threathen the financial stability, when once again bubbles in financial markets or unsustainable debts will come into being. We have almost stretched the accomodative monetary policies that we see worldwide, to their maximum limits.
In sum, the historic days are not over yet. As we are very much aware how we came into this crisis, it remains a risky approach to stick to low interest rate policies. Time will tell.
Wat Bernanke told us, is that the FOMC, with its double mandate on price stability and employment, chose to prioritize the economic growth and employment by maintaining low interest rates for the time being. The quantitative easing will end in June, but there will be reinvestments of matured bonds. The Fed considers a stop on this reinvesting as a tightening of monetary policy and will only do so after due consideration and on the basis of an explicit FOMC decision. So, for now, we will face a prolongued period (at least three months) of low interest rates in the US. Employment is the main thing.
The market effects were quickly visible with a happy stock market and a diving dollar. Meanwhile I was pondering the thought if the economy in the US would really be in such a bad shape that it deserved further easy-money? Or could there be another angle at all this?
I realised that we are in the run up to new elections and recalled literature from a while ago: research by the FED that observed a correlation between the behaviour of the FED/FOMC and the pre-election year. This would be either an explicit or implicit case of the principal-agent situation. Meaning that in the year before the elections, the US Presidents appreciates a solid economy which then creates jobs that he can show off with in the election year. And from that perspective, the FED-decision is quite clear (and a case in point).
Still, this is playing with fire, as we are in the same situation that brought us the financial crisis: a prolongued perod with low interest rates, which may seduce markets into taking too much risk. Which may lead to the situation where we get rid of the hangover by taking a new beer, the day after (as we all know, the recipe for die-hard alcoholism). En also our central bank (De Nederlandsche Bank NV) states a serious warning in its financial stability report which does not sound happy at all:
Just as in the run-up to the crisis, we can observe overliquidity in the worldwide financial system, with global imbalances. These developments may, in the medium term, threathen the financial stability, when once again bubbles in financial markets or unsustainable debts will come into being. We have almost stretched the accomodative monetary policies that we see worldwide, to their maximum limits.
In sum, the historic days are not over yet. As we are very much aware how we came into this crisis, it remains a risky approach to stick to low interest rate policies. Time will tell.
11/04/2011
The successor to Wellink: why I think van Dijkhuizen is the best for the job !
These days, decisions are in the making about the best man to succeed Wellink as the President of De Nederlandsche Bank (our central bank). There are three candidates for the job: Hoogduin, Kremers, en van Dijkhuizen. Whereas in former days, the President used to be responsible for both monetary and supervisory matters, the Minister of Finance, JanCees de Jager, is now choosing for a separation of duties (see here Dutch source 1 and here Dutch source 2). Due to the failures in Dutch banking supervision of the last years, there will be a separate executive director responsible for bank supervision. That director can independently judge and committ the whole central bank board (and its President). And as to the general set-up for bank supervision in the Netherlands, I am amazed at the following statement of the Ministry of Finance:
The Minister trusts very strongly on the internal systems of checks and balances of De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the Authority for Financial Markets (AFM). Both supervisors are themselves responsible for the proper functioning of their internal governance, the legality of their expenditure, the execution of supervision and the determination of priorities and accents of their work.
I find the above quote highly interesting and surprising because things haven't gone that well at the two Dutch supervisors of financial institutions. Too much money has been billed to the institutions under supervision, which had to be corrected by the administrative judge in an appeal (while the Ministry of Finance and supervisors for years ignored the complaints of representative organisation that highlighted this excessive billing). Three banks have failed, not the least as the result of a strong monoculture at the prudential supervisor, DNB. And the AFM has shot bullets as well as blanks by using open norms on anything that moved. So with a Ministry of Finance that doesn't change any of this and just trusts those supervisors to continue doing their job well, we don't have to wonder why the Netherlands will be quite likely to soon face another financial crisis or failing bank. Perhaps the only positive thing that we can say for the Ministry of Finance is that at last, they have formulated some sort of vison on supervision 0.1, because so far it was the only Ministry in the Government that hadn't done its homework properly.
Yet,it might also be the case that the Ministry does not aim to steer policies by a proper structure, but by manning the supervisors with the proper President. It might be this choice that underlies the choice of the Ministry for Ronald Gerritsen, currenty it's own secretary-general, for the role of President of the Authority for Financial Markets (AFM). And similarly one might expect a choice for Kees van Dijkhuizen (former Treasury of the State, just as Wellink was), for the new boss at DNB. But let's not rush too much with my personal preference.
Apart from all the above, we have to be aware of the challenges for the successor of Wellink. The first one is that he (a she could not be found apparently) needs to work with an impossible governance structure in which a pigheaded Director of Supervision can committ the whole DNB-board without consulting them in advance. Second of all, the new President needs to be someone who is able to change the internal culture at DNB from a Kings-Court attitude to more street-wisdom. it must be someone that not just thinks, or prefers study of legal implications, but is also able and willing to act. So we are looking for a pro-active and inspiring leader, with sufficient political flexibility and insight.
Looking at the candidates it is obvious that not all of them are known to the public. Hoogduin, is an abstract macro-economic expert and doing very well in that role. But it is also clear that the analytical approach isn't suited to the public and staff: it's not the man to inspire staff with a warm / human vision and he appears to be less able in communicating simple messages to the public at large. In his way of work he is thus quite likely to condense problems into a set of mathematical equations of an economic logic, which dictate the outcome in the long run. Finally it is unknown whether his political antenna is sufficiently well tuned.
Kremers is the architect of the current supervisory (Twin Peaks) system. After his job at the Ministry of Finance (in the nineties), he joined IMF. From there he congratulated the Ministry with te well chosen twin peaks regulatory system. In fact, he thus complimented himself over a distance and this was quite embarrassing to watch. It is unclear what job he holds exactly at RBS, after the merger. He does fit the criterion however, that he used to work at the Ministry of Finance worked. And he will also be politcially versatile, though lacking in hands-on experience. He seems too self-involved in his mental ideas and recipes. Placing him in the chair of President of DNB, means that DNB gets a new version of a mastermind at the top who has an audience bowing for his great thoughts. It is exactly this symbiotic groupthink relationship between Wellink and his staff that needs to be changed and with Kremers, it seems unlikely that his unhealthy relationship between leader / staff will change. So Kremers is not the right candidate, although many may say he is the right man because of the increasing importance of avoiding systemic risk (and relationship with the IMF).
Finally, Kees van Dijkhuizen. He worked as the Dutch Treasurer and then at NIBC, which wasn't the most obvious choice as it was a bank in special circumstances and trouble (takeover by Kaupthing didn't succeed so NIBC is still in the hands of a a consortium of JC Flowers). He actually worked there in silence, introduced a new consumer savings account (NIBC Direct), to broaden its funding, and made some steps into expansion abroad. All are quite healthy and logical steps, and what appeals to me in this is the hands-on nature. Dijkhuizen, then, is the only candidate that demontrates his ability in hands-on management in both public and private sector, surrounded by complex political, macroeconomic and market dynamics. It seems to me that the richness and diversity of qualities you need to succeed as he does, are precisely the qualities that we require of the new president of DNB.
Henceforth my sincere advice and conclusion: van Dijkhuizen is the best man for the job!
The Minister trusts very strongly on the internal systems of checks and balances of De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the Authority for Financial Markets (AFM). Both supervisors are themselves responsible for the proper functioning of their internal governance, the legality of their expenditure, the execution of supervision and the determination of priorities and accents of their work.
I find the above quote highly interesting and surprising because things haven't gone that well at the two Dutch supervisors of financial institutions. Too much money has been billed to the institutions under supervision, which had to be corrected by the administrative judge in an appeal (while the Ministry of Finance and supervisors for years ignored the complaints of representative organisation that highlighted this excessive billing). Three banks have failed, not the least as the result of a strong monoculture at the prudential supervisor, DNB. And the AFM has shot bullets as well as blanks by using open norms on anything that moved. So with a Ministry of Finance that doesn't change any of this and just trusts those supervisors to continue doing their job well, we don't have to wonder why the Netherlands will be quite likely to soon face another financial crisis or failing bank. Perhaps the only positive thing that we can say for the Ministry of Finance is that at last, they have formulated some sort of vison on supervision 0.1, because so far it was the only Ministry in the Government that hadn't done its homework properly.
Yet,it might also be the case that the Ministry does not aim to steer policies by a proper structure, but by manning the supervisors with the proper President. It might be this choice that underlies the choice of the Ministry for Ronald Gerritsen, currenty it's own secretary-general, for the role of President of the Authority for Financial Markets (AFM). And similarly one might expect a choice for Kees van Dijkhuizen (former Treasury of the State, just as Wellink was), for the new boss at DNB. But let's not rush too much with my personal preference.
Apart from all the above, we have to be aware of the challenges for the successor of Wellink. The first one is that he (a she could not be found apparently) needs to work with an impossible governance structure in which a pigheaded Director of Supervision can committ the whole DNB-board without consulting them in advance. Second of all, the new President needs to be someone who is able to change the internal culture at DNB from a Kings-Court attitude to more street-wisdom. it must be someone that not just thinks, or prefers study of legal implications, but is also able and willing to act. So we are looking for a pro-active and inspiring leader, with sufficient political flexibility and insight.
Looking at the candidates it is obvious that not all of them are known to the public. Hoogduin, is an abstract macro-economic expert and doing very well in that role. But it is also clear that the analytical approach isn't suited to the public and staff: it's not the man to inspire staff with a warm / human vision and he appears to be less able in communicating simple messages to the public at large. In his way of work he is thus quite likely to condense problems into a set of mathematical equations of an economic logic, which dictate the outcome in the long run. Finally it is unknown whether his political antenna is sufficiently well tuned.
Kremers is the architect of the current supervisory (Twin Peaks) system. After his job at the Ministry of Finance (in the nineties), he joined IMF. From there he congratulated the Ministry with te well chosen twin peaks regulatory system. In fact, he thus complimented himself over a distance and this was quite embarrassing to watch. It is unclear what job he holds exactly at RBS, after the merger. He does fit the criterion however, that he used to work at the Ministry of Finance worked. And he will also be politcially versatile, though lacking in hands-on experience. He seems too self-involved in his mental ideas and recipes. Placing him in the chair of President of DNB, means that DNB gets a new version of a mastermind at the top who has an audience bowing for his great thoughts. It is exactly this symbiotic groupthink relationship between Wellink and his staff that needs to be changed and with Kremers, it seems unlikely that his unhealthy relationship between leader / staff will change. So Kremers is not the right candidate, although many may say he is the right man because of the increasing importance of avoiding systemic risk (and relationship with the IMF).
Finally, Kees van Dijkhuizen. He worked as the Dutch Treasurer and then at NIBC, which wasn't the most obvious choice as it was a bank in special circumstances and trouble (takeover by Kaupthing didn't succeed so NIBC is still in the hands of a a consortium of JC Flowers). He actually worked there in silence, introduced a new consumer savings account (NIBC Direct), to broaden its funding, and made some steps into expansion abroad. All are quite healthy and logical steps, and what appeals to me in this is the hands-on nature. Dijkhuizen, then, is the only candidate that demontrates his ability in hands-on management in both public and private sector, surrounded by complex political, macroeconomic and market dynamics. It seems to me that the richness and diversity of qualities you need to succeed as he does, are precisely the qualities that we require of the new president of DNB.
Henceforth my sincere advice and conclusion: van Dijkhuizen is the best man for the job!
11/01/2011
Eurocrisis part 3: brace for impact....?
Now that we entered the new decennium, we're still faced with some financing problems in the EU. This weeks auctions for government bonds of EU Member States are all in the news and the ECB keeps on repeating their mantra that they're only there for the small work (buying bonds as long as markets believe that that helps...) and that politicians are the only ones who can really face/solve the eurocrisis. So where do we stand with the political solution?
Essentially there is a deafening silence. China and Japan sooth the markets and EU by stating that they're ready to step in to buy EU bonds, but is that the solution that any politician would favour?
Basically all politicians are still fighting some old wars with partial solutions:
- focusing on limiting bonuses
- going for basel 3 and enhancements
- throwing in countercyclical buffers
- ensuring extra levys on banks with systemic risks
- making sure bond holders pay also when a bank fails.
The impact of the sum of the above political solutions on the market as a whole or on niches in the market is however unknown, less well understood but it remains in the end what matters. So what happens now is that politicians are steering the financial markets by looking in the rear view mirror and on ocassion some 5 working days ahead. They're putting the ECB in an awkward half political position and forcing the ECB to step out of its mandate to correct their own passiveness and ineffective behaviour.
We can only brace for impact now and hope that indeed there is some economic recovery that helps us in Europe out of the dip so that we can organise soft solutions in the coming years rather than make tough decisions right now. Yet, if politicians maintain their course on stiff and rigid rules for banks, there's not a lot of leeway and perspective on generating economic recovery and getting rid of the eurocrisis at all.
EU politicians essentially have to choose. If they want to save the euro, they need to postpone the international measures for banks just as many years as the US postponed introducing Basel 2. If they want both, they're ending up with badly financed EU-Member States, low revenue generating banks, no economic growth and a sell out of industries as well as EU-bonds to China.
My personal preference would be to postpone the generic scapegoating for banks so that they can be of help to recover from the crisis. Because right now politicians in Europe are really overshooting the post-crisis measures for banks in Europe, while undershooting the required measures for sustainable government finances. Which means that they are working towards creating a future where Europe is a museum with a lot of Chinese and Arab visitors.
UPDATE THURSDAY 13-morning: Apparantly the Spanish auction went well and there's relief all over the place. Also the Dutch Finance Minister announced that IMF may contribute to the EFSF fund some more. So there must be a lot of movement behind the screens to resolve the crisis. As for the amount to add to the fund... see the estimation of citigroup below:
UPDATE THURSDAY 13-afternoon: At the ECB press conference Q&A session this afternoon Trichet clearly outlines, in strong words that the ECB has delivered and will deliver its goal in Europe. He stresses that in fact it is up to the politicians to deliver the E of the EMU (stressing that he is delivering on the M). And he outlines that he finds the stability fund should be increased in terms of volume and use (quantity and quality).
Essentially there is a deafening silence. China and Japan sooth the markets and EU by stating that they're ready to step in to buy EU bonds, but is that the solution that any politician would favour?
Basically all politicians are still fighting some old wars with partial solutions:
- focusing on limiting bonuses
- going for basel 3 and enhancements
- throwing in countercyclical buffers
- ensuring extra levys on banks with systemic risks
- making sure bond holders pay also when a bank fails.
The impact of the sum of the above political solutions on the market as a whole or on niches in the market is however unknown, less well understood but it remains in the end what matters. So what happens now is that politicians are steering the financial markets by looking in the rear view mirror and on ocassion some 5 working days ahead. They're putting the ECB in an awkward half political position and forcing the ECB to step out of its mandate to correct their own passiveness and ineffective behaviour.
We can only brace for impact now and hope that indeed there is some economic recovery that helps us in Europe out of the dip so that we can organise soft solutions in the coming years rather than make tough decisions right now. Yet, if politicians maintain their course on stiff and rigid rules for banks, there's not a lot of leeway and perspective on generating economic recovery and getting rid of the eurocrisis at all.
EU politicians essentially have to choose. If they want to save the euro, they need to postpone the international measures for banks just as many years as the US postponed introducing Basel 2. If they want both, they're ending up with badly financed EU-Member States, low revenue generating banks, no economic growth and a sell out of industries as well as EU-bonds to China.
My personal preference would be to postpone the generic scapegoating for banks so that they can be of help to recover from the crisis. Because right now politicians in Europe are really overshooting the post-crisis measures for banks in Europe, while undershooting the required measures for sustainable government finances. Which means that they are working towards creating a future where Europe is a museum with a lot of Chinese and Arab visitors.
UPDATE THURSDAY 13-morning: Apparantly the Spanish auction went well and there's relief all over the place. Also the Dutch Finance Minister announced that IMF may contribute to the EFSF fund some more. So there must be a lot of movement behind the screens to resolve the crisis. As for the amount to add to the fund... see the estimation of citigroup below:
UPDATE THURSDAY 13-afternoon: At the ECB press conference Q&A session this afternoon Trichet clearly outlines, in strong words that the ECB has delivered and will deliver its goal in Europe. He stresses that in fact it is up to the politicians to deliver the E of the EMU (stressing that he is delivering on the M). And he outlines that he finds the stability fund should be increased in terms of volume and use (quantity and quality).
16/11/2010
Eurocrisis: elegant compromise to soften relations between EU and Ireland
I am just listening to the EU press conference of the Eurogroup. I was unable to fully listen to the start of the conference, but what I understand is that all parties involved stand ready to help out Ireland with their banking sector problem. And there would be short and intensive consultation on technical isses. In this way a compromise is reached between the stubborn Irish position (we don't want help as a government) and the EU Commission and ECB concerns (we need to help the Irish out, because their situation may become unsustainable).
Juncker says now: it's up to the Irish. We will help as the Eurogroup to be supportive. As far as the programma and consultations is concerned, the meetings will be with ECB, EC and IMF, so the Eurogroup will not be involved. There's even some humour between Juncker and Rehn now (in the treaty we trust - but the devil is in the details). Still the Commission will not disclose a specific amount of money/support that is considered.
Earlier in the conference, the EFSF boss outlined that he can raise funding in a couple of days. And he noted that there was considerable interest from Asian countries. So the Asians stand ready to help the Irish.
Juncker says now: it's up to the Irish. We will help as the Eurogroup to be supportive. As far as the programma and consultations is concerned, the meetings will be with ECB, EC and IMF, so the Eurogroup will not be involved. There's even some humour between Juncker and Rehn now (in the treaty we trust - but the devil is in the details). Still the Commission will not disclose a specific amount of money/support that is considered.
Earlier in the conference, the EFSF boss outlined that he can raise funding in a couple of days. And he noted that there was considerable interest from Asian countries. So the Asians stand ready to help the Irish.
21/05/2010
Politicians shut down the markets...
I am wondering lately: could things become even worse than having Greek butter on the head? This week we got the answer, and it was the German government that gave it to us by unilaterally introducing a prohibition on short-selling (as a response to financial markets developments). Because the Germans find it clear that those crooks at banks and financial markets are messing with us politicans and we will get back to them. Even the Dutch parliament followed that same line of reasoning today. And the stock markets in the US continued their nose dive.
I remember well that two years ago, at the beginning of the crisis, we were all afraid that politcians would overreact on the crisis. Well, we finally experience it now. With Lehman, it was the distrust between banks that lead to a frozen/absent market. But now, the mechanism is more direct. Politicians themselves shut down the markets and thus create an atmosphere of distrust and unease. Because the real killer for a market is politicians stepping in en messing with the trades directly. So at first we had a liquidity-crisis, then a trust-crisis, followed by a euro-crisis which now results in a political-financial crisis.
Things aren't proceeding that well this way. And all of that because essentially Merkel comes from Eastern Europa and hasn't learnt that well how financal markets work. It would be quite remarkable if, in the end, the 'communist system and upbringing' turns out to be responsible -in this indirect way- for the euro failing and for the end of eurocapitalism.....
I remember well that two years ago, at the beginning of the crisis, we were all afraid that politcians would overreact on the crisis. Well, we finally experience it now. With Lehman, it was the distrust between banks that lead to a frozen/absent market. But now, the mechanism is more direct. Politicians themselves shut down the markets and thus create an atmosphere of distrust and unease. Because the real killer for a market is politicians stepping in en messing with the trades directly. So at first we had a liquidity-crisis, then a trust-crisis, followed by a euro-crisis which now results in a political-financial crisis.
Things aren't proceeding that well this way. And all of that because essentially Merkel comes from Eastern Europa and hasn't learnt that well how financal markets work. It would be quite remarkable if, in the end, the 'communist system and upbringing' turns out to be responsible -in this indirect way- for the euro failing and for the end of eurocapitalism.....
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